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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is based on the premise that when speaker-hearers are 
involved in misunderstandings, they provide analysts of talk with valuable 
evidence of a process which is not normally amenable to direct investigation, 
namely, the process of 'successful communication'. A number of scholars, 
working independently from different disciplinary perspectives, have begun 
to investigate such evidence but there has been no systematic programme 
of research to determine either the structural characteristics of 
misunderstandings or the different types of misunderstandings which could 
occur in everyday interaction. 
In order to facilitate such a programme, a corpus of one hundred 
misunderstandings was collected by the diary method. As a first step 
towards analysing the corpus a communication model was developed in 
order to account for the salient structural characteristics of 
misunderstandings. Four major integral components were identified which 
provide an important source of evidence for establishing (i) that a 
misunderstanding has occurred, (ii) the extent, course and outcome of 
a misunderstanding and (iii). the type of misunderstanding which has 
occurred. The components are both 'textual', such as utterances, and 
'non-textual', such as understandings, and therefore enable the essential 
aspects of communication to be accommodated in the analysis. 
The fact that nineteen different types of misunderstandings were 
identified indicates the complexity of the phenomenon. The "process" 
analysis of the corpus and of additional data, drawn from the work of 
other researchers, shows that speaker-hearers are able to negotiate 
understanding by means of a number of devices'. In detailing these 
'devices' and the inter-relationship between them, it is suggested that 
the correct use of'devices' and the recognition of inappropriate responses 
are crucial communicative skills. The majority of misunderstandings are 
detected and resolved because speaker-hearers draw on these skills. 
Nevertheless, some misunderstandings are not resolved and these data 
emphasize how important it is that speaker-hearers utilize the resources 
available to them. By specifying what these resources might be, this thesis 
argues that successful communication requires highly complex, structured 
interaction in which the monitoring of understanding is of paramount 
importance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
1 
This thesis is based upon an investigation of the phenomenon of 
'misunderstandings' in conversations between native speaker-hearers of 
English. The aim of the thesis is to develop an analytic model which 
describes the structure of misunderstandings and to establish a typology 
which distinguishes between different types of misunderstandings, thereby 
contributing to our knowledge of how speaker-hearers communicate in 
everyday language use. 
A misunderstanding occurs when a communication attempt is unsuccessful 
because what the speaker intends to express differs from what the hearer 
believes to have been expressed. It is distinct from both correct 
understanding, where what the hearer believes to have been expressed is 
equivalent to what the speaker intended to express, and non-understanding, 
where the hearer has no understanding of what the speaker intended to 
express. Correct understanding is more common than misunderstanding or 
non-understanding but Fön a number of occasions such correct understanding 
is the consequence of careful negotiation between speaker-hearers who seek 
or offer clarification of what has been intended, said, heard or understood 
and who indicate or acknowledge problems in their communication attempts. 
Misunderstanding is sufficiently common for it not to be treated as 
an extraordinary occurrence by participants, who often recognize that a 
misunderstanding has occurred in their conversation and who are able to 
resolve it. Such a resolved misunderstanding may well become a source of 
amusement and/ or something to be recounted to others who were not 
participants. 
1. This is not always the case, however, and participants' 
failure to recognize that a misunderstanding has occurred sometimes results 
in hostility or confusion (Gumperz, 1982; Milroy, 1984). 
Misunderstandings are therefore a feature of conversation which 
affect the content and direction of the conversations in which they occur 
and which affect the behaviour and attitudes of the participants. As such, 
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they warrant study in line with other features of conversation, such as 
'side sequences' (Jefferson, 1972), 'openings' (Schegloff, 1968) or 
'closings' (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973). However, misunderstandings, unlike 
these sequential features, involve the negotiation of understanding. During 
the course of a misunderstanding participants often query and explain their 
utterances, thereby offering the analyst a means by which speaker intention 
and hearer understanding can be examined. If evidence can be provided of 
the ways in which speaker-hearers undertake communication, it becomes possible 
to analyse communication without total recourse to the analyst's intuitive 
interpretation of what speakers and hearers are doing when they communicate. 
The difficulty of gaining access to the cognitive processes of speakers 
and hearers, in terms of their intentions and understandings respectively, 
has impeded communication study. Direct observation is impossible. As 
Labov & Fanshel comment 
In general, we must admit that we are not inside the 
patient's mind, and we need all the help that we can 
muster in order to see what he understands by his 
expressions and what he intends others to understand 
(Labov & Fanshel, 1977: 120). 
The "help that we can muster"-comes from a number of sources: participants 
can provide commentaries, their utterances and the responses to them can 
be used as a basis for inferring what was going on, paralinguistic cues can 
indicate participants' attitudes and so on (Labov & Fanshel, 1977; Kreckel, 
1981; McGregor, 1983,1984,1985). Analytic decisions on the interpretation 
of these utterances and cues may rest with the analyst and although his 
intuition may be supported or supplemented by textual evidence, his interpretatior 
of the data may be only one of several possible interpretations (cf. 
Gumperz & Tannen, 1979; Gumperz, 1982). If one examines an exchange of 
utterances from the individual perspectives of each of the different 
participants, one may find that what the speaker intends of his utterance 
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may not be what the hearer understands of it and this may differ again 
from what an overhearer or analyst understands of it. A sound basis for 
interpreting utterances, intentions and understandings is provided by 
conversations which include participants' explanations of what was intended 
or what understood. These explanations are an intrinsic part of the 
conversation in which they are expressed and are likely to reflect the 
appropriate intentions and understandings of the participants more accurately 
than retrospective commentaries which might be unconsciously altered after 
consideration of the conversation. Such explanations are often found 
during misunderstandings. 
The use of examples of miscommunication as a step towards studying 
communication has previously been proposed (Zaefferer, 1977; Gumperz & 
Tannen, 1979; Stubbs, 1983). Discussing theoretical methodology, Stubbs 
makes the following suggestion : 
Rather than attempt to capture directly how people 
communicate, the researcher can concentrate on the 
problematic aspects of communication situations - 
points, for example, at which the communication 
breaks down or encounters difficulties. By looking 
at what happens when people fail to get the message 
across, at why this happens and at what speakers do 
in order to reinstate the normal smooth flow of 
interaction, one can gain insight into the routine 
structures of behaviour " 
(Stubbs, 1983: 241). 
This thesis seeks to provide such insight through the analysis of the 
structure of misunderstandings. In referring to "speakers", Stubbs may 
well be talking about "speaker-hearers". In this thesis, it is axiomatic 
that participants in the roles of both speaker and hearer strive to 
"reinstate the normal smooth flow of interaction". The hearer's role is 
given explicit prominence since it is the hearer who misunderstands and it 
is the hearer who listens to utterances based on or deriving from that 
misunderstanding before becoming the speaker who produces a resolving 
utterance (see Grimshaw's (1980) plea for according the hearer more attention). 
ýF 
Previous studies of misunderstandings have been undertaken from a 
number of different disciplinary-perspectives. Primarily sociolinguistic 
in orientation, these studies have variously focussed (i) on inter-ethnic 
and inter-dialectal misunderstandings (Gumperz, 1982; Gumperz & Tannen, 1979; 
Milroy, 1984; Milroy & McTear, 1983; Varonis & Gass, 1985), (ii) on 
interpretive procedures and participant roles (Schwartz, 1977; Grimshaw, 
1984) and (iii) on sequencing (Jefferson, 1972). In addition, a theoretical 
pragmatic study of how particular understandings, including misunderstandings, 
are reached (Zaefferer, 1977) and a discourse analysis model which is 
applied to a misunderstanding amongst other data (Burton, 1981) have been 
undertaken. These studies support the contention that the study of 
misunderstandings can offer insight into communicative behaviour in that 
they make it clear that participants do interactive work to resolve 
misunderstandings, are affected by misunderstandings and draw upon numerous 
sources of knowledge when communicating. 
There has been no detailed analysis of the structure of'misunderstandings 
in general although the structures of individual misunderstandings have 
been considered. In the absence of any systematic corpus-based analysis, 
examples of misunderstandings tend to be discussed on an ad hoc basis. 
This thesis attempts to identify the structural characteristics of misunder- 
standings and to provide a system of reference to misunderstandings. The 
analysis and classification of misunderstandings should indicate the scope 
of what is involved when misunderstandings occur. Classification is not 
mere listing; rather, "a classification of a set of objects is a system 
of reference for the objects together with rules for referring them to it" 
(Carvell & Svartvik, 1969: 29). The devising of a system of reference for 
the components of misunderstandings should be of use in subsequent work on 
the phenomenon and should provide insight into communicative processes which 
are not directly observable. 
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The analysis of misunderstandings is subject to the problems which 
beset the analysis of any spoken-discourse, such as data collection, 
determining relevant context and background knowledge, accounting for 
multi-functional utterances and accounting for cohesion and coherence in 
the discourse (see Coulthard, 1977; Stubbs, 19831 Brown & Yule, 1983 for 
discussion of these and other problems). An analysis of misunderstandings 
has to overcome the fundamental problem of handling both observable features, 
such as utterances, and features which cannot be observed, such as intentions 
and understandings. The analysis must therefore amalgamate 'textual' 
components, that is, components which are present in the transcribed text, 
and 'non-textual' components, that is, components which are not present in 
the transcribed text and which must be determined by consideration of 
the text. Utterances, paralinguistic cues and actions are textual components 
while intentions and understandings are non-textual components. Participants' 
understandings may change during the conversation and the analysis must 
account for such change. It cannot present a static view of, discourse 
with the participants appearing to be mere catalysts who have produced 
the discourse; the analysis must preserve the dynamism of interaction 
and must account for the participants as the positive creators of that 
interaction. 
Thus, in order to examine the structure of misunderstandings and to 
typologize them it is necessary to devise an analytic system. The prime 
concern of this thesis is the devising and application of such a system. 
Subsequently, the findings of the analysis and the typology will be used 
to show how participants undertake communication and how they negotiate 
understanding so that their communication attempts are successful. 
The thesis is organized in the following way : 
The first three chapters are concerned with establishing a methodology 
and a corpus. In Chapter I previous work on misunderstandings is discussed 
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and the context in which the research discussed in this thesis has been 
undertaken is established. Chapter II considers the problems of data 
collection and details the corpus on which this research is based. Chapter 
III discusses the problems of describing communicative behaviour, referring 
in particular to speaker's intention and hearer's understanding, and 
proposes a. moder of communication which incorporates these elements. 
Chapters IV, V, VI, VII and VIII are concerned with the analysis of the 
corpus. The analytic methodology is outlined in Chapter IV. This methodology 
draws on the proposed model of communication and enables the utterances, 
paralinguistic and extralinguistic features produced during a misunderstanding 
to be described. Two types of components are identified: (i) textual 
components, which can be checked against the text, such as utterances, and 
(ii) non-textual components which are recovered after consideration of the 
textual components, such as participants' understandings. 
Two primary textual components are identified: (i) origin, the 
utterance which is misunderstood and (ii) manifestation, the utterance 
which is based on or derives from the misunderstanding and manifests it in 
the conversation. These components are discussed and illustrated from the 
corpus in Chapter V. 
The utterances and features other than the origin and the manifestation 
during a misunderstanding constitute the secondary textual components, 
devices. Thirty devices are identified; they resolve or fail to resolve 
the misunderstanding. Each device is described and illustrated from the 
corpus in Chapter VI. 
The non-textual component which is identified is the state of 
realization of each participant, that is, whether or not each participant 
realizes, or is awarethat, the misunderstanding has occurred. Each participant's 
state of realization determines how he understands the conversation and 
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it therefore plays an important role in determining the structure of a 
misunderstanding. Realization-is discussed in Chapter VII, in which 
evidence for it and the ways by which it is effected are discussed. 
Chapter VIII discusses the structural sequences found in the corpus. 
Basic and diversified structures are identified, both of which can be 
expanded and interactively expanded. 
As a consequence of the analysis, a typology of misunderstandings is 
proposed in Chapter IX. This typology is based on participants' states of 
realization and it distinguishes nineteen types in the corpus. 
In order to test the adequacy of the analytic and typological methods, 
additional data are analysed and typologized in Chapter X. The data are 
drawn from the work of other researchers who have examined miscommunication. 
It is found that the model adequately handles the analysis of misunderstanding 
but that the typology requires revision. This revision involves presentation 
rather than criteria and it is easily accomplished. 
The analysis and typology of the corpus and additional data 
demonstrates that participants have the facility to detect and resolve 
misunderstandings. The specific range of devices which are available to 
them constitute a crucial facet of their communicative skills. The 
majority of misunderstandings are successfully dealt with but there are 
a number which are not realized or resolved. In these instances, participants 
have failed to use devices successfully, which suggests that participants 
communicate from their own perspectives and that if they are not able to 
consider how others are interpreting the conversation, their communication 
attempts may not succeed. The interactive negotiation which participants 
undertake can be highly complex and is indicative of a communicative 
procedure which participants can choose to adopt and execute in order to 
accomplish successful communication. 
CHAPTER I 
THE STUDY OF 'MISUNDERSTANDING' 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Miscommunication has been investigated from various disciplinary 
perspectives: ethnomethodological (Jefferson, 1972), sociolinguistic 
(Schwartz, 1977; Grimshaw, 1980,1982), linguistic/ sociolinguistic, 
specifically relating to inter-ethnic and inter-dialectal miscommunication 
(Gumperz, 1982; Gumperz & Tannen, 1979; Milroy. 1984; Milroy & McTear, 1983; 
Varonis & Gass, 1985) and pragmatic (Zaefferer, 1977). The hypothesis 
which underlies much research on miscommunication is that study of instances 
of miscommunication might yield insight into what happens when they do not 
occur, that is, when there is no breakdown in communication. Zaefferer 
(1977: 329), writing in terms of "understanding", in a theoretical pragmatic 
context, argues that the study of "misfunctions" gives more insight into a 
system. than the study of "examples of perfect functioning" and similarly 
Gumperz & Tannen (1979) comment that 
" by studying what has gone wrong when communication 
breaks down, we seek to understand a process that goes 
unnoticed when it is successful " 
(Gumperz & Tannen, 1979: 329). 
The hypothesis is not new. In sciences concerned with systems in which 
internal mechanism or structure is not directly observable it is common to 
concentrate on the output of these systems, particularly on defective 
output, as a means of determining how the systems are constructed and how 
they function. 
It is debatable whether a study of miscommunication in order to shed 
light on understanding is a feasible practice. Two particular problems 
impede such a study. Firstly, understanding is an unobservable process; 
Lyons (1977: 731) calls understanding a "cognitive act". It may well be 
that the process of misunderstanding is as opaque as that of understanding. 
The cause of a misunderstanding might seem apparent, such as lexical or 
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referential ambiguity, but the actual cognitive process by which the misunder- 
standing was made remains unobservable. Secondly, misunderstanding is not 
the converse of understanding. A misunderstanding is an understanding which 
happens to be incorrect and is distinct from non-understanding, where an 
utterance is not understood at all. 
Psychological research into the effects of ambiguity on sentence 
processing (e. g. Mackay, 1966; Foss, 1970; Carey et. al., 1970; Bever et. 
al., 1973) demonstrates that tasks involving ambiguous sentences take longer 
to complete or are completed less successfully than tasks involving. unambiguous 
sentences. When the subjects performing the experiments make errors in 
understanding sentences these errors are judged to be failures by the 
subjects because of processing difficulties caused by ambiguity or because 
of idiosyncratic responses by the subjects. The adoption of a simple 
polar model of understanding means that misunderstandings are seen as 
failure, like non-understanding, without there being any importance attached 
to the implications of such a failure, that is, the fact that it is 
understanding, which happens to be incorrect. Similarly, in discussions 
on the definition and testing of language comprehension (Freedle & Carroll, 
1972), reference to misunderstanding, as opposed to understanding and non- 
understanding, is minimal. 
Understanding is not absolute but admits degree, so that in partially 
understanding an utterance one might actually understand it sufficiently 
correctly to know what the speaker intended his utterance to mean. Alternatively 
a partial understanding might result in the hearer misunderstanding an 
utterance, if the part which he has failed to understand correctly has been 
misunderstood rather than not understood at all. Garrett (1974), in 
presenting hypotheses about the order of sentence processing, offers a 
characterization of comprehension which allows that partial understanding 
is frequently sufficient and he acknowledges that comprehension errors occur. 
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Attempts to quantify understanding have been unsuccessful on the whole. 
Mistler-Lachman (1972: 614) argues that measurement of comprehension has 
not been successfully achieved and that the various attempts to do so "are 
comparable only if one presupposes a unitary form of comprehension -a 
specific and fixed goal, as it were, achievement of which can be fixed like 
a fifty-yard dash". 
It is possible that the quantification of understanding can most 
profitably be attempted through the study of conversations in which 
understanding is discussed and negotiated, that is, in conversations in 
which misunderstandings occur. The quantification of understanding could 
be achieved by an assessment of the correlation between what the speaker 
intends and what the hearer understands of the speaker's utterance. If 
the speaker makes one or more attempts to amend the hearer's understanding 
it can be assumed that the hearer has not understood correctly and that he 
is guided towards a correct understanding. The utterances which the speaker 
and the hearer exchange during this guiding process provide-evidence for 
the analyst of how correct understanding is reached. 
Although the study of misunderstandings is unlikely to add insight 
into the cognitive process of understanding, it is the contention of this 
thesis that the study of misunderstandings can add insight into the 
communicative process whereby a speaker endeavours to ensure that a hearer 
shares his understanding of an utterance produced by that speaker. This 
thesis focusses on the structure of misunderstandings as a means by which 
the communicative process may be studied. In the following section previous 
work on misunderstandings is reviewed and it will be seen that to date there 
has been no systematic investigation of the structure of misunderstandings. 
In Section 3 the definition of misunderstanding which is adopted in this 
thesis is discussed. 
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2. TREATMENT OF 'MISUNDERSTANDING' 
The study of defective output has been successfully undertaken by 
researchers working on speech error data (e. g. the papers in Fromkin, 1973, 
1980 which detail mistakes made by language users and discuss the 
implications for theories of language structure and processing). According 
to Fromkin (1973: 4+) speech error data "provide us with a 'window' into 
linguistic mental processes" and this is borne out by the relationships 
drawn between performance errors and conjectured language processing 
procedures, which offer interesting models of how a language user's 
'competence' might be structured. The language user is mostly taken to be 
a speaker rather than a hearer. 
Speech perception is not entirely neglected. Goldstein (1980) discusses 
bias and asymmetry in speech percgtion and proposes that listeners make 
use of bias to narrow down alternative hypotheses when processing a signal, 
arguing (1980: 259) that "Errors in perception are simply hypotheses that 
happened to be incorrect". Since it is currently impossible to verify 
whether or not language users do make subconscious choices between various 
possible interpretations of what they hear, such an argument is necessarily 
inconclusive. 
Nevertheless, the argument for choice has been put forward in respect 
of misunderstanding by Zaefferer (1977). He explains interpretation as 
being a choice of readings, explanations for which can be provided by 
decision analysis; a misunderstanding is therefore an incorrect reading 
choice. The assumptions regarding the pay-off matrix in the decision 
analysis are presumably made on the basis of the analyst's intuition and 
could therefore vary considerably depending on which analyst establishes 
them. Furthermore, decision analysis cannot explain why a particular 
interpretation is made but can merely indicate possible reasoning which 
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the hearer might have undertaken in order to arrive at the particular 
interpretation he made. Decision analysis is also favoured by Davidson 
(1974,1975) but while his argument for the importance of belief in the 
interpretation of utterances is valid, his view that decision analysis 
offers an acceptable means of accounting for the beliefs of speakers and 
hearers is less convincing. 
Decision analysis cannot substantiate the claim that speech interpretation 
error is caused by incorrect choice. Though unverifiable, it remains 
possible to attribute perception error to incorrect choice because 
perception and interpretation are very different processes. 
Garnes & Bond (1980), discussing the appropriateness of using error 
data to shed light on speech perception amongst other linguistic phenomena, 
consider the behaviour of listeners when confronted with anomolous sentences 
in experiments : 
" When listeners cannot make sense of what they hear, 
their typical reaction is to question the reader, 'Did 
you say ?' There are, however, different kinds of 
data that show that hearers may instead attempt to 
reinterpret what they hear and actually attempt to 
process their misperceptions " 
(Garnes & Bond, 1980: 232). 
Whether or not the lexical switch from 'listener' to 'hearer' is intentional, 
it indicates the difference between perception of a signal and the 
subsequent processing, that is, understanding of it. 
This distinction between perception and understanding is vitally 
important and failure to appreciate it can result in over-simplification 
of what is happening, particularly in respect of errors. Celce-Murcia 
(1980) discusses the causes of some misperceptions and she goes on to 
attribute misunderstandings to these misperceptions but her scope remains 
limited to speech perception rather than understanding and thus she fails 
to attach any importance to the difference between possible factors in 
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'slips of the ear' in her list of causes of misperceptions (1980: 207). 
For example, factor (1), "Phonological misperception of consonant and vowel 
segments", is very different from factor (7), "Misperception based on the 
listener's current preoccupations". It is quite possible that the hearer 
in (7) could have perceived the signal correctly but because of his current 
preoccupations he does not understand it as the speaker intended it to be 
understood. 
Misperception may cause or contribute to a misunderstanding but not 
vice versa since perception precedes understanding. Misperception and 
misunderstanding do not necessarily co-occur. Misperception is a hearing 
problem or a problem in the processing of a signal once it is heard while 
misunderstanding is a problem in the interpretation of that signal. As 
with errors in production, perception errors can be matched against the 
correct expression. Thus it is possible to distinguish between correct and 
incorrect production as evidenced by, for example, "weak and feeble - feak 
and weeble" (Fromkin, 1973: 15) and between correct and incorrect perception, 
provided that a listener reports a misperception correctly, such as "speaker 
produced fuel flask, listener perceived field Glasses" (Browman, 1980: 213). 
One might assume that the hearer would not understand the utterance 
containing the phrase 'fuel flask', given the incongruity of what was 
actually perceived, 'field glasses'. However, the hearer could achieve 
an understanding of the misperceived utterance if ambiguity or contextual 
or situational support made the misperception comprehensible. 
2. In 
such a case, however, the hearer correctly understands what he has heard; 
he has not, however, correctly understood what the speaker actually uttered 
nor what the speaker intended. Distinction between understanding and 
misunderstanding is thus less easily drawn than distinction between perception 
and misperception. 
Failure to hear correctly could be a contributory factor in the occurrence 
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of a misunderstanding but the two errors should be treated separately. A 
misunderstanding may occur when a participant has-incorrectly heard either 
some part or the whole of an utterance. If this mishearing is realized 
and acknowledged and a clarification or repeat is sought, by the use of 
such formulae as "Pardon? ". "What did you say? ", "I didn't catch that" and 
so on, it is not a misunderstanding. If the person who misheard the utterance 
interprets that mishearing, believing it to be correct, and continues 
the conversation under this belief, it is a misunderstanding. Mishearing 
can thus result in misunderstanding. Goffman (1976: 296) makes a structural 
distinction between the two which gives the impression that they are not 
connected : 
" The structural difference between an unhearing and a 
misunderstanding is to be found in terms of how the 
difficulty gets corrected. With unhearings the 
recipient signals there is trouble; with 
misunderstandings, the speaker " 
Even if a hearer has failed to hear an entire utterance he may believe he 
knows what the utterance expressed and he may respond accordingly. The 
correction or signalling of the trouble depends on whether the speaker or 
the hearer realize that it has happened and depending on the progress of 
the conversation could be done by either speaker or hearer. Goffman's 
example of a misunderstanding could well be due to mishearing : 
" Doctor :: Have you had a history of cardiac arrest 
in your family ? 
Patient : We never had no trouble with the police " 
(Goffman, 1976: 295, from Shuy). 
The misunderstanding here could be caused by the patient's unfamiliarity 
with medical terminology but it could equally well be caused by mishearing, 
that is, failing to hear "cardiac". 
Grimshaw (1980) uses the term 'mishearing' for failing to understand 
correctly, called 'misunderstanding' in this thesis. The term 'Misunderstanding' 
is reserved for anti-understanding by Grimshaw (1980: 36); anti-understanding 
15 
occurs when, having understood an utterance correctly, one chooses to 
respond as though it had not been understood correctly, which is intentionally 
misunderstanding. Grimshaw discusses a taxonomy of outcomes of 
communicative events which provides the following outcomes : nonhearing, 
understood as intended, non (or partial or ambiguous) understanding, 
mishearing and Misunderstanding (that is, intentional misunderstanding). 
The criteria which distinguish mishearing (that is, misunderstanding) from 
the others are firstly that the hearer is confident of having correctly 
heard and interpreted the speaker's utterance and secondly, that the 
hearer has the linguistic capacity to understand the utterance correctly, 
that is, should know the meaning of the constituents and so on. Grimshaw 
has difficulty in determining the outcomes for some of his data : "Five 
and six represent cases of partial understanding ... that shade off into 
mishearing. Both could also be read as Misunderstanding" (1980: 49). "Five" 
and "six" are constructed data and therefore lack situation, context, 
intention and so on, all of which might guide the analyst. 
In a subsequent paper, Grimshaw (1982) subjects an episode of naturally 
occurring conversation in which he is a participant to an adaptation of 
Labov & Fanshel's (1977) comprehensive discourse analysis. In addition, 
he elicits comments from one of the two other participants. In spite of 
the extra resources upon which he draws (his own ethnographic knowledge, 
his participation, commentary from another participant), Grimshaw is not 
able to determine exactly what the episode is "about" and which communicative 
outcome ensues. He nevertheless makes some instructive observations 
(1982: 20) : (i) that "those involved appeared to be talking at cross- 
purposes"(t'lAat at least two of the participants were not aware that there 
was any problem in understanding, (iii) that the "impasse" was not resolved 
and (iv) that "even minimal 'sense' could be made out of the exchange 
only by recourse to deeper and deeper examination of a number of contextual 
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dimensions" (1982: 20). Thus participants are not themselves troubled by a 
miscommunication which subsequently cannot be understood, even with the 
benefit of hindsight. 
Grimshaw provides a very detailed analysis of the episode but he 
acknowledges that his analysis has limitations : 
The expansions in the appended text are tentative and 
the characterizations of interactional moves even 
more-subject to challenge. It is not clear, in short, 
that an analyst can confidently claim to understand 
either "what has been said" or "what was done" in 
the colloquy (of the participants) 
(Grimshaw, 1982: 22). 
The fact that the analysis cannot explain the datum is one major problem. 
The fact that Grimshaw is unable to place the communicative nonsuccess within 
his taxonomy is another : 
" None of the participants in this episode has Misunderstood. 
Neither have they, however, understood as intended, partially 
understood, or misheard- misread (as I use those terms) 
(Grimshaw, 1982: 23). 
Grimshaw is quick to point out the shortcomings of his taxonomy (imprecise, 
nonexclusive, nonexhaustive, abstract) but suggests that attempts to refine 
the taxonomy and to analyse discourse so that there are no competing 
interpretations should develop successfully as comparative testing and 
validation become available. 
Grimshaw's distinctions between partial understanding, mishearing and 
Misunderstanding seem difficult to apply. It is possible that he has tried 
to be too specific. By assigning indeterminate illocutionary force and 
different levels of knowledge to partial or nonunderstanding and problems 
with signals and defeasibilities such as shortcomings in capacity or attention 
to mishearings ('misunderstandings' in this thesis), he focusses on the cause 
rather than the outcome. It might be easier to distinguish between the 
lr 
different types of miscommunication if one were to focus instead on whether 
the hearer suspects nonsuccess, knows nonsuccess is the outcome or does not 
know that nonsuccess is the outcome ; indeeed, one of the criteria for 
mishearing (misunderstanding) is that the hearer believes he has correctly 
heard and interpreted the utterance. This erroneous belief may be in 
respect of an utterance of indeterminate illocutionary force which Grimshaw 
seems to restrict to partial or nonunderstanding. 
Grimshaw's attempts to deal with communicative nonsuccess and to 
analyse an actual example of nonsuccess, together with his forthrightness 
about the difficulties he encounters are praiseworthy. To offset the fact 
that in spite of detailed analysis he cannot resolve to his own satisfaction 
the overall problem of "what is going on", he is able to establish (i) that 
participants may gradually become aware of nonsuccess, (ii) that not all 
participants may neceesarily become aware of nonsuccess and (iii) that the 
resolving of nonsuccess is often a complex task which may be subject to 
considerations such as the importance which participants attach to the 
conversation and so on. 
X 
The work of the ethnomethodologists is primarily concerned with 
patterns in the organization of conversation and with specific sequences 
within conversation. Jefferson (1972), dealing with the issue of whether 
or not participants resolve misunderstandings, investigates the procedures 
by which participants handle errors in conversations. Jefferson argues that 
the sequences which she isolates have an orderliness which suggests that 
they are rule-governed. One of the "side sequences" which she details 
(1972: 3(y+) is a 'misapprehension sequence' in which "there is a statement of 
sorts, a misapprehension of sorts and a clarification of sorts : (s) - (m)- 
(c)". The option to clarify is the clarifier's when it is he who shows the 
(m) has occurred, the (m) being open to other interpretations, and is the 
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(m)-speaker's when the (m)-speaker shows that (s) needs to be clarified, 
thus obliging the (s)-speaker to clarify his utterance. These two options 
refer to different conversational problems for the participants : the first 
is a misunderstanding in the sense used in this thesis, a failure to 
understand an utterance correctly; the second is a request for clarification 
or a signal that something in (s) is not correct or cannot be interpreted, 
which effectively enables the participants to avoid a potential misunderstanding. 
Adjacency between the three utterances, (s) - (m) - (c), is implied 
and indeed if they were not adjacent the notion of 'side sequence' would be 
lost because the metatopic it constitutes would be integrated with the 
overall topic. However, the hearer's response which manifests his misunderstand- 
ing of the speaker's utterance could occur several utterances and/ or 
speaker turns after the original misunderstood utterance ; clarification 
could follow at an indeterminate number of utterances and speaker turns 
later. This clarification could be undertaken by more than one participant 
and could extend through more than one utterance and/ or turn. The extent 
of a misunderstanding could thus be potentially greater and more complex 
than (s) - (m) - (c). 
Jefferson does not intend the three parts of her 'misapprehension 
sequence' to be definitive and she names them "for convenience", the names 
being "a way to handle them readily" (1972: 304. This is unfortunate because 
by not defining "misapprehension" she risks talking about different, though 
related, phenomena as one phenomenon; 'misunderstanding', 'misapprehension' 
and 'no comprehension are used inter-changeably. Having difficulty in 
understanding an utterance differs from incorrectly understanding an utterance 
which also differs from not having any understanding of an utterance, 
although all three are communication problems which participants have the 
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capacity to resolve and all three may well involve sequences within the 
conversation. 
In subsequent work on errors and their repair (Jefferson, 1974; 
Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks, 1977) only production errors are discussed, 
such as the use of the wrong word, the inability to identify a referent, the 
inability to express a proposition clearly and so on. These are inevitably 
recognized as errors by the speaker, who corrects himself, or by the hearer, 
who expresses his difficulty in making sense by a question or by otherwise 
drawing attention to the 'trouble source' ; in other words, a misunderstanding 
is avoided because the hearer is aware that he is having trouble with the 
utterance expressed by the speaker. The adjacency between 'trouble source' 
and repair or request for repair is unlikely to be found in misunderstandings 
where the hearer's utterance which manifests his misunderstanding separates 
what is misunderstood, the 'trouble source', from the repair of any error in 
it or problem caused by it. The utterance by the hearer which manifests his 
misunderstanding of the speaker's utterance could also be considered a 
'trouble source' as it is an inappropriate response to the speaker's utterance. 
When the 'trouble source' is the hearer's utterance it could be repaired in 
the next utterance but presumably only rarely by the hearer himself. 
Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks's (1977) argument that self-correction 
predominates over other-correction is unlikely to be borne out by instances 
where 'self', the hearer, does not know he has made an error without being 
given some indication of this by 'other', the speaker. 
Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks (1977) distinguish between 'initiation' 
and 'outcome' of repair, discussing techniques by which initiation draws 
attention to the error and prompts a repair of it. In misunderstandings, 
the error could also be the initiation in that the inappropriacy of the 
hearer's response could initiate repair without additional comments. 
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Alternatively, the exchange of utterances subsequent to the hearer's utterance 
could be the initiation, ranging from the question/ exclamation "What? " 
to an elaboration of the response during the course of which the misunder- 
standing becomes apparent. Outcome of production errors is restricted to 
success or failure but in errors of understanding a number of outcomes are 
concurrently possible. If the misunderstanding is corrected for two out of 
three participants the outcome is both a success and a failure. 
The sociolinguist Schwartz (1977) is similarly concerned with the 
sequencing of misunderstandings and also with the ways in which misunderstand- 
ings are detected and resolved. Schwartz, however, offers a definition of 
misunderstanding which raises a number of questions : "By 'misunderstanding' 
I mean an interpretive error that is discovered by its maker at least two 
utterances after it is made" (1977, in 1978: 3). This definition raises a 
number of questions which Schwartz fails to answer. Is the 'maker' of a 
misunderstanding the one whose utterance is misunderstood or the one who 
misunderstands it? In what way is it discovered' - is it the realization 
that it has occurred or is it the admission of its occurrence in the 
conversation? When is 'two utterances after it is made'? When, indeed, 
is a misunderstanding made - after the utterance has been expressed or 
simultaneously on hearing it? Why should 'two utterances' be significant? 
As a result of limiting himself to one datum, Schwartz can claim that 
'utterance', 'reply' and 'correction' follow successively and that a 
misunderstanding is discovered in a certain order, namely, by the speaker 
first and then by the hearer when the speaker corrects him. This order 
need not necessarily be the only one: it is quite possible that a hearer 
realizes that he has misunderstood an utterance before the speaker of that 
utterance realizes the misunderstanding has occurred. The hearer may have 
realized the misunderstanding's occurrence in the light of utterances 
subsequent to the one misunderstood, in which case the sequence of utterance, 
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reply and correction is broken by other utterances. 
Schwartz indicates that failure to share an interpretation of an 
utterance is not necessarily a misunderstanding, thereby adding another 
dimension to the problem of distinguishing between misunderstanding and 
other interpretation problems. He makes the interesting observation that 
there is a communicative skill in dealing with a misunderstanding as a 
misunderstanding : 
"A hearer interpreting a remark's meaning differently than 
its producer, and the hearer showing the producer this, 
doth not, by itself, a misunderstanding make. Conversationalists 
may not treat this as a technical or linguistic difficulty, 
but as a political, moral, or psychological one ... Treating something as a misunderstanding, then, is as 
much an interpretive accomplishment of speaker-hearers 
as treating something as a joke or story " 
(Schwartz, 1977, in Schwartz, 1978: 19). 
Schwartz's theoretical discussion of misunderstanding indicates what is 
involved in this interpretive accomplishment in respect of one misunderstanding 
only. By extensively commenting on the three utterances which comprise his 
datum and by drawing on other examples he discusses the procedures which the 
participants undertake in order to detect the misunderstanding and to resolve 
it. The commentary is specific to the one datum and does not conclusively 
support the theoretical arguments which Schwartz puts forward. 
The idea that treating a conversation phenomenon such as misunderstanding 
as an interpretive accomplishment is supported by the work of researchers of 
inter-ethnic and inter-dialectal misunderstandings (Gumperz, 1982; Gumperz 
& Tannen, 1979; Milroy, 1984; Milroy & McTear, 1983; Varonis & Gass, 1985). 
The data in these studies are drawn from actual conversations and are 
subjected to detailed interpretation. 
Gumperz (1982) and Gumperz & Tannen (1979) investigate discourse 
strategies by using data from actual conversations in which communication 
is not successful. The object of their research is to determine the 
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sociocultural knowledge which speaker-hearers draw on in conversation. 
The miscommunications which they discuss all "involve mistaken judgements 
of others' conversational intent" (Gumperz & Tannen, 1979: 321). These 
judgements tend to be attitudinal and are mostly due to inter-cultural 
differences between speakers and hearers. The fact that the judgements are 
mistaken is detected retrospectively by the participants and by commentators. 
Gumperz & Tannen (1979) are not primarily concerned with understanding ; 
they investigate the causes of miscommunication and the sociocultural 
and linguistic knowledge which would enable each type of miscommunication 
to be avoided. 
Milroy (1984) and Milroy & McTear (1983) are similarly concerned with 
the causes and consequences of breakdowns in communication. Their examples 
are drawn from speaker-hearers who have different dialectal backgrounds 
because the "internal grammars" of such speaker-hearers are assumed to 
differ, thus enabling the role of "linguistic knowledge in comprehension" 
to be assessed (Milroy, 1984: 7-8). 
The following specification of miscommunication is given : "A 
miscommunication may be said to take place when there is a mismatch between 
the speaker's intention and the hearer's interpretation" (Milroy, 1984: 8). 
The speaker's intention is not limited to any one utterance and the 
miscommunication can therefore presumably be in respect of a larger part 
of the conversation than one particular utterance or in respect of what 
could be called social motives rather than intended propositions. The 
consequences of the misunderstandings discussed are primarily attitudinal. 
The question of how breakdowns in communication are rectified is not 
pursued. Milroy (1984)'does, however, make a distinction between 
"misunderstandings", which involve differences in speaker-hearers' semantic 
analyses of an utterance and which do not interrupt the conversation's 
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flow, and "Communicative breakdown", which happens when participants are 
aware that "something has gone wrong" in the conversation. This distinction 
is important in terms of the'structure of misunderstandings since Milroy's 
"misunderstandings" are not separate entities within conversation whereas her 
"communicative breakdowns" are. 
"From both an applied linguistic and sociolinguistic viewpoint, Varonis 
& Gass (1985) discuss miscommunication between native and non-native speakers. 
They argue that in addition to having different language systems, a lack 
of shared belief space can cause communication problems. They suggest 
seven ways in which participants can behave after there has been a lack of 
understanding and they illustrate each of these with actual data. The 
seven ways in which participants can behave are as follows : 
1. Immediate recognition of problem but no comment. 
2. Immediate recognition of problem and makes comment. 
3. Later recognition of problem but no comment. 
4. Later recognition of problem and makes comment. 
5. Recognition after conversation but no comment. 
6. Recognition after converaation and makes comment. 
7. No recognition. " 
(Varonis & Gass, 1985: 328). 
These provide a valuable guide to the possible outcomes of misunderstanding 
but the distinction between "immediately" and "later" is not clearly drawn. 
From the examples given, "immediate" recognition of a communication problem 
is made when the next speaker produces an utterance which comments on or 
corrects the problem and which is adjacent to the utterance which has 
manifested the problem. "Later" recognition is made when the next speaker 
pauses before producing his comment or correction; in the example of 
"later" recognition, the correcting utterance is similarly adjacent to the 
utterance which has manifested the problem. It is possible that within a 
conversation a comment or correction could occur "later" in the sense that 
a number of other utterances and / or speaker turns elapse between the 
utterance which manifests the problem and the correction of it. 
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Varonis & Gass (1985) analyse an "extended misunderstanding" between 
a native and a non-native speaker in a telephone service encounter. Their 
analysis considers the participants' beliefs about the conversation, the 
differences between their goals and the correlation between the confidence 
of each participant in his/ her interpretation and the correctness/ incorrectness 
of that interpretation. Although a "heuristic" for explaining participants' 
confidence in their interpretations is offered, there is no explicit account 
of how the analyst assesses participants' beliefs and goals, nor of how 
confidence in interpretation is actually determined and corroborated. 
Not all the utterances in the datum are given accuracy/ confidence coding; 
two are given the code "NC" ("Not coded"), perhaps because they are deemed 
incidental to the miscommunication. The datum is very complex, with one 
participant changing goals five times and the other misunderstanding 
eleven times. Varonis & Gass make a number of important points as a 
result of their analysis : (i) native speakers and non-native speakers 
have particular problems in communicating, (ii) conversing in accordance 
with the Co-Operative Principle and turn-taking conventions does not 
necessarily result in understanding, (iii) participants use "negotiation 
routines in which one interlocutor indicates difficulty with the interpretation 
of another's utterance" (1985: 341) and (iv) when meaning is not negotiated 
between native and non-native speakers their conversation is prone to 
problems. 
Zaefferer (1977), from a theoretical pragmatic viewpoint, focusses on 
' the cause of misunderstanding. He offers a formal definition which 
incorporates context, the environment in which the utterance is situated : 
"A person I has misunderstood or has an incorrect 
understanding (with respect to language L) of some sound 
event SE in context C if and only if there are states 
of affairs SA1, Cl such that 
1 SE has occurred 
2C holds 
3 SA holds because SE counts in C as 
bringing about SA (according to L), 
2S 
(4) I believes (i 
(ii 
(iii 
(5) SA is not the 
(Zaefferer, 1977: 331-2). 
that (ý), 
that C.. -holds , that SA1 holds because SE 
coints in Cl as bringing about 
SA (according to L), and 
same as SA " 
According to this definition a misunderstanding occurs when a hearer, ('I'), 
has an incorrect belief about the context in which an utterance is expressed. 
A particular state of affairs automatically holds if it is brought about 
by a sound event in a particular context. A hearer could not therefore 
misunderstand a sound event if he believed the context to be the context 
which actually obtained at the time of the sound event. 'Context' is not 
explained, although the burden of the definition rests on it. One has 
to assume that it refers to constraints which restrict an utterance to a 
particular meaning in a particular spatio-temporal location. It seems 
possible that a hearer can correctly believe what context holds but 
nevertheless misunderstand an utterance. 
In the one other work relating to misunderstanding which is cited in 
the Introduction to this thesis, (Burton, 1981), an example of misunderstanding 
is subjected to discourse analysis but there is no discussion of the datum 
as a misunderstanding. The analysis is discussed below in Chapter III 
in which methods of discourse analysis are considered. - 
A number of points emerge from the studies of misunderstandings 
discussed above : (i) misunderstandings tend to display a particular 
sequence, viz. the misunderstood utterance is followed by an utterance 
based on the misunderstanding which is followed by a correction of the 
misunderstanding (Jefferson, 1972; Schwartz, 1977), (ii) misunderstandings 
tend to be resolved immediately and if they are not then they tend not to 
be resolved at all (Jefferson, 1972; Schwartz, 1977), (iii) if 
misunderstandings are not resolved then the consequences may be hostility or 
confusion (Gumperz & Tannen, 1979; Milroy, 1984; Varonis & Gass, 1985), 
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(iv) misunderstandings may not be noticed by. participants at the time of 
the conversation in which they occur (Grimshaw, 1982; Varonis & Gass, 1985) 
and (v) the detecting and resolving of misunderstandings are communicative 
skills (Jefferson, 1972; Schwartz, 1977; Grimshaw, 1982; Varonis & Gass, 
1985). 
These points support the contention that misunderstandings warrant 
detailed study. A systematic corpus-based approach is adopted in this 
thesis in order to detail the structure and to determine the types of 
misunderstandings. The typology presented in Chapter IX. of this thesis 
is not the first typology of misunderstandings. Zaefferer's (1977) typology 
is determined by cause while Grimshaw (1980; 1982) gives a typology of the 
outcomes of communicative nonsuccesses, of which one type is misunderstanding 
in the sense used in this thesis, that is, failure to understand correctly. , 
The main problem in using cause as a typological criterion (Zaefferer, 
1977) is that isolation of the cause of a misunderstanding may be dependent 
on the analyst's intuition. Participants may discuss their misunderstandings 
and may explain why they believe they occurred but they do not always do so. 
Zaefferer discusses the levels of interpretation at which misunderstandings 
occur (phonological, syntactical, semantical and situational) ; in effect, 
these levels are linked to the causes of each misunderstanding. Zaefferer 
stresses that the typology is idealized and theoretical and he comments 
of his potential types V Whether all of them may actually occur depends 
partly on the way the used notions are made precise" (1977.: 335). A 
typology which is empirical and data-based ought to be able to specify 
which types occur. The "notions" should necessarily be precise because 
they emanate from analysis of actual data. Rather than developing Zaefferer's 
work by empirically examining the causes of misunderstandings, this thesis 
addresses itself to the structure of misunderstandings. 
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The starting point for a corpus based study of misunderstandings is 
the determination of what constitutes a misunderstanding and what criteria 
will be applied in respect of the inclusion of data in a corpus. The 
following section outlines such criteria and provides a definition of 
misunderstanding which is adopted hereafter. 
3. A DEFINITION OF 'MISUNDERSTANDING' 
A first distinction is made between linguistic and non-linguistic 
misunderstandings. This thesis requires language to be involved, as 
opposed to a misunderstanding in which language is not involved. 
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Distinction can then be made between misunderstandings involving spoken 
and written language. The misunderstandings with which this thesis is 
concerned are specifically those which involve spoken language. 
a 
The corpus is limited to conversation between native speakers of 
English who have little or no dialectal variation. 
4. 
This is in contrast 
with the work of, for example, Milroy (1984) or Varonis & Gass (1985), 
which focusses on cross-dialectal and inter-ethnic misunderstandings, that 
is, those between speaker-hearers whose "internal grammars are different 
in some specifiable way" (Milroy, 198LF: 7). Interaction between such 
participants, as between native and foreign participants, is usually marked. 
Misunderstandings between such participants could be due to syntactic, 
semantic and cultural errors as a result of incomplete knowledge of each 
other's language or dialect and environment. Misunderstandings also occur 
between participants who share languages and dialects and whose "internal 
grammars" may be presumed to be very similar ; it is to these misunderstandings 
that this thesis is addressed. 
A requirement of the corpus is that at least two participants must 
be involved, a speaker and a hearer. Zaefferer (1977) does not impose such' 
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a restriction, arguing that a person can misunderstand his own utterance : 
it is quite possible for a person to misunderstand his 
own utterance. This may be due either to wrong beliefs 
about the language he is using (if he knows only a little 
Italian, he may think, having just uttered 'Fa caldo: ' 
that he has stated that it is cold, whereas he has stated 
that it is hot), or to his not noticing a misperformance 
on his side " 
(Zaefferer, 1977: 332). 
This argument is of dubious validity. The speaker understands his utterance 
but fails to appreciate that he has not expressed it correctly. An incorrect 
assumption by a speaker about his utterance is not a misunderstanding of it. 
In this thesis a misunderstanding occurs when a hearer, H, incorrectly 
understands a proposition expressed by a speaker, S, in an utterance in 
interactive conversation where S and H are native speakers (the term 
'proposition' is discussed below in Chapter III). It is further required 
that the hearer manifests his incorrect understanding in an utterance in 
the conversation subsequent to the misunderstood utterance of the speaker. 
This requirement is essential because without such an utterance by the 
hearer, there is no evidence that a misunderstanding has occurred, although 
subsequent utterances might suggest its occurrence. The requirement also 
rules out data in which the hearer thinks he might have misunderstood or 
is aware of a possible problem in the understanding of the utterance; 
rather than believing his understanding is correct, the hearer queries the 
utterance or his understanding of it and thus avoids a potential 
misunderstanding. 
Intentional misunderstandings by the hearer, for joke purposes, 
exploit the phenomenon of misunderstandings and exhibit the same structure. 
Intentional misunderstandings are not, therefore, excluded from the corpus. 
Misunderstandings of arguments and concepts are not included in the 
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corpus. Negotiation of the understanding of ideas differs from negotiation 
of the understanding of the propositions expressed in utterances ; one can 
correctly understand the proposition expressed in an utterance without 
understanding the idea which that proposition is intended to communicate. 
If this were not so, education, for example, would be a more straightforward 
process. Away from the classroom environment, however, it is not always 
easy to detect conceptual misunderstandings. The following tape-recorded 
dialogue was rejected from the corpus after much consideration. After the 
death of a great scholar, A and B are talking about the number of clever, 
worthy people who die : 
(1) A: The wrong ones survive I sometimes think 
(2) B: Well there must be a fair number of wrong ones yes 
(3.1) A: No I mean I sometimes think it's worse than that 
. 2) : That it's in the nature of things that the wrong ones 
survive 
(4.1) B: Mmm 
.2: I'm not that superstitious 
(5.1) A: Oh no I it's not superstition 
. 2) : It's just something I'm attributing to the nature 
of wrong of wrongness as it were 
pause 
. 3) : That the ones who have the spare capacity to invest 
too much effort in self-preservation are the ones who 
may not be the highest creators 
Initially it appears that B misunderstands what A means by "wrong ones" 
in (1). A then tries to explain what he means. B interprets this explanation 
as "superstitious" but A denies that superstition is what he means. In 
fact, the participants are working towards understanding one another's 
views on an idea and each also appears to be working out his own view on 
the matter as the interaction proceeds. The interaction exemplifies a 
particularly esoteric problem of understanding and is not a straightforward 
misunderstanding of a proposition. 
The following chapter discusses the problems of data collection and 
details the composition of the corpus on which the remainder of the thesis 
is based. 
CHAPTER II 
THE CORPUS 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter established what constitutes a misunderstanding 
for the purposes of this thesis. The next stage of this study of 
misunderstandings is the assembling of a corpus but this is by no means 
a straightforward process. The collection of data drawn from 
conversation is notoriously difficult (Labov, 1972; Stubbs, 1983). 
In the following section the problems of collecting data of conversation 
in general and of misunderstandings in particular are discussed. 
Having succeeded in collecting-sufficient data, one has to decide 
how to handle it since methods invariably influence findings. 
Transcription procedures influence data (Ochs, 1979; Stubbs, 1983) 
and the analytic method which one adopts or devises moulds one's 
conclusions (cf. the different approaches to and results of discourse 
analysis). Section 3 of this chapter details the composition of the 
corpus and indicates the ways in which the data are subsequently handled. 
2. PROBLEMS OF DATA COLLECTION 
The adoption of a data-based approach to the investigation of a 
linguistic phenomenon confronts one with the problems of how best to 
collect data and from what source. Labov's 'Observer's Paradox' 
clearly depicts the dilemma facing linguists : 
" the aim of linguistic research in the community must 
be to find out how people talk when they are not 
being systematically observed; yet we can only 
obtain these data by systematic observation " 
(Labov, 1972: 209). 
Labov finds acceptable solutions to this paradox by recording peer- 
group interaction and by recording interviews with diversions to make 
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the participants forget that the interview is taking place. These 
solutions are probably sufficient for Labov since his interest is in 
forms of vernacular speech rather than the ways in which the participants 
interact. The problem of systematic observation is less easily 
bypassed when the focus of study is the nature of interaction because 
the behaviour of participants is as crucial as the composition of 
their utterances. 
The recording of participants' speech and behaviour during 
conversation necessitates optimally receptive microphones and video 
cameras but these devices can constrain participants and restrict 
movement. Crystal & Davy (1969: 96) point out that people behave 
differently when being recorded, having a cyclic pattern of forgetting 
and remembering about the microphone, which consequently affects 
their speech. Their data is therefore-obtained by surreptitious 
recording but they admit that this method requires complex technical 
preparation and thus cannot be used frequently. The use of surreptitious 
recording equipment poses problems not only in terms of technical 
preparation but also on moral grounds. Fear of contrived overhearing 
is not limited. -b participants with confidential secrets. Many 
participants feel worried or threatened by the discovery that an 
., apparently ephemeral, private conversation has in fact been preserved 
and can be played back any number of times to any listener. 
Kreckel (1981) obtained extensive data from the B. B. C. film, 
The Family, for which a sound and camera crew lived with a family prior 
to recording their conversations and activities. This ostensibly 
enabled family members to become acclimatized to the presence of 
recording personnel and equipment. It is impossible to be certain 
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that such acclimatization did in fact happen and that the participants 
behaved wholly naturally. 
In spite of spontaneous informal conversation being ever-present 
much of it tends to remain inaccessible to linguists. The problems 
in collecting data from conversations result in linguists having 
recourse to alternative interactions, such as classroom discourse 
(Sinclair & Coulthard, 1975) and the therapy sessions favoured by the 
ethnomethodologists. The peer-group interaction which emerges from 
these sessions is questionably 'natural'; it certainly cannot be 
reckoned informal conversation. Those people being counselled must 
surely be constrained by the situation and by the expectation that they 
should overtly reveal their emotions, while the therapists are limited 
in the contribution they can make to the interaction; in psychotherapy 
the therapist cannot advise or give judgement (Labov & Fanshel, 1977: 30-5)- 
In a description of the ELIZA man-machine natural language 
interaction program, Weizenbaum (1966) explains the choice of setting 
and his explanation sounds a cautionary note about the appropriacy of 
using any psychiatric setting as a source of linguistic data : 
This mode of conversation was chosen because the 
psychiatric interview is one of the few examples of 
categorized dyadic natural language communication in 
which one of the participating pairs is free to 
assume the pose of knowing almost nothing of the real 
world. If, for example, one were to tell a psychiatrist 
'I went for a long boat ride' and he responded 'Tell 
me about boats' one would not assume that he knew 
nothing about boats, but that he had some purpose in 
so directing the subsequent conversation " 
(Weizenbaum, 1966: 42). 
Because of this setting, ELIZA is able to generate reasonably convincing 
communication without having any understanding of what is received or 
generated. Contrived communication need not be limited to psychiatric 
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environments. Any interview, therapy or similar setting, including 
the classroom, is likely to include an element of one participant 
having a role distinct from the others in that he has the responsibility 
for motivating and directing the conversation. Interaction in a 
pre-ordained setting between participants who have elected or have 
been required to. attend must be marked and therefore inappr. opriate data 
to be counted as informal conversation. 
When one wishes to obtain data of a particular phenomenon in 
conversation rather than simply conversation itself, one faces the 
additional problem of having to collect considerably more material. 
If it is something frequently encountered, such as speaker-switch 
nonfluency (Ferguson, 1975), any recorded stretch of conversation is 
likely to yield sufficient data. If, as in this thesis, the phenomenon 
is misunderstandings, the occurrence of which cannot be predicted, 
there is no guarantee that a carefully set-up session of recording 
informal conversation will yield a single example. 
A precedent for collecting chance data which cannot be anticipated 
has been set by the speech error researchers, the majority of whom 
have adopted the diary method. Fromkin (1971) details her data corpus 
of over six hundred speech errors collected by herself, colleagues 
and friends and where possible she has tried, by dint of questioning, 
to determine what the speaker had been thinking of saying. The 
advantage of the diary method is its immediacy; the person providing 
the data can be questioned as soon as the utterance or error has been 
made. Fromkin refers to the pioneer of speech error research, Meringer, 
and the amount of background information which he collected for every 
error encountered : 
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In true Teutonic style, he also included the birthdate 
of the speaker, the educational background, the time 
of day, the state of health and tiredness, the rate 
of speech etc. Sturtevant reports that Meringer 
became the most unpopular man at the University of 
Vienna " 
(Fromkin, 1971, in Fromkin, 1973: 216). 
Data of misunderstandings with such detailed background information 
could not be collected as easily as data of speech errors because a 
number of utterances by at least two speaker-hearers would have to be 
written down, rather than one discrete error, and the possibly relevant 
background information would be increased proportionately. The 
linguist's intrusion into the conversation would be even more irritating 
to the participants than Meringer's intrusions (but cf. Milroy, 1984 
for successful data collection of misunderstandings by the diary method). 
The linguist's intrusion can call into doubt the reliability of 
the data. MacKay (1980) warns against the selectivity of data which 
might have been influenced by theoretical bias. Adoption of the diary 
method means that one collects the data which one hears but there is 
a tendency to hear only what one is seeking. This warning is less 
pertinent to the collection of misunderstandings than it is to that of 
speech errors because in much of the data the participants themselves 
refer to the fact that a misunderstanding has occurred, which alerts 
one to note down what has been said. 
Defence against criticism of the reliability of diary-recorded 
transcription is less easy. An interaction is longer and more complex 
than a speech error. Memory recall of utterances is far from perfect, 
(see discussion in Clark & Clark, 1977), paralinguistic features 
might not be noticed (Abercrombie, 1968) and intonational features 
cannot be accurately recorded (see . Pellowe, 1980; Pellowe & Jones, 
1978,; 
35,,, 
McGregor, 1982 for discussions of variability of non-segmental 
phonological systems and the problems of 'interpreting' them, even 
under optimal conditions ; see also Labov & Fanshel, 1977 for the 
problem of interpretation of paralinguistic cues). 
A specific problem in the collection of -&ta of misunderstandings 
is that the beginning of a misunderstanding can only be determined 
retrospectively and it is not always possible to retrace the conversation 
back to the utterance which was misunderstood. The potential extent 
of a misunderstanding is illustrated by an exchange encountered at the 
L. A. G. B. conference held in London (November, 1977) 
5" Although the 
exchange was not recorded it was possible to determine what had 
happened because a number of people were concentrating on the paper 
being delivered and on the subsequent questions which related to it. 
Together they were able to recall what had been said. 
Ruth Kempson had delivered very quickly and tersely a paper on 
"Presupposition, Opacity and Negation". Approximately three minutes 
after the commencement of question time, Yoric. k Wilks made a comment 
with which Kempson agreed. Wilks repeated the comment and the general 
audience impression was that he was being rather slow and that Kempson 
could not understand him. This impression was sustained for several 
moments until Wilks apparently had the situation explained to him by 
a member of the audience. Following this explanation, Wilks stated 
"That was a misunderstanding". What had been misunderstood? In 
retrospect it turned out to be something which Kempson had said during 
her paper. 
The problem, which arose approximately half way through the paper, 
concerned a discussion of entailment :" 'John is looking for a red 
car' - John is looking for a unique member of the class of things 
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which are cars and are red and might be his own ; John is looking 
for any member of the class of cars which are red. The first reading 
entails the second: if you are looking for a unique member of the 
class then you are looking for a member of the class". After the 
remainder of the paper had been delivered, several questions were 
raised and answered and then the following dialogue took place : 
Wilks : It seems to me you're using the word 'entailment' 
in a very odd way, not in the commonsense or 
normal way because the truth of one statement 
isn't entailed by the truth of the other, 
they're not mutually entailing 
Kempson : No 
Wilks :- repeats first comment - 
Audience: / murmur 
Kempson :/ inaudible 
Wilks : That was a misunderstanding 
Wilks apparently understood Kempson as having talked about mutual 
entailment of truth whereas she had talked'of one entailment of 
factuality. He maintained this misunderstanding throughout the 
remainder of the paper and the initial questions and answers before he 
expressed an utterance based on the misunderstanding, that is, he 
expressed his opinion that Kempson had used 'entailment' in an odd way. 
Kempson then misunderstood Wilks's utterance ; she agreed with 
him by contradiction that the two statements were not mutually entailing 
whereas he had sought an explanation from her of her use of what he 
considered to be wrongly used 'mutual entailment'. In addition, Wilks's 
repeat of his comment was the'product of a misunderstanding of Kempson's 
"No"; the repetition suggested that he thought Kempson had not properly 
heard or understood his comment, whereas actually she had agreed with 
his comment. There was no way of knowing exactly how the misunderstanding 
was resolved, apart from the presumed clarification given by a member. 
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of the audience. After Wilks admitted to there having been a misunder- 
standing, Kempson moved on to another question. 
This short exchange is remarkably complex and the extent of the 
misunderstanding is considerable. Misunderstandings of this duration 
can only be accurately collected by tape recorder. The Wilks-Kempson 
datum w&15, ýexcluded, 3from the corpus because it proved to be a misunder- 
standing of a sentence in an academic paper rather than of an utterance 
in conversation; also, the conference environment is marked and does 
not provide appropriate data. Nevertheless, the example serves to 
illustrate the possible extent of a misunderstanding and highlights 
the problem of collecting data of misunderstandings. 
3. COMPOSITION OF THE CORPUS 
Initially, in an attempt to collect data, surreptitious recording 
was carried out in a family home, a student flat and a university 
room, where a wide range of conversations took place between various 
different participants. The number of misunderstandings to emerge 
from these recordings was low and was not satisfactorily productive in 
proportion to the time spent listening for them on tape. Concurrent 
with the time spent recording conversations, misunderstandings were 
encountered in conversations in which I participated or which I 
overheard. These misunderstandings often occurred in settings which 
were not conducive to recording, such as in shops, on buses, in short 
exchanges when outside and so on. It seemed foolish to ignore these 
misunderstandings while persisting in recording and listening to 
non-productive conversations. 
Consequently, in view of the negligible amount of data to emerge 
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from tape recordings, ( of the corpus), the diary method was adopted, 
following the precedent set by Fromkin's (1971) collection of speech 
errors and Milroy's (1984) collection of misunderstandings. Whenever 
possible the assistance of the participants was enlisted, but only 
when the misunderstanding had ended as a topic in the conversation. 
The major shortcomings of the diary method, outlined above, were ' 
minimized as much as possible. The problem of recall was alleviated 
to some extent because where possible the participants' corroboration 
of what was said produced a transcription as close to the original 
as possible. Significant features, both paralinguistic and intonational, 
were noted and it is reasonable-to assume that those which were not 
noted, of which there must have been many, were not seen as significant 
by participants after the misunderstanding and therefore were unlikely 
to have played much part during the interaction containing the misunder- 
standing. When the transcription could not be agreed upon, the data 
was discarded. 
Data which could not be transcribed without'. eliciting the help 
of participants prior to the misunderstanding's ceasing to be the topic 
was also discarded. Without such a policy, the intrusion of the 
analyst could distort the structure of a misunderstanding. If, for 
example, the analyst requested that the participants re-traced their 
utterances because they appeared to be having difficulty in understanding 
one another, they might realize that the source of the difficulty was 
a misunderstanding. In such an example, it would never be known how 
the participants would have resolved the difficulty had they not been 
prompted. Data in which the analyst intruded was therefore rejected. 
The corpus consists of one hundred misunderstandings and is 
comprised as follows : four tape recorded misunderstandings, in one of 
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which I am a participant; nine misunderstandings reported to me by 
people who knew of my interest in the phenomenon; five misunderstandings 
in which I was a participant, the extent of my participation varying 
from being the one to explain what was said in the case of a mishearing 
to being one of several whose laughter alerted the speaker/ hearer to 
the fact that an error had been made; fifteen misunderstandings which 
I overheard ; thirty misunderstandings in which an utterance of mine 
was misunderstood ; and thirty-seven misunderstandings in which I 
misunderstood someone's utterance. 
The data, with analysis, is presented in Appendix 1. Each datum 
is numbered according to its type ; full details of the typology are 
given in Chapter IX. 
Though every participant is a speaker-hearer (see Goffman, 1979 
and Goodwin, 1981 for discussion of the role of speaker-hearers and the 
adequacy of the term) it is convenient to refer to the person whose 
utterance is misunderstood as S, the speaker, and the person who 
misunderstands S's utterance as H, the hearer. Any other participants 
are 0 
l, 0 2,03, on, depending on how many are involved. The sex of the 
participants is given, together with relevant background information.. 
Proper names are changed, except in data in which the name is a 
contributory factor to the misunderstanding. Anonymity is preserved 
as far as possible. Any reference made to S, H or 0 in the text is 
given as (S), (H) or (0) rather than actual names to avoid confusion. 
It was not always possible to obtain permission to use data. 
Two ladies on a bus, for instance, would scarcely have been pleased 
to learn that their conversation had been overheard. Since books on 
eavesdropping (e. g. Rees, 1981) make no apology for commercial 
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exploitation of overheard conversations without acknowledgement, similar 
material is used in this thesis. 
Transcription is orthographic to enable data from the different 
sources of tape-recorded, reported and personally collected material to be 
presented comparably. Although intonational features are not included, 
emphatic stress is indicated by capital letters and when the utterance is 
a question or exclamtion, conventional punctuation indicates this, as in 
"WHICH is the hardest? " (A22). Emphatic stress is given because it gives 
prominence to particular words or parts of words, and is therefore a significant 
factor in the structure of the misunderstanding. 
In order to give a clear picture of what types of utterances are 
misunderstood and what types of utterances are produced which manifest 
misunderstandings, distinction is drawn between statements, questions, 
requests, commands and exclamations. Although utterances cannot be equated 
with sentences (Crystal, 1980) and the relationship between utterances 
and sentences is very complex (Crystal & Davy, 1969; Levinson, 1983) 
the 'major /minor' and 'complete/ incomplete' distinctions made of sentences 
by Crystal & Davy (1969: 45) is adopted in respect of utterances which are 
statements. An utterance which is grammatically well-formed, allowing for 
the hesitations and repetitions of actual speech, is characterized as 
'statement' while an elliptical utterance, such as "Only partly on" (Al) 
is characterized as 'minor statement'. An utterance which fails to be 
grammatically well-formed because only part of it is expressed, such as 
"I'm becoming much more susceptible to" (K85), is characterized as 
'incomplete statement'; this differs from 'minor statement' in that it 
is truncated rather than elliptical. 
Utterances which are questions are characterized as 'wh-question', 
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such as "Where do you do this ?" (B54), 'polar question', that is, those 
taking yes/ no answers, such as "Are you with her? " (C64), and 'phatic 
question'. 'Phatic question' is an adaptation of Malinowski's (1930) 
introduction of the term 'phatic communion' to describe the social function 
of expressions in contrast with their conveyance of meanings ; 'phatic 
question' thus characterizes an utterance which is a question and which 
introduces a topic, such as "Did Mum say that Anne rang tonight ?" (M89). 
The utterances "Yes" and "No" could be characterized as 'affirmation' 
and 'negation' or 'denial' but in the interests of clarity, the form of 
each is taken to be optimally descriptive and such utterances are characterized 
as 'Yes' and 'No' respectivdly. If "Yes" constitutes the beginning of 
a statement in an utterance, that utterance is characterized as 'Yes + 
statement', (A2), and if "No" precedes a statement, similarly that utterance 
is characterized as 'No + statement', (B53)" 
The analysis of misunderstandings which is presented in this thesis 
is based on the ways in which participants refer to the proposition expressed 
in the misunderstood utterance, the proposition which is understood to have 
been expressed, the utterance itself and the utterance which manifests the 
misunderstanding and which is based on or derives from that misunderstanding. 
In order that these ways may be characterized, everyday, non-technical 
words are adopted. Thus utterances mad be completed, repeated, emphasized, 
amplified, explained, queried and refuted and propositions may be explained, 
queried and refuted. These terms are explained and illustrated in Chapter 
IV. 
A final distinction made in this thesis is that between paralinguistic 
and extralinguistic behaviour. Paralinguistic behaviour, such as laughter 
or facial expression, is communicatively expressive, that is, it can contribute 
to the communication of a proposition, whereas extralinguistic behaviour, 
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such as a particular action, has no intended role in communication. Action 
is here taken to be positional, such as joining another speaker, rather 
than attitudinal, such as shaking a fist; such attitudinal action would 
be deemed paralinguistic behaviour because it. would be communicatively 
expressive. 
While it is relatively easy to characterize individual utterances, 
it is less easy to characterize the ways in which participants produce 
and receive utterances so as to interact and communicate. Chapter III 
addresses the problem of how to analyse misunderstandings so that the 
structural characteristics can be determined. The analysis of 
misunderstandings requires consideration of the communicative process and 
in Chapter III various approaches to the communicative process are discussed. 
4' 
CHAPTER III 
MODELLING THE COMMUNICATIVE PROCESS 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In order to analyse a misunderstanding one needs to be able to refer 
to (i) what the speaker intends, (ii) what utterance he produces, (iii) 
what utterance the hearer perceives and decodes and (iv) what the hearer 
understands has been expressed. These four factors are important because 
in a misunderstanding there is disparity between (i) and (iv) and this 
disparity is the result of problems in either (ii) or (iii) or both. 
Studies of communication, which have been primarily theoretical, have 
discussed these four factors (e. g. Shannon & Weaver, 1949; Cherry, 1957; 
Miller, 1951,1967; Halliday, 1973; Widdowson, 1980). In focussing on the 
linear relationship between the four factors, researchers have tended to 
ignore the outcome of communication attempts, that is, (iv), what the hearer 
understands has been expressed. This outcome is of particular importance 
in the analysis of misunderstandings because the outcome is what distinguishes 
a misunderstanding from correct understanding or non-understanding. 
Section 2 of tfiis chapter outlines some approaches to, modelling the 
communicative process and Section 3 discusses in more detail some of the 
methods by which conversation has been analysed and also discusses the 
problems which the analyst has to overcome. It is apparent that any analysis 
of the communicative process ought to account for intentions, utterances 
and understandings and a model of communication which provides for these 
crucial factors is proposed in Section 4. By drawing on this model, 
misunderstandings may be analysed. 
2. APPROACHES TO MODELLING THE COMMUNICATIVE PROCESS 
Lyons (1977) discusses a typical model of communication which provides 
the following sequence : 
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The message originated by X is encoded by the transmitter 
into a signal. That signal is sent over a particular 
communication channel to the receiver. The receiver 
decodes the signal into a message and passes the message 
on to Y" 
(Lyons, 1977: 37). 
This sequence is applicable to any form of message transference. In spoken 
communication X is both message originator and transmitter, that is, a 
speaker, while Y is both receiver and message recipient, that is, a hearer. 
The signal is an utterance or a paralinguistic feature such as a laugh or 
a gesture or a combination of utterance and paralinguistic feature. The 
channel is speech or kinetic activity or both. The message is whatever 
the speaker intends to express. _ 
Lyons's model is necessarily idealized. In it there is no disparity 
between what the speaker intends to express and what utterance he produces, 
no interference, accoustic or physical, to distort the channel and no 
disparity between what the speaker intends and what the hearer understands. 
Such idealization is necessary in order to establish what is meant by 
'communication' but it cannot be maintained if one wishes to examine how 
speakers and hearers undertake communication. A study of misunderstandings 
essentially requires consideration of the very disparities which idealized 
communication models are able to omit. The outcome, incidental to a model 
which illustrates the components of communication, is crucial to the 
analysis of misunderstandings. 
Grimshaw (1980), in his taxonomy of communicative events, chooses to 
adopt ideal speaker-hearers, thus excluding conversational resources and all 
the interferences which accompany them, yet discusses the emotional and 
behavioural responses of the speaker. The speaker can ignore the nonsuccess 
or can look for its source and attempt to clarify it by "reformulations, 
repetition of the initial utterance (frequently with increased amplitude) 
or verbal exploration of the sources of difficulty" (1980: 63) in addition 
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to other responses such as laughter, anger or withdrawal from the interaction. 
These responses are the substance of conversation between actual rather 
than ideal speaker-hearers. Though wishing to limit the scope of his 
argument at the outset, Grimshaw nevertheless has to draw on actual features 
rather than idealized concepts in order to discuss communicative outcomes. 
Varonis & Gass (1985) specify five communicative outcomes in their 
heuristic for coding variation in a hearer's interpretation of a speaker's 
utterance (1985: 333-335) : (i) there is "perfect symmetry between intended 
and received message", represented as "X X", (ii) the hearer receives 
the intended message but is not confident about his interpretation, 
represented as "X X1", (iii) the hearer incorrectly interprets the 
utterance but believes it has been correctly interpreted, represented as 
"X -- Y" ('misunderstanding' in this thesis), (iv) the hearer incorrectly 
interprets the utterance but is not confident about his interpretation, 
represented as "X - Y1" and (v) the hearer has little or no. confidence 
in his interpretation, represented as "X O". Hearers' beliefs about 
their interpretations of utterances, which are incorporated in Varonis & 
Gass's heuristic, are crucial in communication. If, for example, one 
correctly understands an utterance but believes one has misunderstood it, 
one proceeds in the conversation as though a misunderstanding has occurred 
although in fact it has not. Conversations are thus influenced by beliefs 
about communicative outcomes as well as by actual outcomes. 
The outcome of a communication attempt tends to be considered in 
respect of a single utterance. Conversation, however, consists of more 
than single utterances. The essence of conversation is that its participants 
take. turns to produce utterances, most of which are responses to previous 
utterances or initiators of subsequent utterances (Sacks et. al., 1974; 
Goffman, 1976). In addition to the outcome of a single utterance communication 
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attempt, therefore, there is a communicative outcome to a series of utterances. 
Speaker-hearers are potentially able to organize their conversations 
so as to maximize the likelihood of successful communication. They can 
orient themselves to one another, can display attentiveness and reactions, 
can monitor understandings, can query utterances, can draw on conversational 
sequences for specific purposes such as opening and closing conversations 
and so on (Goodwin, 1981; Argyle, 1978; Yngve, 1970; Duncan, 1972,1974; 
Jefferson, 1972; Schegloff, 1968; Schegloff & Sacks, 1973). Because 
speaker-hearers are able to explain or re-phrase utterances to which the 
outcome appears unsuccessful they are often ultimately able to achieve 
a successful outcome. - 
Both speakers and hearers in a conversation are positive, active 
contributors. The choice of words, syntactic structure, prosodic and 
paralinguistic features of an utterance which is intended to express any 
proposition is in the speaker's control. The constitution of the utterance, 
together with auditory, contextual, pragmatic and cognitive elements all 
affect the hearer's understanding of that utterance. The roles of speaker 
and hearer are continually alternating as each produces utterances which 
the other seeks to understand. Conversation thus consists of dynamic 
interaction. 
The difficulty of analysing discourse satisfactorily has long been 
recognized by the many researchers who have approached the problem in 
various ways and with various aims (e. g. Harris, 1952; Sinclair & Coulthard, 
1975; Halliday & Hasan, 1976; Van Dijk, 1977; Schenkein, 1978c; Stubbs, 
1983; Brown & Yule, 1983). Two alternative approaches are clearly detailed 
by Widdowson 
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" One can on the one hand, deal with instances of discourse 
from the point of view of the third person analyst; that 
is to say, one can treat discourse in detachment from its 
instantiation, after the event, as a product. On the 
other hand, one can deal with discourse from the point 
of view of the participants caught, as it were, in the 
act; that is to say, one can treat discourse as a process 
(Widdowson, 1979: 70-71). 
Coulthard & Brazil (1979: 3), specifically referring to Schegloff, feel that 
the ethnomethodologists treat conversation as "an accomplished product 
rather than a developing process", a view endorsed by Widdowson (1979: 71). 
Sinclair, Coulthard and Brazil's analyses of classroom interaction emerge 
as systematized sequences of products rather than analyses of the processes 
undertaken by the participants in the discourse. 
It is difficult to imagine how such processes can be analysed except 
by concentration on sequencing and Widdowson himself wonders if process 
analysis can be accomplished. He claims that it should be able to "yield 
information about how the participants see the discourse at a particular 
point in its development and what controls their options at this point" 
(1979: 71). Rather than confirm the unlikelihood of achieving a process 
analysis, this aim actually suggests an approach not usually undertaken for 
the obvious reason that the material tends not to be open to observation and 
therefore not open to analysis, that is, concentration on "how participants 
see the discourse". Determining how participants see the discourse can 
be done by eliciting their opinions as to what is happening in a discourse 
in which they have participated or which they have overheard (c. f. Kreckel, 
1981; McGregor, 1983,1984) but although the information yielded by such 
elicitation is important and makes substantial contributions to an appreciation 
of how discourse is negotiated and interpreted, shedding light on the 
behaviour and reasoning of the participants, the opinions are either 
retrospective or those of a third party and in no way affect the developing, 
discourse. 
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In conversations in which the participants discuss their utterances 
and monitor the success or non-success of their communication attempts 
it is possible to determine how they "see the discourse" because the 
discourse itself contains discussion of how the participants are "seeing 
the discourse" : what they intended, what they said, what they heard and 
what they understood. Since instances of miscommunication such as 
misunderstandings often include such discussion and monitoring, it is 
possible that an analysis of misunderstandings can be a process analysis. 
3. * ANALYSING CONVERSATION 
In discussions of conversation it should be possible to refer to 
(i) speaker meaning, (ii) utterance meaning and (iii) hearer meaning. This 
tri-partite view is necessary in order to account for the variation in 
meaning which can occur. In respect of a single utterance, the speaker might 
intend to express a, his utterance, owing to an error in encoding. or 
production, might express b and the hearer might understand it as expressing 
C. 
This variability makes it difficult to refer to what an utterance 
'means' or to what is 'meant' by an utterance. Hurford & Heasley's (1983: 269) 
definition of utterance meaning is standard in linguistics : "UTTERANCE 
MEANING is what a speaker means when he makes an utterance in a particular 
situation". Utterance meaning is thus distinct from sentence meaning, 
which is constant regardless of context, situation or speaker intention. 
Hurford & Heasley's definition is too limiting in the context of communication. 
It cannot allow for the fact that what a speaker means may not be what he 
expresses in the event that he produces his utterance incorrectly or produces 
an utterance which does not aptly express what he intends. In Kjolseth's 
(1972) discussion of whether utterances have intractable meanings or whether. 
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they change on each occasion of use, an utterance of Katz's is cited : 
"Whatever I said on that occasion, what I meant was ... " 
(1972: 51). The 
utterance had not expressed what the speaker had intended to express. 
The meaning of that utterance was not, therefore, what the speaker meant. 
The standard definition of utterance meaning also cannot allow for 
the fact that if the hearer has misunderstood the utterance, then the 
utterance meaning for that hearer differs from what the speaker intended so 
that there are two meanings in respect of the one utterance. In terms of 
communication, -therefore, some other means of reference is required. 
Simpson (1979) sees the difficulty of accounting for utterance meaning. 
In considering what is involved when one regards the meaning of an utterance 
as the function fulfilled by the utterance he raises the problem of how 
'function' is to be understood : 
Is it the intention of the speaker or is it the reaction 
of the hearer ? If it is the intention of the speaker, 
then the problem of eliciting intentions arises; if it 
is the reaction of the hearer, then misunderstanding on 
his part may lead to a situation in which the reaction 
is not the one intended. This would require us to say 
that the speaker had no control over the meaning of his 
utterance. And indeed it is often the case that an 
intended meaning is misunderstood 11 
(Simpson, 1979: 182). 
It is a fact of communication that the speaker cannot control the meaning 
of his utterance once it has been expressed. The hearer can often be 
directed in such a way that he correctly understands the speaker's intended 
meaning but the meaning which the hearer attributes to the utterance is 
ultimately in his control alone. 
In the work of, for example, Grice, Searle and Strawson on what it is 
for an utterance to have meaning for both speaker and hearer, it is agreed 
that essentially the hearer must know (recognize) the speaker's intention 
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in making the utterance before it can be said to have meaning for him, the 
hearer. The detailing of the definition which expresses this tenet 
differs and develops throughout the various work on the subject but Grice's 
unmodified definition (1969) gives a general indication of the way intention 
is considered necessary to the speaker's 'meaning' something of an utterance : 
" "U meant something by uttering x" is true iff, 
for some audience A, U uttered x intending 
1. A to produce a particular response r 
2. A to think (recognize) that U intends 1. 
3. A to fulfil 1. on the basis of his fulfilment of 2. " 
(Grice, 1969: 151). 
If x is a question U would have meant something by that question as long 
as he intended A to produce a particular response, such as an answer to that 
question, A having recognized that U intended an answer to be provided and 
having done so knowing that U intended this. 
If, however, "particular response" is interpreted differently, as a 
response so particular it has to be a specific answer rather than any 
answer, a different situation emerges. U may have intended A to produce 
a particular response, intended A to recognize this and to produce the 
particular response on the basis of such recognition but A's response could 
be based on a different interpretation of the question; the expected 
particular response would not have been forthcoming and therefore something 
else would have been meant by uttering x, something not intended by U 
but which could be taken to be the meaning of x should U choose not to 
make the misunderstanding known in the conversation, assuming he realizes 
it has occurred. The 'something' meant by U, the speaker, needs to be 
precisely specified, as does the response of A, the hearer, rather than 
being theoretically conceptualized. 
Searle's (1969: 47) interpretation of response is different. He argues 
that"the hffect' on the hearer is not a belief or response, it consists 
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simply in the hearer understanding the utterance of the speaker". In 
most instances, a speaker will intend his utterance to be understood and 
additionally will very often intend that a response be provided by the 
hearer, in the form of another utterance or an action; the hearer's 
response depends on what the speaker intends his utterance to mean and on 
the hearer's understanding of both intention and utterance. The conjunction 
of recognition of intention and understanding of utterance need not be 
fully achieved in every instance ; one or the other can occur, as noted 
by Bierwisch in his distinction between linguistic and communicative skills : 
language and communication (or more generally : social 
interaction) are based on different systems of knowledge. 
Under certain conditions you may therefore understand 
very well what someone wants to communicate without 
understanding what he says, and you may in other cases 
understand what someone says without understanding what 
he wishes to communicate 11 
(Bierwisch, 1980: 3). 
Different levels of understanding can apply to different circumstances 
so that, for example, the intention might be to pass the time of day in 
phatic communion, or to find out if the hearer knows something, or to 
require the hearer to do something. Greetings will usually be exchanged 
without the hearer needing to ponder on why the speaker greeted him; 
recognition of the intention to greet is sufficient. The hearer might 
tell the speaker that he knows something without being aware that the 
speaker's intention was to elicit this information, and indeed may yield 
the information without being aware that he has done so. He might perform 
the action which the speaker wished him to perform without knowing of that 
wish. This action might be in response to an indirect speech act but in 
such an act it is assumed that the hearer recognizes the speaker's intention 
in expressing an utterance with two illocutionary forces, such recognition 
generally stemming from application of Grice's "Cooperative Principle" 
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(1974: 45), as Searle explains : 
In indirect speech acts the speaker communicates to 
the hearer more than he actually says by way of relying 
on their mutually shared background information, both 
linguistic and nonlinguistic, together with the general 
powers of rationality and inferences on the part of the 
hearer " 
(Searle, 1975: 60-61). 
One can imagine a scenario in which, late at night, A, wishing B to go 
home to enable A to get to bed, says "I've had a very busy day". There are 
two intentions behind this utterance : (i) A intends B to realize that he 
should go and (ii) A intends to inform B that he has had a busy day. The 
intention to inform B about the busy day is a strategem by which A seeks to 
have B realize that he should go. It is quite possible that B will fail to 
recognize A's intention that he should leave and instead will only realize 
A's intention to inform him about the day. The consequence of such 
understanding could be that B proceeds to quiz A on his day or, still worse, 
elaborate on how busy his own day has been. 
It is thus possible that multiple intentions underlie an utterance. The 
variability which such multiplicity of intention can bestow on utterances 
is augmented by the fact that they may have different meanings dependent on 
participants' understandings of them. Taken to extremes, one could have a 
speaker following Humpty Dumpty's creed of using a word which means what 
he chooses it to mean (Carroll, 1939: 196) while the hearer hears a word and 
has it mean what he chooses it to mean. According to Coulthard (1977), 
discourse analysts are prepared to adopt hearer meaning, arguing that : 
" the illocutionary force of an utterance is what it is 
taken to be by the listener rather than what it is 
intended to be by the speaker on the grounds that 
neither listener nor analyst can ever be sure of the 
speaker's intention because it is never available for 
-examination, but the listener's interpretation is 
evident in his response-and it is this which determines 
the progress of the interaction " 
(Coulthard, 1977: 19). 
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Because of the explanations of speaker's intention which are to be found 
when misunderstandings occur, intention becomes available for examination. 
Moore & Carling (1982) offer a different view of meaning. They argue 
that the "container view" of meaning, that is, "the view that language 
somehow contains its meaning and speaks for itself" (1982: 154 is ill-founded. 
They propose instead an "epiphenomenalist" view : 
" From the epiphenomenalist perspective, language acts as 
a locating medium enabling one individual to cause 
another to gain access to knowledge, or to draw inferences 
from knowledge that he already has. On this view of 
language, meaning does not inhere in utterances but 
emerges from them " 
(Moore & Carling, 1982: 162). 
In an analysis of conversation one needs to be able to refer to both 
inherent and emergent meaning and also to incipient meaning, that is, to 
utterance meaning, hearer meaning and speaker meaning. 
By making provision for these three meanings in respect of one utterance 
one need not stumble over the fact that there is no exact meaning to an 
utterance (Goffman, 1976). Speaker-hearers are rarely troubled by this 
fact because, as Goffman points out, speaker-hearers presume on a "mutual 
understanding" : 
Commonly a speaker cannot explicate with precision 
what he meant to get across, and on these occsions 
if hearers think they know precisely, they will likely 
be at least a little off 
(Goffman, 1976: 261). 
Precision of expression and understanding is unlikely to prevail in 
conversation but nevertheless on occasions a speaker will endeavour, 
often strenuously, to make his exact meaning known to the hearer and the 
hearer has to work towards understanding this meaning. This interactive 
effort is noted by Downes (1977: 95) who comments "What is meant', then, 
except for ritualized exchanges, will have to be worked towards, explicated, 
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and negotiated by participants in ongoing conversations". McGregor (1982) 
also holds that meaning is. something which participants negotiate but for 
him there is no btable core of meaning'. Agreement with this contention 
depends on one's interpretation of 'stable' ; the proposition which the 
speaker intends to express is stable for him and the proposition which the 
hearer believes has been expressed is stable for him. Though they may 
differ, both speaker meaning and hearer meaning are briefly absolute. Each 
has a stable core of meaning until they are refined in the light of prior 
and subsequent utterances. Consequently there can be several stable cores 
of meaning to any one utterance, albeit briefly in the moments of expressing 
and understanding. Interactive negotiation may then be required to match 
these different meanings. 
In descriptions of discourse, emphasis tends to be on the functional, 
that is, on what the utterances are doing, rather than on what they are 
expressing. This emphasis emanates from Austin's (1962) observations on the 
actions performed by words and utterances. Analysis which focusses on 
what words and utterances do can be found in theoretical grammar (e. g. 
Ross, 1970; Sadock, 1974), in the originally philosophical discipline of 
speech act theory (e. g. Searle, 1969; Cole & Morgan, 1975) and in work on 
discourse and conversation. Because little attention is paid to what is 
expressed and to the interactive work done by speaker-hearers in order 
that they may successfully communicate, one receives the impression that 
conversation is neatly organized and that its organization is super-imposed 
on speaker-hearers rather than emanating from them and being engineered 
by them. 
Thus one finds sequencing described by generalized function terms, or 
"transparent labels" according to Coulthard & Brazil (1979: 2), who*are 
critical of the ethnomethodologists' descriptions, such as "Appeal, 
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Processing Pass, Conference Pass, Acknowledgement" (Jefferson & Schenkein, 
1978: 162). Coulthard & Brazil, however, adopt a very similar approach in 
describing ostensibly basic units of interaction as the exchanges "eliciting, 
directing and inferring" (1979: 26). Neither group of researchers appears 
to feel any need or desire to account for what is being "appealed", 
"processed", "elicited", "directed" and so on. 
Similarly, Kreckel (1981) investigates the transmission of messages, 
a process which, one imagines, would necessitate consideration of the 
meaning of those messages. Her experiments in understanding and interpretation, 
however, which require the assignment of metapragmatic categories to data 
by participants and non-participants to the conversations which constitute 
the data, are limited to communicative acts such as "asserting, describing, 
inferring, rejecting" and so on (1981: 136). Information is not provided 
on what is being "asserted", what "described", "inferred" or "rejected". 
It is not enough for a hearer to know that a speaker is performing any of 
these acts ; to understand, he must also know what proposition the act 
expresses. 
Accounting for the function of utterances without regard to meaning has 
important limitations. An utterance can count as a promise if it satisfies 
a number of conditions relating to promises (Searle, 1969: 54ff. ) ; what 
is promised is not taken into account except insofar as whether the speaker 
is entitled to make that promise. While the hearer can recognize that a 
promise is being made, he might have a different understanding of what is 
being promised than the speaker intended. 
Without consideration of what is being expressed in an utterance, 
difficulties in analysis may not be solved. One such problem in Sinclair 
& Coulthard's (1975) analysis is*the problem of deciding when an act is 
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an "informative" and when a "comment", the function of which is "to 
exemplify, expand, justify, provide additional information" (1975: 42). 
Sinclair & Coulthard acknowledge the difficulty in distinguishing between 
the two but feel that in the teaching situation "informative" is signalled 
paralinguistically. Subsequently, Coulthard (1981: 13) decides that the 
difference between the two cannot be properly distinguished until 
considerably more work has been done in establishing the relationship 
between discourse units and their lexico-grammatical realisations, in other 
words, in relating what is said to how it is expressed. 
Burton (1981: 67) argues that secondary distinctions need to be made 
and divides "informative" and "comment" into sub-categories, with "additive, 
adversative and causal" items comprising "informative" and "repeat, restate 
and qualifying" items comprising "comment". This division, however, still 
does not solve the problem of distinguishing between "informative" and 
"comment". One datum which she analyses is of particular interest in that 
it happens to be a misunderstanding : 
to Challenging 
Move 
Act Opening 
Move 
1A: I'm 
going to 
do some 
weeding 
Act Supporting Act 
Move 
inf 
2 B: Yes 
please 
3A: What 
RE-OPENING 4 
B-Ot'7ENING 5 
6 B: I 
thought 
you said 
you were 
going to 
pour some 
drinks inf 
B: Yes 
please 
A: You 
don't 
listen 
to 
anything 
I say inf 
ack 
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Challenging Act 
Move 
7 A: NoI 
said I'm 
going to 
do some 
weeding inf of 
(Burton, 1981: 79). 
The 'challenging move' (3) is reckoned one in which the speaker "may ask 
for more information concerning the semantic relations that obtain 
between the referents in the discourse topic"(1981: 72, following Keenan 
& Schieffelin, 1976). "What", however, could be classed as one of other 
possible challenges, such as asking for a repetition of the utterance 
or for clarification of information on the identification of objects, 
persons and ideas. "What" could equally well be an exclamation of 
surprise, which presumably could also count as a challenge. "Yes please" 
in (4) could be a supporting move rather than a re-opening move if 
"What" is a request for a repeat, with the implication that the utterance 
(2) is inappropriate. 
The following utterance, "You don't listen to anything I say", is 
an 'informative' but could equally well be an 'accusation', the function 
of which is "to request an apology or a surrogate excuse" (1981: 77). 
This utterance does provide information but it is information particular 
to the conversation and could be an 'accusation' that B has not been 
paying attention and also a signal of this lack of attention. The 
subsequent utterances are 'informative' but again the information given 
is crucially related to the conversation rather than to anything 
extrinsic and global. The act 'metastatement' is limited to referring 
to the structure, speaker-turn and so on of the following discourse 
but it would be profitable to allow'metastatements' to refer to prior 
discourse as well. 
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Burton's interest is in analysing the structure of discourse, determining 
its constituents according to a rank scale. The problems of classification 
to which her analysis falls prey could be avoided by use of evidence from the 
participants as to how the utterances should be interpreted. Since there 
are occasions when speaker-hearers monitor and discuss their utterances, 
it would be useful to be able to draw on these monitorings and discussions 
explicitly in analysis (a development of Hoenigswald's (1966) advocation 
of the usefulness of folk linguistic evidence). 
The ethnomethodologists (e. g. Sacks, Schegloff, Schenkein) investigate 
the organization of conversation. Their procedure is to trace patterns 
in numerous conversations by considering the way participants themselves 
organize their conversations. The result of their investigations is 
primarily the isolation of various sequences (e. g. Schegloff, 1968 on 
"conversational openings" ; Pomerantz, 1978 on "compliment responses" ; 
Schenkein, 1978b on "identity-rich puzzles"). 
The role of sequencing in the process of understanding is discussed 
by Schegloff & Sacks (1973, in Turner, 1974). They discuss the. effect of 
two utterances produced by two different speakers, that is, speaker and 
hearer, showing that the second utterance displays the hearer's understanding 
and acceptance of or disagreement with the first utterance. The relevance 
of this to the realization that a misunderstanding has occurred is noted : 
inspection of a second by a first can allow the first 
speaker to see that while the second thought he 
understood, indeed he misunderstood " 
(Schegloff & Sacks, 1973, in Turner, 1974: 240). 
This relationship between two utterances is discussed with particular 
reference to the closing of a conversation which can only be achieved if 
the two utterances are adjacent.. Applied across a wider spectrum of conversation 
their thesis remains tenable but for the insistence on adjacency : 
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" It. is then through the use of adjacent positioning 
that appreciations, failures, correctings, et cetera 
can be themselves understandably attempted. Whenever 
there is reason to have the appreciation of some 
implicativeness made attendable, 'next utterance' is 
the proper place to do this, and a two utterance sequence 
can be employed as a means for doing and checking some 
intendedly sequentially interactive occurrence in a way 
that a one utterance sequence can not " 
(Schegloff & Sacks, 1973, in Turner, 1974: 240). 
Obviously there would be no feedback if only one utterance was expressed 
and while the second utterance should be adjacent to effect closing, 
there is no essential need for such adjacency during conversation. It 
would be more efficacious in alerting the speaker to the hearer's reception 
of his utterance if it followed that utterance, but unless a topic change 
diverts attention it is likely that any subsequent utterance by the hearer 
would be related by the speaker to his initial one. Requiring adjacency 
pairing as a means to understanding implies little intelligence on the 
part of speaker-hearers. 
Schegloff (1977) stresses the constraint enforced by the first part 
on the second in an adjacency pair, pointing out that the sequential 
organization of conversation is essential to the process of understanding 
again, the emphasis is on the second pair part being evidence of 
understanding, or lack thereof, of the first. His concern is with the 
ambiguities which arise in conversation and specifically with whether or not 
an utterance is a question. His belief that in general participants are 
not troubled by ambiguity because their conversation is geared to what 
they do and do not know and that ambiguity tends to be "an overhearer's 
problem" (1977: 99) is unlikely to be borne out by data of misunderstandings 
because "ratified participants" (the term used by Goffman, 1976) appear to 
fall foul of ambiguities which to overhearers and analysts look obvious 
and easily discernible. 
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Goffman (1976) rejects adjacency pairs or dialogic chaining as being 
too limiting, preferring to draw attention to the way each utterance is 
a response to a prior one, linked by various thematic and sytematized 
means to other utterances and to factors extrinsic to the immediate 
conversational environment. He recognizes the importance of the entire 
conversation rather than close attention to any one abstracted sequence 
of utterances, which is a promising step towards developing a satidfactory 
methodology for studying misunderstandings. Similarly, his model for talk 
has much to recommend it : 
"a sequence of response moves with each in the series 
carving out its on reference, and each incorporating 
a variable balance of function in regard to statement- 
reply properties 
(Goffman, 1976: 293. 
Adoption of such a model would free one from the limitations of paired 
sequences in which varying numbers of embedded sequences might be found. 
Sequences can be readily identified if the utterances which comprise 
sequences have specific functions, such as greeting-greeting, question- 
answer, farewell-farewell. Not all utterances have such definite functions. 
Within a conversation, after the greetings and before the farewells, 
participants may discuss a number of topics. Their utterances cannot 
always be divided into such sequences as question-answer, suggestion-comment, 
puzzle-solution and so on. Any one utterance could simultaneously be 
question/ suggestion/ puzzle ; the response to it could simultaneously be 
answer / comment/ solution. 
A further problem with sequencing is that sequences ought to have 
specific beginnings and endings (but cf. Levinson's (1983) discussion of 
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potential second parts in sequencing and the notion of "conditional relevance"). 
Misunderstandings are unlikely always to be neatly packaged. If the 
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participants never become aware that a misunderstanding has occurred there 
will be no completion of a sequence but there will be numerous embeddings 
within that open-ended sequence. Sequencing, therefore, does not seem to 
be a promising analytic method in respect of misunderstandings. 
The comprehensive discourse analysis of Labov & Fanshel (1977) is a 
successful attempt to link conventional discourse analysis, that is, analysis 
of how utterances are linked and how conversations are structured, with the 
intentions of the speakers and the understandings of the hearers. They 
make use of surface-level information such as syntactic structure, prosodic 
and paralinguistic cues, background information and commentary by the 
participants. They seek to identify recurrent communications, for which 
they use the term 'proposition', and to describe hole the participants 
interact. They use actual text and provide an extremely detailed analysis 
of the text. Although criticism can be levelled at them for the lack of 
corroboration of their interpretations by both participants (the therapist 
comments on the text but the patient does not) and also by those referred 
to in the text (Cicourel, 1980; Corsaro, 1981) they nevertheless produce 
an analysis which succeeds in handling discourse and its concomitant 
background influences. However, their analysis is so detailed that it 
would take considerable time to apply. Referring to the study of conversation 
they comment (1977: 27) "It is not enough to understand the conversation; 
it must in some way be reducdd to general principles that will make other 
conversations easier and quicker to analyse and report". Ease and quickness 
do not appear to be the characteristics of their microanalysis and while it 
may prove to be the case that no thorough discourse analysis can be a 
contraction of its text, Labov & Fanshel's method is too complex a model 
to apply to misunderstandings. Since data of misunderstandings are drawn 
from a number of conversations, it would be difficult to amass all the 
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sociological information upon which Labov and Fanshel draw for their 
analysis. 
In preference to complex microanalysis and also to the isolation of 
sequences as analytic methods, an attempt is made in this thesis to develop 
Goffman's view of conversation : 
It a sustained strip or tract of referencings, each 
referencing tending to bear, but often deviously, some 
retrospectively perceivable connection to the 
immediately prior one 
(Goffman, 1976: 309)" 
Instead of an immediately prior utterance, the conversation is described 
in terms of its referencing back to the utterance which has been misunderstood 
or away from that utterance when topics are developed or new ones taken up. 
The term 'topic' is not used in Hockett's sense (1958: 201), making 
distinction between 'topic' and 'comment' in the same way that subject 
was traditionally distinguished from predicate. In this thesis it is not a 
grammatical term but instead is a general term for what the conversation, 
in -hart or in whole, might be said to be about. While it is agreed that 
this is notoriously difficult to determine (McGregor, 1982.1983,1984,1985) 
there is nevertheless a strong folk-linguistic conviction that at the time 
a conversation is taking place its participants are talking about 'something' 
or a series of 'somethings' ; each 'something' is a topic' in this thesis 
(see Brown & Yule, 1983: 68ff. for a clear discussion of "discourse topic" 
and "speaker's topic"). 
A 'rroposition', what a speaker intends to express in an utterance, 
is identified within the topic. A proposition is a particular ¶omething' 
contributed by an individual as a part of the whole 'something', the topic, 
which is being talked about. The term 'proposition' is more usually used 
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in respect of sentences and is usually deemed subject to a true-false 
distinction. Lyons (1977: 38), for example, describes propositions thus : 
"... propositions are expressed by sentences (and contained in utterances) 
and may be either true or false", while Hurford & Heasley (1983: 19) define 
it as follows :"A PROPOSITION is that part of the meaning of the utterance 
of a declarative sentence which describes some state of affairs". If a 
speaker asks a question he is questioning the truth of the proposition; if 
he issues a command he attempts to alter the truth of the proposition by 
demanding that some element to the proposition be changed. 
In this thesis, however, a proposition is neither true nor false. 
It can be a statement, question or command. In, for example, the utterance 
"I wonder what she's selling it for" (A5 in the corpus of data) the proposition 
is that the speaker is curious about how much "she" is asking for "it" (a 
car) and that the speaker would like to know this amount. The facts that 
the speaker "wonders" and that "she" is selling her car are not propositions ; 
the combination of the two in the utterance is the proposition. Additionally, 
in this thesis 'proposition' is not restricted to factual usage ; it can 
have descriptive, expressive or social use (Lyons, 1977). The term 'proposition' 
is used in this general sense so that reference can be made to what the 
speaker intends to express and what the hearer believes to have been expressed. 
The true-false distinction is irrelevant and the requirement that a., 
proposition applies only to a declarative utterance is too limiting. Freed 
from these restrictions it is possible to attribute 'proposition' to whatever 
the speaker intends to express and 'received proposition' to whatever the 
heaver believes to have been expressed. 
The analysis presented in this thesis is based on what participants do 
with the propositions which they have expressed, when these have been 
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misunderstood. It thus differs from the ethnomethodologists' Mork and from 
more conventional discourse analysis. The adoption of the proposition as 
the central unit of analysis has been mooted in respect of child language 
discourse (Ochs, Schieffelin & Platt, 1979) while other proposition-based 
analyses of texts are directed towards investigation of memory-representation 
and the comprehension of text rather than investigation of understanding 
and communication (see Stubbs, 1983: 213-4 and Brown & Yule, 1983: 107ff. for 
discussions of proposition-based analyses of texts). Because the term 
'proposition' is not used in its formal sense in this thesis, the system 
of analysis presented here, though based on propositions, differs from 
analyses of texts based on the constituent propositions of the sentences 
contained therein. 
Research on conversation has not been confined to its structure and ways 
of analysing it. There has also been some consideration of the way 
conversation can be successfully understood. While there is no absolute 
blueprint for the procedures adopted by participants, Grice's 'conversational 
maxims' (1975: 45-7) are frequently referred to as being probable guiding 
principles. Grice also establishes a "Cooperative Principle" : 
Make your conversational contribution such as is required,  
at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose 
or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged 
(Grice, 1975: 45). 
Grice simplifies the co-operation between participants by concentrating 
on the positive contribution to communication made by apparent failures 
to observe this principle, these apparent failures in fact producing 
conversational implicatures. A participant can exploit the conversational 
maxims which Grice details (1975: 45-7) for the purpose of producing a 
conversational implicature ; on the other hand, the participant might not 
be exploiting a maxim but night instead have failed to fulfil a maxim 
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because he has failed to hear an utterance correctly or having heard it 
correctly he has nevertheless misunderstood it. Such a participant might 
believe he is observing the Cooperative Principle whereas in fact he cannot 
do so because the utterance to which he responds is not the one produced 
by the speaker. 
The Cooperative Principle is counter-productive as an aid to understanding 
once a misunderstanding has occurred. If a speaker assumes the Cooperative 
Principle has been observed by a hearer, and such an assumption is likely, 
he will not realize that a misunderstanding has occurred because he will 
assume that the hearer has a valid conversational reason for producing an 
utterance which appears to change the topic or which fails to fulfil some 
other maxim. The speaker would then attempt to determine what has been 
conversationally implicated in the response to his utterance, an attempt 
which is certain to fail. The Cooperative Principle depends on mutual 
understanding, the very thing it is intended to facilitate, yet it can 
hamper correct understanding. 
The assumption that an "accepted purpose or direction of the talk 
exchange" (Grice, 1975: 45) can be absolutely determined by one participant 
ignores the fact that conversation is dynamic and that "purposes" and 
"directions" are changeable according to how they are understood. Grice's 
maxims focus on the utterance produced so that an active role is played by 
the speaker, who constructs the optimal utterance in which to express his 
proposition, while the hearer more passively assumes that the utterance 
is in compliance with the maxims and bases his understanding on that 
compliance. However, a hearer is not a replica of a speaker and what may 
betinformative, true, relevant and perspicacious for the speaker may not be 
for the hearer. The achievement of mutual understanding requires each to 
make allowances for the other's individual characteristics and beliefs,. 
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whether or not these are known or assumed. 
Failure to communicate successfully is not necessarily because the 
speaker's utterance has not been as informative, true, relevant or 
perspicacious as it might have been, according to some absolute, ideal 
criteria, but because the hearer does not wholly share the speaker's 
beliefs about these qualities, understanding instead some other information, 
truth, relevance or perspicacity from the utterance. The fact that each 
speaker-hearer is a separate individual with a different belief can pose 
a, more potential threat to successful communication than the conventional 
'performance' interferences such as accoustic distortion, hesitation which 
affects clarity and so on. 
It is apparent from the body of research on conversation that the 
dynamism of interaction is difficult to reflect in an analysis and that 
although intentions and understandings are intrinsic to the communicative 
process, they cannot easily be accommodated in analyses of conversation. 
In an attempt to incorporate intention and understanding into an analysis 
of misunderstanding, a model of communication is proposed in the following 
section. This model details possible outcomes to communication attempts 
and relates these outcomes to what the speaker intended to communicate. 
The model draws on Lyons's (1977: 37) model for its structure in that it 
contains the following elements : sender, message, signal, message, 
receiver. In addition, it specifies outcomes in a similar way to the 
outcomes proposed by Varonis & Gass (1985: 333-335). The proposed model 
does not incorporate the hearer's confidence in his understanding of the 
utterance although this is implied because both understanding and 
misunderstanding are confident beliefs while non-understanding is either 
a confident belief in a lack of understanding or a doubt in the understanding 
which means that there is no conclusive understanding achieved. The 
model makes clear whether or not there is variation between what is 
intended and what understood. 
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4. A PROPOSED MODEL OF COMMUNICATION 
In this thesis 'S' and 'H' are specifically a speaker and a hearer 
who respectively are misunderstood and misunderstand. In the model 
of communication a speaker is characterized as 'A' and a hearer as 'B'; 
the model is not limited to communication which results in misunderstand- 
ing and therefore A becomes S and B becomes H only in particular 
instances. 
When A communicates a proposition to B there are three possible 
outcomes to the communication :B can (a) understand, that is, correctly 
comprehend what proposition A endeavours to communicate; or (b) non- 
understand, that is, fail to comprehend any proposition at all ; or 
(c) misunderstand, that is, fail to comprehend correctly the proposition 
which A endeavours to communicate and instead comprehend a different, 
incorrect proposition. 
The proposition, p, is expressed in an utterance, x. The 
constitution of x as an apt expression of p is A's responsibility. 
Optimally, x will be as clear an expression of p as possible, complying 
with the grammar of the language and with numerous pragmatic constraints. 
If A expresses p in an apt x and utters x so that it can clearly be 
heard, the success of the communication depends on how B receives both 
x and p, that is, how he hears and interprets x and what proposition he 
understands it as expressing. The interpretation of x is the decoding 
of its constituents; one can comprehend x correctly without necessarily 
comprehending p correctly. 
B's reception of x is xr. B's reception of p is pr. x and pp 
are unlikely to match x and p exactly. What B hears, the received 
utterance, x, will be an approximation of x and what B understands, the 
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received proposition, p, will similarly be an approximation of p. 
Close approximation is sufficient to count as equivalence, that is, 
correct hearing and understanding. 
The model of communication details the various ways by which the 
three possible outcomes of communication are achieved : 
A expresses proposition p in utterance x: 
For B: (a) understanding 
X=X 
P=p F 
XX 
pr =p 
(iii) x=0 
Prap 
(b) non-understanding 
(iv) x= x (v) xx (vi) 
x= 
Pr=0 IT 0 IF=A 
(c) misunderstanding 
ýVýl X=X viii) 
X 
,ix 
FF #p 
(ix) x=0 
PP 
(a) Understanding When the outcome of communication is understanding, 
B receives the proposition which A intended him to receive. 
In the first instance of understanding, (i) x=x, pr = p, 
x is 
equivalent to x; B correctly hears and interprets the utterance 
produced by A. p is equivalent to p; B correctly understands the 
proposition intended by A. 
In (ii), xýx, p=p, B fails either to hear or to interpret 
correctly the utterance produced by A but correctly understands the 
proposition intended by A. The faulty reception of x can be due to 
mishearing or to an incorrect interpretation of the utterance. One 
frequently encounters the claim 'I don't understand what you are saying 
but I know what you mean'. Neither mishearing nor utterance 
interpretation error by B need preclude correct understanding of the 
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proposition expressed in that utterance. 
In (iii), x=O, pr = p, B does not receive any utterance at all 
but nevertheless correctly understands the proposition. In a crowded 
bar, for example, one might not hear what is said but one can correctly 
understand that one is being offered a drink. 
(b) Non-understanding When the outcome of communication is 
non-understanding B does not receive any proposition at all. 
In the first instance of non-understanding, (iv) xr = x, 
r 01P 
the utterance is received correctly but no proposition is received. 
Examples of such non-understanding are common in teaching sessions where 
a pupil correctly hears what the teacher has said and decodes that 
utterance correctly but has no understanding of it whatsoever, such '* 
as the following mathematical joke which frequently results in non- 
understanding : Question: If two Witcher, of Agnesi revolved about their 
asymptotes and then lay'beside a hyperboloid in one sheet, would there be 
be a perfect union? Answer: It depends on their eccentricities. 
In (v), x jx, pr = 0, the utterance is incorrectly heard or 
decoded and because of the mishearing or incorrect decoding no 
proposition is received. 
In (vi), x=0, pr = 0, no utterance is received and no 
proposition is received. In a crowded bar this could be an offer of 
a drink by A which B cannot hear and cannot understand. 
(c) Misunderstanding When the outcome of communication is 
misunderstanding, B (H) receives a proposition which is not the 
proposition A (S) intended him. to receive. 
70 
In the first instance of misunderstanding, (vii) x=x, IF 0 p, 
the utterance is correctly received but the proposition which B (H) 
receives is incorrect. This is illustrated by the following datum from 
the corpus, : A5 : 
(1) S: I wonder what she's selling it for 
(2) H: Going up in the world getting rid of 
her bashed mini 
(3.1 S: No that's not what I mean 
.2: 1 mean how much is she selling it for 
(1) is x. It is ambiguous and can be correctly interpreted in two ways. 
The proposition which A (S) intends to express in x, however, is one 
of the two possible interpretations. B (H) fails to receive this 
proposition, receives the other and misunderstands. 
In (viii), x : t-x, pr 0 p, neither utterance nor proposition are 
correctly received. B (H) hears or interprets x incorrectly and 
understands p incorrectly, as in the following datum, B54 : 
(1) S: Where do you do this ? 
(2) H: To make the crops grow 
(3) S, O: / laugh 
(4) 0: (S) said WHERE do you do it 
A (S) and B (H) are discussing morris dancing. "Where" in (1) is 
misheard as 'why' and therefore the proposition is misunderstood. 
In (ix), xr = O, IF 4 p, no utterance is received and the 
proposition which is received is incorrect. In a crowded bar, for 
example, this could be the understanding of an utterance which has not 
been heard, as an offer of a drink where actually A (S) is saying that 
he is going. 
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Specification of how xr and pr relate to x and p results in the 
communicative outcome of any one utterance. The immediate outcome of a 
misunderstanding of an utterance is specified as 'j p'. Conversations 
consist of more than single utterances and the eventual outcome of a 
misunderstanding may be the consequence of a series of utterances exchanged 
by S, H and any other participants 01,02, On. Thus the communicative 
outcome may develop from 'pr ý p' to 'p a p' by means of a series of 
utterances. The model of communication provides the means by which these 
utterances and their contribution to the development and resolution of a 
misunderstanding may be analysed. Chapter IV outlines the analytic method 
which draws on the communication model and which is subsequently applied 
to the corpus of data in order to determine the structural characteristics 
of misunderstandings. 
S 
CHAPTER IV 
ANALYTIC METHODOLOGY FOR ESTABLISHING 
THE STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter III it was argued that an analysis of conversation ought 
to be able to reflect the dynamism of interaction. Additionally, it was 
suggested that an analysis of conversation should not exclude consideration 
of the meaning of utterances nor the contingent issues of what the speaker 
intends to express and what the hearer understands to have been expressed. 
The analytic method adopted in this thesis seeks to meet these requirements 
by detailing the ways in which participants refer to the proposition 
expressed in the misunderstood utterance, the proposition which is understood 
to have been expressed, the utterance itself and the utterance which 
manifests the misunderstanding and which is based on or derives from that 
misunderstanding. 
Drawing on the model of communication proposed in Chapter III, the 
corpus of misunderstandings can be analysed by attending to the ways in which 
participants refer (i) to p, the proposition which S intends. to express in 
an utterance, (ii) to x, the utterance which S produces, (iii) to 
x r, the 
utterance which H hears and decodes, (iv) to pr, the proposition which H 
believes to have been expressed and (v) to the utterance by H which is 
based on H's p. This last utterance would be the next x in a sequence of 
utterances in the communicative process but in order to simplify the analysis 
x is restricted to the utterance by S which H misunderstands. This enables 
subsequent utterances which relate to x to be analys, sd in terms of their 
relationship to x. 
2. AN OUTLINE OF THE STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS 
In Chapter Ia misunderstanding was defined as occurring when H 
incorrectly understands a proposition expressed by S in an utterance and 
subsequently manifests this incorrect understanding in an utterance. It 
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follows from this definition that a misunderstanding must contain at 
least two utterances : (i) the utterance by S which is misunderstood and (ii) 
the utterance by H which is based on this misunderstanding. The analysis 
of misunderstandings commences with the identification of these two 
utterances, which are termed origin and manifestation respectively. 
A misunderstanding probably contains utterances in addition to the 
origin and the manifestation and many of these utterances will relate to 
the misunderstanding, developing it, resolving it or failing to resolve it. 
These utterances, which may include paralinguistic features such as laughter, 
are termed devices and constitute the means by which participants deal 
with misunderstandings. The term device is adopted in preference to 
'strategy' (Brown & Levinson, 1978) because 'strategy' implies conscious 
application whereas a device may be used without the participant being 
aware of its use. 
Origin, manifestation and devices constitute the textual components 
of a misunderstanding. They are produced by the particiLpants and can be 
checked against a transcribed record of what was said. A misunderstanding 
also contains non-textual components which the analyst can only recover 
after consideration of the textual components and, if available, retrospective 
commentary by the participants. The non-textual components are the speaker's 
intention, p, which can be recovered by assessment of the origin and of 
subsequent devices, and the hearer's understanding, p T, which can be recovered 
by assessment of the manifestation and of subsequent devices. The other 
non-textual component which can be identified is the particular understanding 
which participants have in respect of the misunderstanding, namely, whether 
or not each participant is aware that the misunderstanding has occurred, 
termed state of realization. Identification of each partici4pant's state 
of realization provides a key to the interpretation of the conversation 
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since, for example, if S realizes and H does not realize a misunderstanding 
has occurred, H will have a different understanding of the origin utterance 
to S, who will know that H has this different understanding. 
A misunderstanding consists of a number of utterances and it occurs 
within a conversation which usually contains additional prior and subsequent 
utterances. A misunderstanding originates with the origin utterance and 
it closes when it has ceased to be the topic of conversation. After a 
misunderstanding has lg osed, participants either return to the topic raised 
in the origin, having agreed what that topic is intended to be, or they take 
up a new topic. If participants do not realize that a misunderstanding has 
occurred, that misunderstanding closes when the topic raised in the origin, 
which remains misunderstood, is no longer the topic of conversation. 
Thus, if participants are aware that a misunderstanding has occurred, that 
misunderstanding . 
closes when it has been resolved whereas if they do_ 
not realize it has occurred, thereby continuing to have different 
understandings of the origin, that misunderstanding closes when a new 
topic is raised. For such participants the misunderstanding continues 
throughout the conversation but generally ceases to affect understandings 
of subsequent topics. 
The analysis of a misunderstanding therefore follows the following 
procedure : (i) identify origin and manifestation, (ii) identify devices 
between the origin and the close of the misunderstanding and (iii) identify 
the participants' states of realization. The following sections discuss 
this procedure, step by step. 
3. ORIGIN AND MANIFESTATION 
The origin is the point in the conversation at which the misunder- 
standing originates. It is misleading to think of the origin as the 
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'beginning' of a misunderstanding because only the analyst can perceive 
that the misunderstanding 'began' at the origin. The participants might 
be aware of the origin retrospectively but the misunderstanding 'begins' 
for them at the point in the conversation when they realize that it has 
occurred ; such realization can happen at a different time in the 
conversation for each participant. Prior to the realization that a 
misunderstanding has occurred each participant believes that correct 
understanding obtains. 
An utterance by S only becomes an origin if H subsequently produces 
an utterance based on his misunderstanding of S's utterance. This utterance 
by H is termed manifestation: it manifests the misunderstanding in the 
conversation. The ambiguous notion of 'beginning' could also be applied 
to manifestation because the conversation following the manifestation is 
influenced by or centres on the misunderstanding. A misunderstanding 
therefore does not begin' at any point in the conversation but rather it 
originates in one utterance and is manifested in another. 
Origin and manifestation occur in a strict sequential order but it 
must be stressed that H is not under any obligation to provide a 
manifestation. When H responds to a question he is often obliged or expected 
to provide an answer ; he is under no such obligation or expectation to 
provide a manifestation of any misunderstanding he might have made of that 
question and though he will very likely do so he will not be aware that 
his utterance is a manifestation. The fact that a question has been 
misunderstood is of no consequence to the sequential organization which 
conventionally expects an answer to be provided to a question, unless the 
force of the utterance as a question has been misunderstood and the reply 
fails to take the form of a recognizable answer. Unless a manifestation 
is provided the misunderstood question is not an origin. The sequencing 
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of origin and manifestation is a structure imposed on the conversation by 
the analyst and has no immediate'part in a speaker-hearer's folk-linguistic 
awareness, although in a post hoc sense S and/ or H might be-aware of the 
roles of the two utterances. 
Identification of the origin depends on the identification of the 
manifestation. Identification of the manifestation is made in the light of 
its inappropriacy as a response to the origin. Since a manifestation is 
the product of an incorrect understanding of the origin it is a response 
to a different proposition than the one which S intended to express in his 
utterance. Consequently, the manifestation is likely to lack coherence. In 
the following example, extracted from B53, the manifestation is not an 
appropriate response to the origin : 
(1) ORIGIN S: Are you Manx ? 
(2) MANIF. H: No, eh, I'm divorced actually 
H misunderstands S's question in (1) as meaning 'Are you married ?' and her 
reply is to this question rather than the one actually asked by S, "Are 
you Manx? ". The inappropriacy of (2) in response to (1) enables both S 
and the analyst to realize that a misunderstanding has occurred. 
The manifestation in the example is a direct one because it is a 
recognizably inappropriate response to the origin. An indirect manifestation 
is one which is an apparently appropriate response to the origin and which 
therefore cannot be recognized as being a manifestation without further 
utterances to elaborate it. The manifestation is indirect in the following 
datum, A48 : 
(1) ORIGIN S: I've only got one side of it 
(2) MANIF. H: Why? 
(3) S: Because I've got Peer Gynt on the other 
(4) H: Oh I thought you meant it was in mono 
(5) S: No I meant only one side of the album 
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S and H are listening to a tape which S made of H's record. H's response 
to the origin with the wh-question "Why? ", in (2), is an appropriate 
response and S answers the question in (3) without being aware that a 
misunderstanding has occurred. Had H, who knows that the record is in 
stereo, asked a more specific question, such as 'Didn't you record it 
properly? ' or 'Is your music centre broken? ' ,S might have realized 
that a misunderstanding had occurred. Instead, H becomes aware of this in 
the light of S's response in (3) , which is an answer to a different question 
('Why (have you only got one side of the record)? ') and responds in (4) 
with an explanation of what she thought S intended to express in the on in. 
This explanation enables both S and the analyst to realize that the 
misunderstanding has occurred and it further enables the analyst to locate 
the indirect manifestation at (2). Without subsequent utterances to 
elaborate it, such as occur in this datum, an indirect manifestation can 
oril. y be identified if H subsequently becomes aware that he has misunderstood 
the origin and reports the misunderstanding to the analyst. 
The analysis of a misunderstanding thus commences with the identification 
of the on in and the manifestation ; in the case of indirect manifestations 
other utterances must be examined. These utterances are devices. 
4. DEVICES 
The manifestation is one utterance between the origin and the close of 
a misunderstanding. A variable number of other utterances are also to be 
found between the origin and the close. In A48 above, the misunderstanding 
consists of five utterances: (1) and (2) are the origin and the 
manifestation respectively, while (3), (4) and (5) are additional utterances. 
These additional utterances are devices.. Devices chiefly consist of 
utterances which relate to the origin and what S intends it to express, to , 
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to the manifestation and what H has misunderstood the origin as expressing 
and to the fact that S's and H's understandings are or might be at 
variance. Devices pertain to a misunderstanding in a variety of ways : 
they can refer specifically to the misunderstanding, can express propositions 
which elaborate the origin or the manifestation, can query S's intention 
or H's understanding, can signal or acknowledge error and so on. Devices 
can also be extralinguistic features such as actions undertaken by the 
participants which have some bearing on the misunderstanding. 
Use of the various devices contributes to the development and potential 
or actual resolution of misunderstandings. In A4 8 S's answer in 
(3) as to 
why she only has one side of the record, as opposed to the anticipated 
answer as to why she recorded the record in mono, enables H to realize that 
she has misunderstood (1). H's subsequent explanation then enables S to 
realize that the misunderstanding has occurred and prompts an explanation 
by S of what she intended to express in the origin. These three utterances 
each constitute particular devices, explained and illustrated below, and 
they enable the misunderstanding to be fully resolved. 
The model of communication is used to analyse the structure of 
misunderstandings. x corresponds with the origin, the utterance which is 
misunderstood. xr corresponds with what H hears and decodes. p corresponds 
with what proposition S intends to express in his origin utterance. 
p 
corresponds with H's understanding of that origin ; pr is often revealed 
in direct manifestations. 
Although every utterance is an x and every proposition expressed 
therein is a p, in this thesis x is restricted to the origin utterance and 
p to the proposition expressed in that origin. It is thus possible to 
specify a number of utterances other than the origin and the manifestation 
by referring them back to x and ý in terms of their function relating to x 
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and p, and to xr and p in terms of their function relating to 
x and p. 
Thus, an utterance which explains the origin is specified as 'x ex lained' 
in that it explains what was said while an utterance which explains what S 
intended to express in the origin is specified 'p explained' in that it 
explains what was meant, such as ".. I meant only one side of the album" 
(A48). 
Similarly, an utterance which explains what the origin was heard or decoded 
as is specified as 'x explained' in that it explains what utterance H 
heard and decoded, while an utterance which explains what the origin was 
understood as is specified 'pr explained' in that it explains what 
proposition H believed to have been expressed in x, such as ".. I thought 
you meant it was in mono" (A48). - 
Function specifications such as 'p explained' and 'xr explained' 
are devices, the use of which enables participants to develop and resolve 
misunderstandings. Various devices are available to participants, including 
a number which relate to x, p, x and Pr. x may be 'completed', 'repeated', 
'emphasized', 'amplified', 'explained', 41ueried' or 'refuted' ; p, xr and pr 
may be 'explained', 'queried' or 'refuted'. These terms are used in a 
specific technical sense which usually but not invariably corresponds with 
the everyday non-technical sense of the word. 'Amplification', for example, 
does not detail increased volume but rather an elaboration or the provision 
of additional information. 
The model of communication shows the outcome of a misunderstanding as 
I/ p': the proposition which S intends to communicate is not the 
proposition which H understands to have been communicated. A number of 
devices relate to '# p': if there is an awareness that something is not 
right in the conversation, participants can draw attention to this by 
'signalling' an error in pr and-they can 'acknowledge' such an error, 
while if they realize a misunderstanding has occurred they can draw attention 
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to this by 'signalling' a misunderstanding and they can 'acknowledge' the 
occurrence of a misunderstanding. 
since x and p are restricted to the origin, any utterance which develops 
or changes the topic of the origin cannot be specified as another x which 
expresses another p, unless it in turn is misunderstood. Therefore, any 
utterance which expresses another proposition between the on n and the 
close of the misunderstanding is specified as 'y'. Utterances which express 
new propositions after the close of the misunderstanding are specified as 
'z' utterances ; these do not contribute to the development or resolution of 
the misunderstanding although they may relate to the origin in that, for 
example, they provide an answer to a question posed in the origin. 
The devices outlined thus far are related to x, p, p and 
x, an error 
in p 'and the misunderstanding itself or are 'y' or `z' utterances which are 
distinct from x and p. Other utterances may be related to the manifestation. 
Such utterances cannot be dealt with in terms of x, p, xx and 
p yet would 
need to be specified as distinct from 'y' and 'z' utterances because they 
would be pertinent to the manifestation rather than being utterances which 
raise new topics or which develop that of the origin. In order to 
accommodate such utterances in the analytic system, the function specifications 
of utterances in relation to x, p, p and r are also applied to utterances 
which relate to the manifestation. The manifestation can thus be 'completed' 
'repeated', 'emphasized', 'amplified' 'explained', 'queried' and 'refuted'. 
It is important to bear in mind that these devices are in terms of the 
utterance which is the manifestation rather than the proposition which that 
utterance expresses ; devices relating to the proposition expressed in the 
manifestation are in terms of pr. 
An additional device which is not related to the model of communication 
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and is not an utterance is the extralinguistic device of 'action'. 
Positional or other moves may be important contributions to a misunderstanding 
and must therefore be incorporated in the analysis. 
The following list details the devices which constitute the various 
utterances to be found in misunderstandings. As will be seen in Chapter 
VI below, not all these devices are used in the corpus. Each device is 
exemplified by relating it to the origin and manifestation of an actual 
misunderstanding. A5 is 
ORIGIN S: I wonder what she's selling it for 
MANIF. H: Going up in the world getting rid 
of her bashed mini 
(a) Devices which relate to x xr, p and p: 
1. x completed : "It for" (if the origin had been interrupted, 
such as 'I wonder what she's selling') 
2. x repeated : ""I wonder what she's selling it for" 
3. x emphasized s "I wonder WHAT she's selling it for" 
4. x amplified : "I wonder how much she's selling it for" 
5. x explained : "I said I wonder what she's selling it for" 
6. x queried : "Did you say I wonder what she's selling it for? " 
7. x refuted : "You didn't say I wonder what she's selling it for" 
8. X explained : "I thought you said I wonder why she's selling it" 
9. X queried : "Did you think I said I wonder why she's selling it ?" 
10. xr refuted : "I didn't say I wonder why she's selling'it" 
11. p explained : "I meant how much is she selling it for" 
: 12. p queried : "Did you mean you wonder how much she's selling it for-? " 
13, p refuted : "You can't mean you wonder how much she's selling it for" 
14. pr explained : "I thought you meant why is she selling it" 
15, p queried : "Did you think I meant why is she selling it? " 
16. pr refuted : "I didn't mean why is she selling it" 
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(b) Devices which relate to the misunderstanding or to an error in 
p 
17. P error signal : "What ?" or "pardon? " 
18. p error acknowledgement : "Sorry" (assuming the 
p error 
acknowledgement stems, for example, from 
from an objection to the snideness of the 
manifestation's comment on the social 
pretensions of the seller) 
19. misunderstanding signal : "We're at cross-purposes" 
20. misunderstanding acknowledgement : "Oh, I get you now" 
(c) Devices which involve utterances which express new propositions and 
which relate to the manifestation : 
21. y: "I might be able to afford it" 
22. manifestation completed : "Of her bashed mini" (if the manifestation 
had been interrupted after "Going up 
in the world getting rid" 
23. manifestation repeated : "Going up in the world getting rid of her 
bashed mini" 
24. manifestation emphasized : "GOING UP in the world GETTING RID of 
her bashed mini" 
25. manifestation amplified : "Improving her status by getting rid of 
her battered old mini" 
26. manifestation explained : "I said going up in the world getting 
rid of her bashed mini" 
27. manifestation queried : "Did you say going up in the world getting 
rid of her bashed mini? " 
28. manifestation refuted : "You didn't say going up in the world 
getting rid of her bashed mini" 
29. z: "You don't want to buy that o: ld thing" (after the misunder- 
-standing has been resolved) 
(d) Devices which involve extralinguistic activity : 
30. action : Looking at the advertisement for the car (to see the price) 
These devices would vary depending on whether they were used by S or H 
but the examples indicate the nature of each device. 
Having identified origin, manifestation and devices it becomes possible 
to determine each participant's state of realization. 
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ý. STATES OF REALIZATION 
Every participant must either realize or fail to realize that a 
misunderstanding has occurred. States of realization are thus pertinent 
to every misunderstanding. When a misunderstanding has occurred, participants' 
understandings of the conversation depend on their state of realization. 
Thus S could realize but H could fail to realize that a misunderstanding 
had occurred and they would therefore understand the conversation differently. 
A misunderstanding in which these states of realization obtained would 
differ from one in which both participants realized and would differ again 
from one in which neither realized. - 
It is possible to determine which states of realization obtain by 
examining the devices used between the origin and the close of the 
misunderstanding. If, for example, S has realized a misunderstanding has 
occurred he might attempt to ensure that H also realizes, that is, attempt 
to effect realization. If S uses explicit devices such as 'p refuted' and 
'p explained', that is, "No I didn't mean ... " and "I meant ... 
", it is 
probable that S has realized and is attempting to effect realization for 
H. H, in response, might use a device such as 'misunderstanding 
acknowledgement' or 'p explained', that is, "Oh! " and "I thought you 
meant ... " which could make it apparent that H has realized the 
misunderstanding has occurred. 
States of realization can also be determined by eliciting retrospective 
commentary from the participants. Additionally if a participant reports 
a misunderstanding then that participant has realized that the 
misunderstanding has occurred. 
I 
The analyst should attempt to determine the point in the conversation , 
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at which realization is effected for each participant since the state of 
realization governs the options open to participants. 
Realization is subject to binary classification because in every 
misunderstanding '+ realization' or '- realization' must obtain for every 
participant. However, it is not always possible to be certain of all 
participants' states of realization because of insufficient textual evidence 
or lack of retrospective commentary and therefore provision must be made 
for those data in which there is uncertainty. When textual evidence 
suggests that '+ realization' or '- realization' obtains but when there 
is no confirmation of this '? + realization' or '? - realization' are 
deemed to obtain. When there is neither textual evidence nor retrospective 
commentary '? realization' is deemed to obtain. 
6. SUMMARY AND SAMPLE ANALYSES 
A misunderstanding is composed of both textual and non-textual 
components. The textual components can be checked against a transcription 
of what was said and done during a misunderstanding ; they are utterances, 
paralinguistic and extralinguistic features. The non-textual components 
are the participants' intentions and understandings and can only be 
determined by examination of the textual components and/ or by corroboration 
from the participants. 
The textual components can be divided into two t primary and secondary. 
The origin, the utterance by S which is misunderstood by H, and the 
manifestation, the utterance by H which is based on or derives from his 
misunderstanding of the origin, are both primary components in that they 
are essential to a misunderstanding as it is defined in this thesis. All 
remaining utterances, paralinguistic and extralinguistic features are 
devices and are secondary components in that they are optional to a 
misunderstanding as defined in this thesis. 
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The non-textual component which is incorporated in the analysis is 
the state of realization which obtains for each participant, that is, 
whether or not each participant is aware that the misunderstanding has 
occurred. This component serves to mark the point in the conversation at 
which beliefs about the origin and therefore any subsequent utterances 
change. Realization marks the extent of the misunderstanding in two ways : 
(i) from the origin to '+ realization' and (ii) from '+ realization' to 
the close. Prior to realization the participant is not aware of the 
misunderstanding and after '+ realization' the participant can elect to 
resolve or conceal the misunderstanding until it closes. 
The corpus in Appendix 1 is analysed in accordance with the method 
described in this chapter. Each datum includes a commentary which specifies 
(i) the source, (ii) p, the proposition intended by S, (iii) pr, the 
proposition H believes to have been expressed, (iv) S's state of realization 
and how it has been effected (if it is+ realization'), (v) H's state of 
realization and how effected, (vi) 0's state of realization and how effected 
and (vii) whether or not the transcription was confirmed by the participants. 
This commentary serves to explain the misunderstanding since to know what 
p, p F, 'S realization' and 'H realization' are is to understand the course 
of the misunderstanding. 
The following two examples illustrate the analysis. 
(a) A5. S, (f), and H, (f), are discussing a friend who is selling her car 
(1) ORIGIN S: I wonder what she's selling it for 
(2) MANIF. H: Going up in the world getting rid of 
her bashed mini 
(3.1) pr ref. prtl. S: No that's not what I mean 
+S real. 
. 2) p exp. :I mean how much is she selling it for 
+H real. 
. 3) z: I'll have to remember to tell it to 
Claire for her misunderstandings 
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Source s Reported by S 
p=I wonder how much she's selling her car for 
pr =I wonder why she's selling her car 
S real. '+ S real. ' effected by. recognition of cognitive 
inappropriacy of (2); antici4 pated response giving 
price of car. 
H real. _ '+ H real. ' effected by S pr ref. prtl. &p exp. ' 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription. 
S in (1) muses on how much her friend wants for her car but H believes she 
is musing on why the friend is selling the car and in (2) suggests why the 
car is for sale. Thus, (1) is the origin and (2) is the manifestation. 
S realizes that the misunderstanding has occurred because (2) is not an 
appropriate response to (1); this inappropriacy is deemed 'cognitive' 
because the manifestation is not what S has anticipated (the ways in which 
manifestations may be inappropriate are discussed in Charter VII). S then 
sets about alerting H to the misunderstanding. She effects '+ H realization' 
by using . tpr ref. prtl. ' in 
(3.1) and 'p exp. ' in (3.2). In (3.1) she refutes 
H's understanding of (1); this refutation is 'partial' because it does not 
specify H's pr but uses instead a pronoun. In (3.2) S explains what p she 
intended to express. These devices effect '+ H realization'. There is no 
textual evidence for H's state of realization but it was confirmed when the 
two discussed the misunderstanding and recorded it. The utterance (3.3) 
is produced after the misunderstanding has closed, that is, the two participants 
have realized the misunderstanding has occurred and have dealt with it 
successfully. It is therefore a "z" utterance. 
(b) A48. S, (f), and H, (f), are listening to a tape which S has made 
of H's record. 
(1) ORIGIN S: I've only got one side of it 
(2) IND. MANIF. H: Why ? 
(3) y S: Because I've got Peer Gynt on the other 
,+H real 
(4) pr exp. H: Oh I thought you meant it was in mono 
+S real. 
(5) pr ref. prtl. S: No I meant only one side of the album 
&p exp. 
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Source :HaC. E. H. -J. 
p I've only got one side of the record 
pr == I've only got one channel (i. e. It's in mono) 
S real. : '+ S real. ' effected by H's 'pr exp. ', explaining the 
misunderstanding. 
H real. : '+ H real. ' effected by S 'y' utterance, giving reason 
for having one side of the record. 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription. 
S in (1) comments that she only has one side of "it", meaning the record. 
H believes that S is commenting that she only has one channel, that is, 
that she has recorded the record in mono, and in (2) she asks "Why? ". 
(2) is thus an indirect manifestation. It is not an inappropriate response 
to the origin and it is only because S produces, in (3), a 'y' utterance 
which explains what is on the other side of the tape that the misunderstanding 
can be detected by the analyst. The 'y' utterance effects '+ H real. ' and 
H then explains what she thought was intended. This use of 'pr exp. ' in 
(4) effects '+ S real. '. S partially refutes p by saying "No" to H's 
p 
and explaining p in (5). 
Applying this analytic methodology it is possible to analyse the 
corpus. The following three chapters discuss the results of this analysis. 
The primary textual components, origin and manifestation, are discussed in 
Cha: "ter V, the secondary textual components, devices, are discussed in 
Chapter VI and the non-textual component, realizations is discussed in 
Chapter VII. 
CHAPTER V 
PRIMARY TEXTUAL COMPONENTS OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS : 
ORIGIN AND MANIFESTATION 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter IV it was explained that the analysis of misunderstandings 
commences with the identification of two essential utterances : (i) the 
origin, the utterance by S which is misunderstood by H and (ii) the 
manifestation, the utterance by H which is based on his misunderstanding 
of the origin. These two utterances constitute the two primary textual 
components of misunderstandings. 
This chapter discusses the origins and manifestations which have been 
found in the corpus. Section 1 concentrates on the types of origins which 
occur, Section 2 on the types of manifestations and Section 3 on the relation- 
ship between origins and manifestations. 
2. ORIGIN 
The origin is the utterance by S which is misunderstood by H. The 
misunderstanding might be of one or more words in an utterance which is 
otherwise understood correctly or of an entire utterance but the term 
origin is applied to the entire utterance rather than to individual words. 
The proposition which the entire utterance expresses is misunderstood even 
if only one word in that utterance is actually misunderstood. 
An origin may extend over more than one utterance in a speaker turn, 
as in the following example, A6 : 
(1) H: That's six pence 
(2.1) ORIGIN S: 
. 2) ORIGIN 
(3) MANIF. H: 
(4.1) S: 
" . 2) 
S an Australian. Is paying fi 
S- takes three 2p pieces from her purse - 
I thought they'd be more 
They're so big 
It's six pence a sheet regardless of size 
I meant the money 
It looks as if it should be more valuable 
than it is 
Dr some photocopying. 
7. 
The two utterances 
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(2.1) and (2.2) express related propositions, both of which are misunderstood 
and both are deemed origins. 
The following misunderstanding, K85. also has two origins 
) 1 Hell 
ORIGIN 
: 
2 : My nerve ends must be getting nearer the 
surface 
pause 
H - goes to kitchen - 
. 3) ORIGIN S: Im becoming much more susce--tible to 
(2) MANIF. H: Little niggles 
(3) S: Heat and cold 
S is in the kitchen, H, initially, in the adjoining room. The second 
origin is an incompleted statement and the manifestation is an incorrect 
completion of this statement, based on a misunderstanding of "nerve ends" 
in the first on n. This first origin is the primary one and it might not 
be feasible to call the second one an origin at all since H understands it 
correctly as far as it goes in contrast with the first which is misunder- 
stood. However, H interrupts and incorrectly completes (1.3) and would not 
have done so had she not also misunderstood it, carrying over her misunder- 
standing of (1.2). 
The majority of origins are statements, polar questions and wh-questions 
but other utterance types are open to being misunderstood. (See Section 4 
below for a Table detailing the correlation between origin utterance types 
and manifestation utterance types). 
The origin is interrogative in 43% of the corpus and of these the 
illocutionary force is misunderstood in only two data. In A22 the origin 
is understood as a minor statement in which "which" is a relative pronoun 
rather than as a question in which "which" is an interrogative pronoun, as 
S intends. In Q98 a wh-question is understood as a request : 
9o 0 
(1) ORIGIN S: How "s Johnny Walker? 
(2) MANIF. H: Get him some more whisky 
H incorrectly assumes that the question in (1) is an indirect speech act 
which has the force of a request. In the other data in which the origin 
is interrogative H correctly understands that the origin is a question but 
misunderstands the proposition expressed therein. 
In three data (K83, M89 and M91) the origin is a phatic question. The 
person asking the question is not interested in that question being 
answered but wishes to secure the hearer's interest and attention in the 
to is raised by the question, as a prelude to either speaker or hearer 
continuing the topic. The origin in the following example, M89, is a 
phatic question : 
(1) ORIGIN S: 
(2.1 IND. MANIF. H: 
.2 
.3 
(3.1) SS: 
. 2) 
Did Mum say that Anne rang tonight? 
Yes 
Poor Anne 
She was going off to do the washing 
Aaah 
Did she say that Anne phoned ME? 
S asks H is she has been told that Anne, H's daughter, has phoned S; S 
is in fact telling H that the phone call took place as a prelude to talking 
about Anne. H correctly understands (1) as a phatic question in that she 
takes up the topic of Anne but she misunderstands the proposition that the 
phone call was to S., not to herself; S was not aware that Anne had phoned 
S. 
H correctly understands the illocutionary force of the three origins 
which are requests (A19, B56 and L87) and that of the one origin which is 
a command (A18). In A18 the command "Take your paper bin" is misheard 
as 'Take your paper in' and the manifestation is a query as to which paper 
S is referring. 
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The illocutionary force of the origin is misunderstood in one other 
datum, A7. In A7 a minor statement is understood as a request or command : 
(1) 0: That's the sort of thing they do at the 
Crescent 
(2) H: What ? 
(3) ORIGIN S: Seances 
(4) MANIF. H: Say what ? 
H does not understand that (3) is intended to explain that seances are the 
sort of thing "they" do at the Crescent. She understands it to be a request 
or command for her to 'say ances' which she assumes is a test of pronunciation 
since the Crescent is a private school which she attended. Her manifestation 
is a question which seeks to clarify what she is supposed to be 'saying'. 
3. MANIFESTATION 
The manifestation is the utterance by H which is based on or derives 
from H's misunderstanding of the origin and is a response to that origin. 
The manifestation provides evidence, both to participants and analyst, that 
a misunderstanding has occurred. 
Manifestations may be direct or indirect. A direct manifestation is a 
recognizably inappropriate response to the origin whereas an indirect 
manifestation is an apparently appropriate response which cannot be 
recognized as a 
, 
manifestation without further utterances to elaborate it or 
retrospective awareness by H. 
When the indirect manifestation is a question such as "Why? " (as in 
A48) S's response tends to alert H to the misunderstanding, because the 
resronse answers a different question to the one H intends. When, however, 
the origin is a polar question and the indirect manifestation is simply 
"Yes" or "No" the topic may change and neither participant may realize the 
misunderstanding. In data such as the following, A42, however, the tonic is 
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continued and thus the misunderstanding is realized : 
(1) ORIGIN S: 
(2) IND. MANIF. H: 
(3) S: 
(4.1) H: 
.2 
.3 
Are you having your tea and going? 
No 
I thought you were going at quarter to four 
Oh my tea 
I thought you meant my eat tea 
Yes 
S and H are colleagues; H is going to a dental appointment at four o'clock 
and office tea is consumed at half past three. S may well have anticipated 
the answer "Yes" to her question, hence her reluctance to accept H's 
negative answer without further comment. 
The indirect manifestation can be extremely indirect, as the following 
datum, K86, illustrates : 
(1.1) ORIGIN S: Bob's doing a foreigner in Surby for 
somebody 
. 2) : The brother-in-law came over and he doesn't 
speak any English so Bob was in a mess 
. 3) : He got him to the pub but the guy kept talking German 
. 
4) : James knows a bit so they managed 
(2) IND. MANIF. H: How's his marriage? 
(3) S: Which one? 
(4) H: The second 
(5) S: She's going into the Jane in a coins of 
days time 
(6) 2nd MANIF. H: Well what about the one in Surby? 
(7) S: No it's only a foreigner 
(8) H: But .. oh God 
Relevant background information is that Bob, a builder, has been married 
twice, "Surby" is a village, "the Jane" is the local maternity hospital ; 
S, Bob and James are all friends and are all known to H, who is S's sister. 
To understand the misunderstanding, it must be appreciated that "doing a 
foreigner" is Manx idiom for 'moonlighting', that is, performing one's 
trade in one's own time for private employment rather than as part of one's- 
job. H knows this expression but sordidly misunderstands it as meaning 
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'having an affair with a foreigner'. Rather than inquire into the morality 
of the presumed affair, H tries to draw S into commenting by asking after 
Bob's marriage, since the matter-of-fact narrative in (1.1 - : 1.4) gives 
odd 
H the impression that S does not find the situation/while H finds it bizarre, 
particularly that Bob is having this affair "for somebody". S duly answers 
the indirect manifestation but not to H's satisfaction since unbeknown to 
her he does not understand her reason in so questioning him. S, not 
sur-risingly, makes no connection between Bob's building job in Surby for 
somebody with a German brother-in-law and Bob's second, happy and imminently 
productive marriage. H utters a second manifestation in (6), using a 
different wh-question which has the same intention as the first. The reply 
in (7) cannot be as patriotic and chauvenistic as it seems to be and H is 
forced to re-interpret "foreigner", eventually realizing that she has 
misunderstood (1.1). (8) is an admission of problems in understanding 
but after "oh God" H re-interprets the conversation and realizes the 
misunderstanding. S does not realize it since H makes no further comment. 
The indirect manifestation in (2) is unrelated to the topic of the on in and 
therefore ppecludes realization ;S later fails to heed the inatpropriacy of 
the second direct manifestation. 
A second manifestation tends to be a re-phrasing of the first, 
especially when the first is indirect. Manifestations can also be repeated. 
In B60 two participants both misunderstand the origin and both utter 
manifestations. The second H is deemed to be 0 because he is a third 
participant who misunderstands with H and who expresses a manifestation 
subsequent to H's : 
(1) ORIGIN S: Is Freud still alive ? 
(2) IND'MANIF. H: No of course not 
(3) IND. , XANIF. 0: No 
(4) H: He died ages ago didn't he? 
(5) S: Not Freud the man 
(6) H: Uh ? 
(7) S: Freud the idea 
9 
The two manifestations are virtually the same, the first being more 
emphatic. I 
Manifestations, like origins, are not restricted to single utterances. 
The greatest number of utterances which comprise a manifestation is 
four, not because of a particular complexity in the manifestation but 
because the utterances are short statements with one short question. 
The datum, B52, begins 
. as' 
follows : 
(1) ORIGIN S: By the way, what's Darrel wearing? 
(2.1 IND. MANIF. H: I don't know 
.2 MANIF. : I know Eddy Waring 
.3 MANIF. : Darrel Waxing? 
.4 MANIF. : Never heard of him 
S and her husband are going with H to an informal sing-song at which 
H's husband, Darrel, is to play the organ. H's four utterances could 
be construed as thinking aloud; H is trying to work out who "Darrel 
Waring" is, on the assumption that he is someone of note about whose 
profession or claim to fame she is being asked. The four utterances 
all 
, 
manifest her misunderstanding of (1). 
A manifestation may be an incomplete statement. The success of 
the joke in the intentional misunderstanding in A38, for example, depends 
on the fact that the manifestation is not completed but rather remains 
suggestive : 
(1) ORIGIN S: How far do you go with your dates? 
(2.1) H: / laugh 
.2 MANIF. : Well, usually 
(3) S: No, how many have you got arranged ? 
S is trying to organize a planning case to be heard as soon as possible 
and is asking H how far in advance he has arranged dates for the 
meetings at which cases are heard. 
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When H interrupts the origin, his manifestation may be an 
incorrect completion of that örigin, as in K85. When an incorrect 
completion is the manifestation H is not limited to that one utterance. 
In A23 H develops the topic which she incorrectly understands to have 
been begun by S, that of taking over Clive Dixon's cottage, whereas S 
is talking about taking over Clive Derwent's cottage : 
(1) ORIGIN S: Of course when Clive finishes his 
work you could always 
(2.1 MANIF. H: Persuade the sister-in-law to get out 
.2 : 
/ laugh 
.3 : Yes 
.4 : But one of the reasons I turned it down, 
well, took my name off the list really 
. 5) : I think his sister-in-law was always 
going to get it 
. 
6) : But one of the things I didn't like was 
the road 
. 7) : One bend worried me 
. 8) : It was really sharp and the road fell away 
(3.1) S: I think we've, eh, gone astray here a little 
.2 : I was thinking of Clive Derwent 
(4.1) H: Oh, not Clive Dixon 
. 2) : Sorry 
The two Clives work in the same office as. S and H; Clive Derwent is 
on secondment and is living in a rented cottage while Clive Dixon is a 
permanent employee whose sister-in-law has recently moved into a rented 
cottage which H, looking for somewhere to rent, had inspected previously. 
In this datum the manifestation, an incorrect completion of the origins 
is enlarged upon in a number of utterances which are related to that 
manifestation but are not additional manifestations. Distinguishing 
between related utterances and multiple manifestations is not easy except 
in the case of adjacent in_ ct and direct manifestations. There seems, 
however, to be a difference between the development of the topic in 
the manifestation in A23 above and in the two statements which 
comprise the manifestation in the following datum, C62 : 
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(1) S: 
(2) H: 
(3) s: 
(4. i H: 
.2: 
.3: 
s 
it 
There's no-one upstairs 
Oh isn't there 
- comes back downstairs - 
They won't be back till two o'clock 
Oh 
Perhaps you can help me 
I've got a problem with my typewriter 
- shakes head - 
(5) ORIGIN S: Can't deal with it 
(6.1) MANIF. H: But I bought it here 
. 2) MANIF. : It's under guarantee 
(7.1 S: I don't have anything to do with them 
. 2) : I'm down here 
H is taking her typewriter to be repaired. The premises in which the 
conversation takes place are divided into retail stationery on the 
ground floor and typewriter sales and servicing on the first floor. S 
is on the ground floor and H is starting to go upstairs when the 
conversation begins. H understands the origin as meaning that the shop, 
that is, the whole business, cannot deal with repairing her typewriter 
and her manifestation of two statements, which in effect complain that 
the shop ought to deal with it, is based on that misunderstanding. The 
two statements are closely linked rather than the second being a 
related development of the first. 
79% of the manifestations in the corpus are direct while 91 are 
indirect. are one indirect and one direct, 3% are two indirect 
and 1% is one indirect and three direct manifestations. The majority 
of manifestations are statements, with and without an initial "Yes" 
or "No" but, as with origins, other utterance types comprise 
manifestations. 
When the manifestation is a question it is important to be certain 
that the question is a consequence of having misunderstood the origin 
4 
and is not a query of the origin because H is doubtful about his 
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understanding of that origin. In this latter case a potential 
misunderstanding is likely to be resolved before it occurs (but cf. D71 
in which the origin is queried and S's response to this query precedes 
the manifestation; the potential misunderstanding-is thus not resolved 
and duly occurs). A manifestation which is a question can be the product 
of some difficulty which H has with the origin, having misunderstood it. 
This difficulty is illustrated by the following datum, A7 : 
(3) ORIGIN S: Seances 
(4) MANIF. H: Say what? 
The manifestation does not query H's understanding of the origin. It 
seeks to elicit clarification of a word in the origin which H, because 
of the misunderstanding, hears as 'ances'. 
4. ORIGIN AND MANIFESTATION 
The interdependence of origin and manifestation is such that 
discussion of one component frequently requires reference to the other. 
This section discusses the relationship between the two components. 
0 Origins and manifestations are not confined to particular utterance 
types. The correlation of origin utterance types and manifestation 
utterance types is detailed in the following Table : 
11 statement - statement 8 statement - wh-question 8 wh-question - minor statement 
5 wh-question - statement 4 statement - polar question 4 polar question - statement 4 -polar question - No + statement 3 statement - exclamation 
3 two statements -- statement 3 minor statement - statement 3 polar quostion - Yes + statement 2 polar question - minor statement 
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2 polar question - No + minor statement 
1 statement - two statements 
1 statement - minor statement 
1 statement - Yes + statement 
1 statement - No + statement 
1 statement - Mm, minor statement 
1 statement - polar question / exclamation 
1 statement - wh-question; wh-question 
1 statement, incomplete statement - minor statement 
1 statement, polar question - minor statement, statement 
1 statement / wh-question - minor statement 1 incomplete statement - minor statement 
1 minor statement - two statements 
1 minor statement - Yes + statement 
1 minor statement - Yes + statement, statement 
1 minor statement - No + minor statement 
1 minor statement - wh-question 
1 Yes + statement - Yes + statement 
1 polar question - two statements 
1 polar question - Yes 
1 polar question - No 
1 polar question - Yes, minor statement 
1 polar question - No, statement 
1 polar question - No + minor statement 
1 polar question - No + minor statement, No 
1 two polar questions - statement 
1 wh-question - incomplete statement 
1 wh-question - minor statement, statement 
1 wh-question - statement, polar question 
1 wh-question - three statements, polar question 
1. wh-question - No + incomplete statement 
1 wh-question - No + minor statement 
1 wh-question - command 
1 request - Yes + minor statement 
1 request - Yes; polar question 
1 request and statement - statement 
1 request/ polar question - No + statement 
1: phatic question -- ... 
Yes 
1 phatic question - No + statement 
1 phatic question - exclamation 
1 command - wh-question 
The correlation indicates that the constraint on manifestations by 
origins is no more than the constraint imposed on any utterance by the 
utterance to which it is a response. 
Origins which are questions are followed by manifestations which 
are statements, some of which are preceded by "Yes" or "No", or are 
simply "Yes" or "No". The one. exception is Q98 in which the on n is 
a wh-question and the manifestation is a command. Origins which axe' 
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statements are followed by manifestations which are statements, some 
of which are preceded by "Yes" or "No", questions and exclamations. 
There are various manifestation utterance types in response to origins 
which are phatic questions and requests. 
Origin utterance types thus do not markedly constrain manifestation 
utterance types. The relationship between origin and manifestation 
is often marked instead by the lack of topic cohesion between them. A 
manifestation is a response to an origin and it develops the topic 
raised in that origin. Because a manifestation is the product of a 
misunderstanding, that is, because it is an utterance based on an 
incorrect understanding of the origin, it is often an inappropriate 
response. A manifestation can be inappropriate in a number of ways, 
often concurrently. 
A manifestation is 'socially' inappropriate when it conflicts with. 
social norms which are pertinent at the time the utterance is expressed. 
The social norms are in respect of the role and status of participants, 
the conventions of the spatio-temporal setting in which the conversation 
is situated and so on. 'Social inappropriacy' is a feature of the 
manifestation in the following datum, E72 : 
(1) ORIGIN S: Have you done? 
(2) MANIF. H: Yes I've done 
The location is a pub in which H is a barmaid. She has been talking to 
some customers about what she did before working as a barmaid, viz. a 
degree, and what she will be doing when she leaves the job, viz. research. 
She understands the origin to refer to her having finished her degree, 
whereai3. S is actpally'asking_her if she has finished talking, with the 
implication that he wishes to be served. H fails to respond in her 
role as barmaid and instead responds as an equal participant in the 
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conversation. The manifestation is thus 'socially inappropriate' (cf. Sacks, 
1972). 
In instances of ': linguistic inappropriacy' linguistic features such 
as the syntax of the manifestation are not cohesive with the origin. 
'Linguistic inappropriacy' is illustrated in the following datum, A9 : 
(1) ORIGIN 
(2) MANIF. 
S: Is it wool? 
H: Very 
S has commented that she likes H's jumper. H understands the origin to be 
an inquiry as to whether the jumper is warm. The manifestation "Very" is 
an intensifier and in accordance with grammatical conventions should not 
be applied to something which does not admit degree. It is thus 'linguistically 
inappropriate' to apply it to "wool". 
In instances of 'pragmatic inappropriacy' the manifestation is not 
in accord with extralinguistic features, such as background knowledge, 
which obtain at the time. 'Pragmatic inappropriacy' can be seen in the 
following datum, A4 : 
(1) H: When we live in Alston I shall get my 
meat for the freezer from Blackett's 
(2) ORIGIN S: Yes you want to chat Graham up 
(3) MANIF. H: Yeah I'm sure he needs a cowgirl 
pause 
(4) S: No, Graham B3. a. ckett not Graham Richards 
Graham (Blackett) in (2) is a butcher; Graham Richards is a farmer. 
The manifestation is 'pragmatically inappropriate' because butchers, in 
the cause of their profession at any rate, do not have any use for cowgirls. 
A manifestation is 'cognitively inappropriate' when it is not what 
S expects. The following datum, Al, illustrates 'cognitive inappropriacy' : 
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(ý) 
(2) ORIGIN 
(3) MANIF. 
(4) 
H: I did that the other day just a little 
S: How far? 
H: Culy partly on 
S: E ow far did you travel ? 
S and H are talking about leavirg car handbrakes on when driving. S 
expects the response to her question in (1) to be in terms of distance 
travelled, either in miles or it terms of one place to another. H's 
manifestation relates to the mechanical amount the handbrake was on, which 
is not what S expects to be told; the manifestation is thus 'cognitively 
inappropriate'. 
An indirect manifestation is characterized as an apparently appropriate 
response to an origin but it is not invariably appropriate. An indirect 
manifestation must be 'linguists; ally appropriate' but can be 'socially, 
pragmatically or cognitively inappropriate 0, The indirect manifestation 
in the following datum, A42, is 'linguistically appropriate' but 'cognitively 
inappropriate' : 
(1) ORIGIN S: 1- re you having your tea and going? 
(2) IND. MANIF. H: ! 
(3) S: I thought you were going at quarter to four 
(4.1) H: Ch my tea 
. 2) :1 thought you meant my eat tea 
S is inquiring whether H is going to have her regular afternoon cut) of tea 
before going to an appointment. E understands "tea" to refer to her 
evening meal. Since S thinks thrt H is going to her appointment "at quarter 
to four", after the regular time for tea, H's manifestation is contrary to 
her expectation of it. 
Given the inter-dependence of origins and manifestations, it is not 
surprising that identification of the two components is occasionally 
difficult. This difficulty is illustrated by the following datum, A26 : 
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(1) S: What's this ? 
(2.: 1) H: Scheherezade 
.2 : Rimsky-Korsakov 
(3) ORIGIN S: Ah, thousand and one nights woman 
(4) MANIF. H: No, man 
(5) S: No, it was a woman 
(6) H: Rimsky-Korsakov was a man 
(7) S: Scheherezade was a woman 
(8) H: She was but he wasn't 
S and H are listening to a record. (3) was initially considered as a 
possible manifestation of a misunderstanding of (2.2), this being what is 
explained in (6). However, after further consideration, the origin has 
been located at (3), to which (4) is the manifestation. S is elaborating 
on (2.1), "Scheherezade", but H incorrectly understands (3) to be an 
elaboration of (2.2). -"Rimsky-Korsakov", and corrects the sex which she 
believes S is attributing to Rimsky-Korsakov. S assumes that the referent 
of her origin and H's manifestation is the same, that iss Scheherezade, 
and consequently in (5) refutes H's manifestation, indicating that H has 
attributed the wrong sex to Scheherezade. 
In this datum the misunderstanding is 'compounded'. S does not know 
that the referent of the manifestation differs from that of the origin and 
therefore misunderstands the manifestation. In a sense the manifestation, 
(4) becomes a second origin and the next utterance, (5), becomes a second 
manifestation. However, the misunderstanding originates in (3) and is 
manifested in (4) and this misunderstanding is 'compounded' rather than a 
second, different misunderstanding's having occurred. It is misleading to 
treat 'compounds' as separate misunderstandings because they are crucially 
related to the initial. misunderstandings from which they develop. Realization 
of the initial misunderstanding should automatically result in realization 
of 'compounds'. 'Compounds' are part of the structure of a misunderstanding 
rather than separate misunderstandings. 
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Data which have been overheard cannot always be verified and in such 
data it can be difficult to locate the origin and the manifestation as in 
the following example, N92 : 
(1.1) ORIGIN 'S: I can't drink whisky at all 
. 2) ORIGIN : Can you? 
(2.1 MANIF. H: Oh beer and whisky .. the lot 
.2 MANIF. : They'll drink anything, those men 
C3.1 S: Yes, but I can't drink whisky 
.2 : Do you : Like it? 
(4) H: / indistinct 
(5) S: Terrible stuff 
The conversation takes place between two men in a pub. H has been talking 
about oilmen drinking heavily. 
The datum is analysed in such a way that H misunderstands both S's 
statement about his own dislike of whisky and his -po: lar question to H 
regarding H's ability to drink whisky. H instead relates the statement and 
the question to his original topic of the oilmen. It is possible, however, 
that the roles of S and H are wrongly attributed. H in (2.1) could answer 
S's question and then in (2.2) revert to the topic of the oilmen. If this 
is the case, the roles of S and H are reversed: (2.2) is the origin and 
(3.1 
3.2) are the manifestations as follows : 
(2.2) ORIGIN S: They'll drink anything those men 
(3.1) MANIF. H: Yes but I can't drink whisky 
. 2) MANIF. : Do you like it ? 
(4) S: / indistinct 
(5) H: Terrible stuff 
In this analysis H fails to understand that his question has been answered 
and that another statement about the oilmen has been expressed. He thus 
erroneously realizes that a misunderstanding has occurred that is, assumes 
a misunderstanding to have occurred when in fact it has not done so. 
4, 
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There is no way of confirming which utterance was actually misunderstood 
but as the first analysis seems the more likely it is the one adopted 
here. It should be borne in mind, however that an alternative analysis is 
vossible. 
The problem of alternative analysis is encountered more frequently 
when identifying the devices used in the corpus. The devices used in the 
corpus are discussed in Chapter VI. 
CHAPTER VI 
SECONDARY TEXTUAL COMPONENT OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS : 
DEVICES 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The utterances between the origin and the close of the misunderstanding 
constitute the secondary textual components of a misunderstanding and are 
termed devices. This chapter discusses and illustrates the devices 
found in the'corpus. 
Participants develop and resolve misunderstandings by the use of 
devices. Devices are divided into four categories according to what they 
relate to : (a) devices which relate to the production and reception of 
the origin and to the intention and understanding of the proposition 
expressed therein ; (b) devices which relate to the misunderstanding and 
to the awareness of an error in the conversation; (c) devices which 
involve utterances expressing propositions other than that of the origin 
including utterances which relate to the manifestation; (d) devices 
which relate to extralinguistic activity. 
Devices have a number of important features. They need not be 
'complete'. Some are partial' in that they are elliptical utterances, 
often using pro-forms, while others are 'incomplete' in that they are 
begun but not finished. When one utterance constitutes one device, that 
device is deemed 'separate'. When one utterance constitutes two or more 
devices, those, devices are deemed 'combined'. When two or more utterances 
in a participant-turn each constitute devices, those devices are deemed 
'sequential'. 
'Glossing' occurs in a device when a participant comments on the 
production or reception of x, p, x and p, as in "I said ... ", "I 
rr 
thought you meant ... " and so on. By the use of 'glossing' a participant 
intends it to be recognized that he is effecting realization, drawing 
attention to an error, explaining a misunderstanding and so on. Without 
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such 'glossing' a device may be less successful in fulfilling its 
intended purpose. 
The devices encountered in the corpus are presented below according 
to their category. Abbreviations, such as 'p exp. ' for p explained', 
are initially given in brackets and thereafter are used in the text. 
In order to distinguish between specific devices, such as 'p explained', 
together with features of devices, such as 'separate' and the function 
they fulfil, such as 'explanation', only devices and their features are 
apostrophized : 'p explained', a 'separate' device, explains p. It 
should be borne in mind that function terms such as explanation and 
amplification are used in a technical sense. 
Each device is defined and illustrated in Section 2. In Section 3 4, 
the correlation between devices and users is discussed. 
2. DEVICES 
(a) Devices which relate to the production and reception of the 
origin and to the intention and understanding of the proposition expressed 
therein. 
1. 'x completed' ('x comp. ') 
Number of times used, in the-corpus :2 -(both by-S) 
'x comp. ' occurs when S's origin has been interrupted before S has 
finished uttering it and a participant goes on to complete the orb 
after the interruption. In the corpus the interruption is by the 
manifestation but it would be possible for another utterance to interrupt 
the origin and for H, perhaps not hearing the completion or perhaps not 
understanding any or all of the origin correctly, to express a manifestation 
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subsequent to the utterance which interrupted the origin or subsequent 
to the completion of that origin. 
In K83 S completes x without heeding the interruption by the 
manifestation : 
(1) ORIGIN S: Did you read in the Clarion this week 
a fellow called Connan ran away with 
all the prizes at the Flower Show 
(2) MANIF. H: Really 
(3) x comp. S: In a wheel chair 
S has been talking about someone paralysed in an accident. H understands 
"ran away with" as 'stole' rather than 'won' and her manifestation is an 
exclamation that anyone would steal Flower Show prizes. When x is 
completed she has more information to add to her pr and as this information 
is incompatible with her understanding of the origin, she re-interprets 
x and thus realizes the misunderstanding. 
In the other example, K85, H's manifestation also interrupts the 
origin : 
(1.3) ORIGIN S: I'm becoming much more susceptible to 
(2) MANIF. H: Little niggles 
(3) x comp. S: Heat and cold 
In this datum, (2) is a completion of x by H. Because H has misunderstpod 
the origin the completion is incorrect and rather than being the device 
'x comp. ' it is a manifestation. S thenuses 'x comp. ' in (3). 
2. Ix repeated' ('x rpt. ') 
Number of times used in the corpus : 13 (all by S). 
4' 
'x rpt. ' occurs when either the entire origin or a part of it-is 
repeated, which draws attention to the utterance, often to the specific 
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item which has been misunderstood. It offers H another attempt at 
correct understanding and can alert him to the fact that his first 
understanding was incorrect. 
x is 'partially' repeated in the following example, A43 : 
(1) ORIGIN S: They've band concerts here 
(2) IND. MANIF. H: Why ? 
(3) x rpt. prtl. S: Band concerts 
When reporting the misunderstanding S commented that after the indirect 
manifestation he asked himself 'What have I said wrongly that (H) couldn't 
give me an answer ? ', aware that H's response was inappropriate. He 
repeats the topic items of the origin in an attempt to elicit an appropriate 
response or to prompt an explanation of the manifestation. 
x is 'partially' repeated in eight out of the thirteen examples in 
which the device is used. In seven of these examples the lexical 
item is repeated : 
A43 They've band concerts here --j Band concerts 
D71 Who deals with Appeals ? Appeal 
F73 Have you had a funeral ? -j A funeral 
K84 Tim and Harry were going to -ý Ayr 
the air races with Steven 
Jackson 
095 She came up to ask if she .4 R. T. 
could record R. T. 
P97 Get my mail -ý Mail 
Q98 How's Johnny Walker ? .4 Johnny Walker 
Of these 'partial' repeats, A43, K84 and 095 are in response to the 
manifestation questions "Why 211, "Where ?" and "Your what ?" respectively. 
In K84, "Ayr races" has been misunderstood as 'air-races', hence "Where? " 
is a manifestation rather than a request for a repeat of the place. name. 
In the other four, x is 'partially' repeated as a consequence of the 
manifestation and subsequent utterances. 
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In one other example of 'x rpt. pttl. ', B61, the salient parts of 
the origin are repeated, the addressee and referent having been correctly 
understood : 
B61 (H), where does Tom Wade -j Where does he live? 
live ? 
In A10 x is repeated and this device combines with a 'partial' 
refutation of pr : 
(1) H: One of the courses at the wedding 
reception was salmon caught by the 
bridegroom's father a few days before 
(2) ORIGIN S: Poached ? 
(3) MANIF. H: I can't remember how it was cooked 
(4) pr ref. prtl. S: No, poached 
&x rpt. 
The-repetition of x 'combined' with a refutation of pr together cause H 
to re-interpret the homonym "poached" without requiring any further 
direction in understanding what was meant by the origin. 
One datum, M90, has two origin utterances. The second is repeated 
while the first is re-phrased after the manifestation. Re-phrasing is 
discussed below as the device 'x amplified'. M90 is as follows : 
- (1.1) ORIGIN1 S: Would you change character ? 
. 2) ORIGIN : Would you be more ruthless ? 
(2) MANIF. H: I would make Raphael and Michelangelo 
try to make them both realize there's 
a place for both . 
(3.1) x1 ampl. S: Would you have a character change in yourself? 
. 2) x2 rpt. : Would you be more ruthless ? 
S and H are talking about going back in the past and living in another 
country. Distinction is drawn between the first origin utterance, xl, 
(1.1), and the second, x2, (1.2). x2 is an elaboration of xl, suggesting 
one character change open to H. x2 can be repeated after the manifestation 
without additional explanation because the preceding amplification of x1 
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makes it clear that the question refers to changing one's own character 
rather than changing the characters of other people. 
The misunderstanding in 096 was transcribed by H and the origin cannot 
be verified. H had heard only part of the origin and therefore only 
this part could be transcribed : 
(1) ORIGIN S: / indistinct / ... lunchtime 
action H - pats stomach - (2) MANIF. H: So it is 
(3) ?x rpt. S: They only allow you to work lunchtime? 
The device 'x rpt. ', in (3), can only be assumed. It is possible that S 
is not repeating the origin but is amplifying it or producing a different 
utterance altogether, an utterance which coincides with the origin only 
in the final word. 
Devices which can only be assumed are preceded by '? '. 
3. 'x emphasized' ('x emph. ') 
Number of times used in the corpus :6 (5 by S, 1 by 0). 
'x emph. ' occurs when all or part of x is emphasized. The device 
is always 'combined', usually with 'x rpt. ' but also with 'x exp. ' ; to 
emphasize any part of x one must repeat it, either straightforwardly 
as a repeat or-else in an explanation which includes a repeat. Emphasis 
tends to be placed on the part of the utterance which is misunderstood, 
drawing attention to the misunderstanding. x is repeated and the verb 
is emphasized in the following example, B52 
(1) ORIGIN S: 
(2.1) IND. /MANIF. H: 
. 2) MANIF. 
. 3) MANIF. 
. 4) 
(3) S, O: 
(4) x rpt. &x emph. S: 
By the way, what's Darrel wearing ? 
I don't know 
I know Eddy Waring 
Darrel Waring ? 
Never heard of him 
/ laugh / 
What IS Darrel wearing? 
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The verb was given no prominence in the origin. It could be argued 
that "What's" is amplified to "What is".. However, no additional word 
is involved as the change amends conventional conversational ellipsis. 
Amplification therefore does not occur. The 'combined' devices, 'x rpt. 
&x emph. ' effect realization for H who presumably re-interprets the 
origin. Emphasis on the verb might not have been sufficient since it 
gives little direction in understanding and S might well have gone on 
to provide an amplification such as 'What clothes is he wearing? ' to % 
ensure that '+ H real. ' is effected. Emphasis alone, however, is sufficient. 
In the following example, A22, 'x rpt. &x emph. ' are preceded by 
an explanation in which the force of the origin is explained : 
(1.1) H: 
. 2) 
(2) ORIGIN S: 
(3) MANIF. H: 
(4.1) S: 
. 2) 
. 3)x rpt. & x emph. 
I've done the A. I. and the psychology part 
Now I'm doing the linguistic side of it 
Which is the hardest? 
No it's not actually .. no it's 
/ laugh / 
I meant a question 
WHICH is the hardest ? 
4 
Emphasis is placed on the pronoun to stress the fact that the origin is 
a question rather a relative clause. 
In B54 emphasis is 'combined' with an explanation of x: 
(1) ORIGIN S: Where do you do this? 
(2) MANIF. H: To make the crops grow 
(3) 990: / laugh / 
(4) x exp. & x emph. 0: (S) said WHERE do you do it 
The emphasis on "where" draws attention to it and makes H aware that 
he has misheard the origin as 'Why'. 
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4. 'x amplified' ('x ampl. ') 
Number of times used in the corpus : 19 (18 by S, 1 by 0) 
'x ampl. ' occurs when there is a change or addition made to x. 
The device amends ellipsis, provides additional information or re-phrases 
the origin. Its proposition is linked to that of the origin and it does 
not constitute a different utterance with a new proposition. 
In some examples in which the origin is re-phrased, items are 
changed so that the referent can be more clearly identified : 
A15 What are we p3Aying ? 
A18 Take your paper bin 
A38 How far do you go with 
your dates? 
D70 Was it quite a lot ? 
-ý What match is it ? 
-j Your wastie bin 
No, how many have you 
got arranged ? 
ý+y How much was there ? 
These examples illustrate the closeness between x and its amplification. 
The third example, A38, 'combines' 'x ampl. ' with a 'partial' refutation. 
'x ampl. ' remedies problems caused by substitution and ellipsis. 
Origins are augmented by lexical item; and pronouns and, as in the 
first example, by a verb : 
Al How far ? 
A21 Which one do you want ? -9 
C62 Can't deal with it -9 
E72 Have you done ?- 
M89 Did Mum say that Anne rang -]j 
tonight? 
How far did you travel ? 
No, which application ? 
I don't have anything to 
do with them 
Have you done talking? 
Have you done working? 
Did she say that Anne 
phoned ME ? 
The, last example, M89, is an amplification which involves the addition 
of a pronoun, which is emphasized, and a change of lexical item from 
a 
'rang' to 'phoned'. 
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The amplification can be minimal when "but", "and", "as well" and so 
on are added to a repeat of the origin. In the following example, B56, x 
is 'partially' repeated with an amplification by "but" : 
B56 Can I have two egg salad .4 But I owe you two 
rolls and I owe you two 
The amplification apparently serves as a hesitant protest about the 
manifestation, re-directing H's attention to what was expressed in the 
origin. Examples such as this one are not classed as 'x rpt. ' because 
'x ampl. ' generally includes a 'partial' repeat of x, with additions 
and amendations. 
In examples in which a misunderstanding cannot be said to have 
definitely. occurred, the amplification of x is the only clue to indicate 
that. a misunderstanding may have occurred : 
N92 I can't drink whisky at all --ý 
Can you ? 
N93 I've heard they're having 
trouble with the flat roofs 
Yes but I can't drink 
whisky 
Do you like it ? 
4' 
And they're having trouble 
with those flat roofs as well 
The amplification by "And" and "as well" in N93 suggests that S is 
expressing the same utterance as she did in the origin but wishes to 
relate it cohesively to the conversation rather than baldly repeat it. 
It is possible that H was changing the topic in talking about flats but 
S presumably imagines that H has misunderstood her and-she tries to 
express her proposition about the flat roofs and tries to ensure that it 
is correctly received, without necessarily effecting '+ H real. '. More 
strongly in N92, S stresses his inability to drink whisky regardless of 
what H might say. To make sure that H receives the proposition correctly 
he asks his elliptical polar question in full. 
A different type of lexical item change is evident in the following 
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example in which a person's name is expressed more formally : 
Q98 How's Johnny Walker ? .- Walker, J. R. 
It is not known whether S realizes this misunderstanding but if he does 
he presumably tries to distinguish the person "Johnny Walker" from the 
whisky 'Johnny Walker' by giving the official school version of Johnny 
Walker's name. If S does not realize that H has misunderstood "Johnny 
Walker" as whisky he could re-name Johnny Walker so that H has a differett 
name to recall, in the light of his patent failure to respond appropriately 
to the familiar version of the name. 
In one example a syntactic change is made to ensure that H 
understands correctly : 
M90 Would you change character ?. Would you have a 
character change in 
yourself? 
The amplification makes it clearer that "character" is one's own 
personality rather than another person. S does this by changing "change" 
from a verb to a noun phrase. 
An attempt at using 'x ampl. ' can be seen in the following example in 
which S tries to re-phrase the origin but becomes muddled: 
A31 What do they do ? -j No no ehm what 
"No no ehm what" could be seen as an 'incomplete' repeat 'combined' with 
a partial' refutation of pr because there is no amplification of x; 
instead, x is contracted. However, the intention is to amplify rather 
than repeat and the attempt is categorized as 'pr ref. prtl. &x ampl. 
incmp. '. 'incmp. ' being the abbreviation for 'incomplete'. ('pr ref. ', 
the refutation of 
r p, is discussed below). In A31 S's inability to 
re-phrase the origin is later overcome by an explantion of what was meant;, 
115 
this explanation comprises 'glossing' and a re-phrasing of the on in, 
"I meant what do they serve". 
In the one example of 0's use of the device, B58, the origin is 
re-phrased to make it more specific : 
B58 Did you have anything to eat - Did you have any tea? 
In order to do this, 0 has to know what S intended to express in his 
Origin. 
5. Ix explained' ('x exp. ) 
Number of times used in the corpus : 10 (8 by S, 2 by 0). 
'x exp. ' occurs when what is said in the origin, as opposed to what 
is meant, is explained. 'x exp. ' can embrace 'x rpt. ' and can be 'combined' 
with 'x emph. '. It usually contains 'glossing'. S explains what was said 
in the following examples : 
A9 I said wool not warm 
A30 I said scales 
B51 (H) dear, I said CAN I take my shoes off not SHALL 
I take my shoes off 
B53 I asked you are you MANX 
M91 I said did I hear a nice sound 
In A9 and B51 'x exp. ' is 'combined' with 'xr refuted' and in B51 and B53 
it jr, 'combined' with 'x emph. '. 
x is explained by 0 in two examples : 
B54 (S) said WHERE do youjdo it 
B57 She said that he got fed up 
In B54 'x exp. ' is 'combined' with 'x emph. '. 
x can be 'partially' explained by agreement with a question about 
x, as in A50 : 
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(7.2) H: Did you ask me if I was born on a Friday? 
(8) x exp. prtl. 'S: Yeah 
S's confirmation that she asked H if she was born on a Friday is tantamount 
to explaining what was said and is therefore categorized as 'x exp. prtl. '. 
When 0 explains x to H, as in B54, "(S) said WHERE do you do it", 
the explanation is of 0's xr. However, if 0's xr is equivalent to S's x, 
the explanation is classed as being of x. The distinction of xr is thus 
reserved for H. 
In addition to explaining what was said in the origin, 'x exp. ' can 
apply to any explanation of why x was phrased the way it was as an 
expression of p. In B57 S explains why the lexical item "stay" was used 
to express "visit" 
(1) ORIGIN S: Are you going to stay in Newcastle ? 
(2.1) IND. MANIF. H: No 
. 2) MANIF. I'll be in Edinburgh 
(3-1) S: Yes 
e2) I didn't mean stay in Newcastle I meant 
visit Newcastle 
(4) 0: Well why didn't you say that ? 
(5-1) x exp, S: Well we LIVE here but we're going to 
STAY in Carlisle 
The emphasis in (5-1) contrasts the two lexical items and is not an 
inclusion Of Ix emph. 1 in the explanation. The explanation is a 
justification for using "stay" in its eighth sense in the 0. E. D., 
"To reside or sojourn in a place for a longer period; to sojourn or put 
up with a person as his guest", as. -opposed to what H and 0 understand it 
as, namely its fourth sense, "To remain in a place or in others, company 
(as opposed to going on or going away)". 
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6. Ix queried' ('x qued. ') 
Number of times used in the corpus :6 (5 by H, 1 by 0). 
'x qued. ' occurs when an inquiry is made of x. It is usually 
used by H who has become aware that his interpretation does not accord 
with what S is saying and who wishes to check that he heard x correctly. 
It can be 'incomplete', as in B60 : 
(4) x qued. incmp. H: Didn't you say 
(5) x exp. 0: She said that he got fed up 
0 interrupts H's query of x, presumably aware that H is having difficulty 
making sense of the conversation and possibly realizing the misunderstanding 
which has caused this difficulty. 
'x qued. ' may be prompted by what could be thought of as dawning 
'+ H real. ', as in A50, in which H queries x and checks a different xr 
against x than her initial xr. H has said that she was born on the 13th 
(2.2) ORIGIN S: Was it on a Friday as well ? 
(3-1) IND. MANIF. H: I don't know 
. 2) IND. MANIF. : I don't remember 
S: A hah 
e2) : I was born on a Wednesday 
(5) H: I was born on a Sunday 
(6) S: MMM 
/ pause 
H: Oh 
. 2) x qued. : Did you ask me if I was born on a Friday ? 
(8) S: Yeah 
(9) H: I thought you asked me if it was frightening 
Prior to S's neutral reaction in (6) to H's statement in (5), giving the 
day she was born, H has little reason to think that there is anything 
adrift in the conversation, in spite of S's earlier neutral response in 
(4.1). S admitted later that she had not really been sure what H was 
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talking about in her indirect manifestations. After S's "Mmm" in (6), 
H appears to re-interpret the origin. She becomes aware that she could 
have misunderstood it and asks S if x was "I was born on a Friday". x 
greatly differs from xr which is explained in (9), that is, "if it was 
frightening". 
Similarly, but less explicitly, in B61 H uses 'x qued. ', having 
become aware that something has gone wrong in the conversation : 
(1) ORIGIN S: 
(2) 01: 
(3.1) MANIF. H: 
5,01,02: 
. 2) x qued. prtl. H: 
(H), where does Tom Wade live ? 
Port Erin (spoken quietly) 
He thinks about a month 
/ look astonished / 
Is that what you said? 
Because x is not reproduced but is referred to by the pronoun "that", 
the device 'x qued. ' is deemed 'partial'. It is a request for a repeat, 
or explanation of x. 
In B57 0 uses 'x qued. prtl. ' by asking "Well why didn't you say 
that ? ". 0 wishes to know why p was not expressed in x as clearly as it 
might have been and therefore why x was uttered the way it was. 
ý. Ix refuted' ('x ref. ') 
Number of times used in the corpus : 0. 
'x ref. ' occurs when what has been said in the origin is refuted. It 
is thus an erroneous denial of what was said in the origin. 
8. 'xr explained' (Ixr exp. ') 
Number of times used in the corpus : 12 (10 by H, 2 by 0). 
I 
'xr exp. ' occurs when an explanation is given of what was thought 
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to have been said in the origin, as opposed to what was actually said. 
The following examples include 'glossing' : 
A18 I thought you said take your paper in 
A46 I thought you said what have you got that hat on for 
A50 I thought you asked me if it was frightening 
B60 I thought you said he got the fed .. up 
B61 Oh I thought you said when does he leave 
L87 I thought you said you wanted them photocopied 
In A47 H answers S's 'xr qued. ' with "Yes, you said 'Will you excuse 
me if I go up to bed"'. This utterance happens to be 'x exp. ' since it 
is exactly what was said in x. However, H is explaining what he heard 
and therefore the device used is 'xr exp. '; xr coincides with x in this 
instance. 
Similarly, in A28 'xr exp. ' is also an explantion of x. H's use 
of 'xr exp. ' here can be seen as a justification for her having 
misunderstood the origin : 
(1) ORIGIN 
(2.1) MANIF. 
. 2) 
(3) 
(4) xr exp. 
(5) 
S: 
x: 
S: 
x: 
We can get fuel now 
We'd better get it on the way back 
It's twenty past eleven now 
I mean on the way back 
You said we can get it now 
I meant on the way back 
By explaining to S what she said in x, which corresponds with xr, H complains 
that this does not correlate with the explanation of the proposition 
given by S in (3). In (4), the explanation of xr9H is in effect 
refuting (3): S may have meant "on the way back" but that was not what 
she said ; what she said, according to H who has heard it correctly, was 
"we can get it now". 
In G75 H 'partially' explains xr by endeavouring to explain its 
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source in the conversation, firstly in response to S's 'xr qued. ' of 
"Who mentioned zeppelins ? ", by uttering "You 
'xr exp. ' is here 'combined' with 'x qued. '. 
when he attributes the "zeppelins" reference 
use of 'xr exp. prtl. ', "I know, but only be 
just did, didn't you ? ': 
0 also uses 'xr exp. ' 
to H: "You did". H's second 
cause I thought (S) did", is 
in response to being told that he himself mentioned "zeppelins". If H had 
explained xr 'completely' by explaining that he heaý 
supposed to be like a sort of zeppelin', instead of 
the misunderstanding might well have been realized. 
the outcome because H's 'Partial' explanation seeks 
of xr rather than identifying what xr is* 
^d the origin as 'It's 
"A sort of zephyr", 
However, this is not 
to trace the context 
The device Ox r exp. 1 tends to explain what was understood, pr. as 
well-as xr because if xr is something other than xv p, 
r is accordingly the 
understanding of that incorrect xr. This is not the case in examples 
like A28 and A47 because in these examples xr is equivalent to x; x is 
a poor expression of p. 
9. 'xr queried' ('xr qued. ') 
Number of times used in the corpus : ?- (2 by S) 
'xr qued. ' makes inquiry of the received origin. In A47 S attempts 
to determine if H heard x correctly since H's manifestation is inappropriate : 
(1) ORIGIN S: Will you excuse me if I go up to bed? 
(2) MANIF. H: No, not at all 
/ pause / 
(3) xr qued. S: Did you hear what I said ? 
In answering this query-H realizes that he has misunderstood the origin; 
although he heard it correctly he only understands it correctly in repeating 
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it back to S in response to her query. 
In the lengthy datum, G75, S uses 'xr qued. ' : 
(2) ORIGIN S: It's supposed to be like a sort of 
a zephyr 
..................................... 
(9) manif. rpt. H: Zeppelins aren't romantic 
(10) xr qued. S: Who mentioned zeppelins? 
In (10) S queries xr in an attempt to locate the source in the conversation 
of the topic raised by the manifestation. 
10. 'xr refuted' (Ixr ref. ') 
Number of times used in the corpus :6 (5 by S, 1 by 0). 
'xr ref. ' occurs when the received utterance is refuted. In three ' 
examples in the corpus the use of 'complete' 'xr ref. ' shows that S has 
realized the misunderstanding has occurredl since to refute xr 'completely' 
is to know what H heard the origin as : 
A9 I said wool not warm 
B51 (H) dear, I said CAN I take my shoes off not SHALL 
I take my shoes off 
B53 Not MARRIED 
In A9 and B51 'xr ref. ' is 'combined' with 'x exp. '. 
In G75 xr is 'partially' refuted by both S and 0. Both deny that 
S has uttered xr : 
(10) S: Who mentioned zeppelins ? 
(11) H: You just did, dicht you ? 
(12) xr ref. prtl. S: No 
000*00*0**0000000000.0000000000000000 
r (16) x ref. prtl. 0: No, you started that one 
& xr exp., 
(17 xr refo prtl. S: Nol I'm afraid not (H) 
I 
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S and 0 attribute xr to H but do not realize that a misunderstanding 
has occurred ýecause of a mishearing so that xr is not equivalent to X. 
11. 'p explained' ('p exp. ) 
Number of times used in the corpus : 50 (48 by S92 by 0). 
'p exp. ' occurs when the proposition is explained, that is, when 
what S intends the origin to express is explained. 'Glossing' is 
present in nineteen 'complete' explanations, such as : 
A8 S: I meant as in your dream 
A31 S: I meant what do they serve 
A33 S: I meant the music 
'Partial' explanations occur when reference is made back to a 
preceding utterance, as in D66 : 
(1) ORIGIN 
(2) MANIF. 
(3.1) p exp. prtl. S: 
. 2) p exp. prtl. 
I 
S and H are talking about a man who used to fly a gyrocopter ; the man 
was killed when the gyrocopter crashed. In (3-1,3.2) p is 'partially' 
explained in that what S meant by "He killed himself" is that "the plane 
killed him", that iss the plane crash resulted in his death. To make 
sense of S's 'partial'- explanations, which refer back to H's manifestation, 
H has to appreciate that S did not mean that the man committed suicide. 
In A45 S 'partially' explains p by referring, with 'glosiing', to 
H's. manifestation and continuation of the topic as an explanation of 
the origin: 
(2.1) MANIF. H: I wish I was like that 
. 2) can't get into mine 
(3-1) p exp. prtl. S: No nor can I 
. 2) p exp. prtl. : That's what I mean 
S: He killed himself, didn't he ? 
No the plane killed him 
Same thing 
That was what I meant 
H: 
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S and 0 attribute xr to H but do not realize that a misunderstanding 
has occurred because of a mishearing so that xr is not equivalent to x. 
11. 'p explained' ('p exp. ) 
Number of times used in the corpus : 50 (48 by Sl 2 by 0). 
lp exp. 1 occurs when the proposition is explainedg that isl when 
what S intends the origin to express is explained. 'Glossing' is 
present in nineteen 'complete' explanations, such as : 
A8 S: I meant as in your dream 
A31 S: I meant what do they serve 
A33 S: I meant the music 
'Partial' explanations occur when reference is made back to a 
preceding utterance, as in D66 : 
(1) 
(2) 
(3.1) 
. 2) 
ORIGIN 
MANIF. 
S: He killed himself, didn't he? 
No the plane killed him 
Same thing 
That was what I meant 
H: 
p exp. prtl. S: 
p exp. prtl. 
S and H are talking about a man who used to fly a gyrocopter ; the man 
was killed when the gyrocopter crashed. In (3-1,3.2) p is 'partially' 
explained in that what S meant by "He killed himself" is that "the plane 
killed him", that is, the plane crash resulted in his death. To make 
sense of S's 'partial'- explanations, which refer back to H's manifestation, 
H has to appreciate that S did not mean that the man committed suicide. 
In A45 S 'partially' explains p by referring, with 'glosiing', to 
H's, manifestation and continuation of the topic as an explanation of 
the origin: 
(2.1) MANIF. H: I wish I was like that 
. 2) can't get into mine 
(3-1) p exp. prtl. S: No nor can I 
. 2) p exp. prtl. : That's what I mean 
I 
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This 'partial' explanation is later supplemented by a 'complete' 
explanation which has no 'glossing' : 
p exp. S: I'm fat so I sit here to remind me 
Ip exp. 1 can be 'incomplete' rather than 'partial' in that it can 
be begun but not finished. In All the explanation need not be 'completed' 
because another utterance answers the manifestation question and this 
answer, together with the 'incomplete' Ip exp. 1 is sufficient to effect 
'+ H real. ' : 
(1.2) ORIGIN 
(2) MANIF. 
(3.1) 
. 2) p exp. incmp. 
(4) 
S: I just have to address the envelope 
and then we're away 
H: Where are you going? 
S: Nowhere 
I just meant 
H: Oh 
vp exp. 1 is 'incomplete' because S decides not to bother to explain p 
to H on the assumption that realization has been effected. In D68 s 
$partially' refutes H's pr and then begins to explain p but does not 
bother to 'complete' the explanation beyond 'glossing' that an 
explanation is being used : 
M ORIGIN S: Wonder why she didn't stay with the 
others (i. e. other 
girls) 
(2) MANIF. H: They were all playing pool (i. e. boys) 
(3) pr ref. prtl. S: No I meant oh never mind 
&p exp. incmp. 
(4) H: Perhaps there was no room in the car 
S is telling H aVout a girl who talked to him at a stag night while her 
boyfriend was playing pool with the other boys and after the other 
girls had left the party for their own gathering. The 'combined' 
, pr ref. prtl. '& p exp. incmppl may effect I+ H real. ' because in 
H offers an appropriate explanation for the girl's not having stayed 
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with the other girls, which he failed to do in his manifestation. 
A 'partial' explanation referring to O's 'incomplete' explanation 
of her own pr, which she believes to be a misunderstanding can be 
seen in J80 : 
(1) 0: 
(2) ORIGIN S: 
(3-1) MANIF. H: 
. 2) 
(4 )pr exp. incmp. 0: 
(5) P exp. prtl. S: 
I wouldn't mind being ill 
It's not very nice 
That's a very nice one 
I had it when I was ill 
Oh I thought you meant 
Yes I did 
(i. e. cough medicine) 
The ellipsis is remarkable. S uses a very 'partial' Ip exp. 1 in 
confirming O's 'incomplete' Ip 
r exp. 1 yet it is sufficient to effect 
0 real. '. S avoids having to explain p to H, for whom the misunder- 
standing remains unrealized. 
When 0 explains p to H, as in B56, "No he means two rolls", the 
explanation is of O's pr but because O's pr is equivalent to S's p. the 
explanation is classed as being of p. The distinction of pr is reserved 
for H. An exception is made in the above datum, J80, in that pr is not 
reserved for H's understanding of the origin. 0 retains pr because 
of her belief that her pr is incorrect, a belief which in fact is 
erroneous. Other than, manifesting her misunderstanding, H never refers 
to her own pr in the datum and therefore lp r exp. incmp. 1 is deemed to 
be used on this occasion by 0. 
Ip exp. 1 can identifY the referent of the origin,, with or without 
, glossing, 
A3 S: I meant the glasses (as opposed to the drip mats) 
A6 S: I meant the money (11 it 11 11 photocopying) 
B55 S: The appointment (it If If 11 time spent 
waiting for new glasses) 
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B59 S: Freud the idea 
D67 S: I am 
(as opposed to Freud the man) 
(11 it 11 you, i.. e. H) 
The success of onelpý exp. 1 which identifies the referentI. 11I meant the 
door", in A21 is ironic because the intended referent is the car door 
and H has misunderstood the referent as the garage door, which she has 
just closed, jamming its stiff bolt across before getting in the car 
and closing the car door : 
(1) ORIGIN S: Are you sure it's shut ? 
(2) MANIF. H: Yes I jammed it 
(3) p exp. S: I meant the door 
Since H knows that she has satisfied S that the garage door is shut, 
she correctly understands the referent in the explanation to be the 
car door. 
Ip exp. 1 often 'combines' with a 'complete' or 'partial' refutation 
of pr, particularly when the explanation involves the identification 
of the referent : 
A13 S: Nog the picnic (as opposed to food mixers) 
A16 S: No, the record (11 it 11 the cello) 
A32 S: Not those cards, the playing cards 
A39 S: No no, the cat (as opposed to the kettle) 
B56 0: No he means two rolls (11 It if two pence) 
Op exp. 1 can provide an explanation of the force of the origin, 
as in A22, "I meant a question", as opposed to the relative clause 
which H understands the origin to be. 
lp exp. 1 must sometimes be used more than once to effect 1+ 11 real. ' 
In A26, where the misunderstanding is caused by different referents 
being attributed to origin and manifestation, S 'partially' refutes pr 
and explains pq "No, it was a woman". This does not provide sufficient 
126 
identification of the referent and in response to H's. explanation of 
pr, "Rimsky-Korsakov was a man", which makes clear the referent of the 
manifestation, S explains p more thoroughly, "Scheherezade was a woman". 
As well as explaining the proposition, Ip exp. 1 can explain the 
reason for expressing p, as in D70 : 
(1) ORIGIN S: Was it quite a lot 2 
(2) MANIF. H: No she's just gone down to do some 
photocopies for me 
(3-1) S: Yes 
. 2) x ampl. How much was there ? 
(4) H: Just five pages 
(5) p exp. S: It's only because I'm waiting to go and 
do some xeroxing t oo 
S is waiting to go and use a photocopying machine which she knows is 
being used by someone else to copy some material for H. .S has elicited 
an appropriate reply to her origin question by using the device Ix ampl. ' 
in (3.2). In (5) she explains why she asked the question. This type 
of Ip exp. 1 need not be essential to H's receiving the correct pr, nor 
need it be essential to effecting 1+ H real. '. It does, however, 
provide additional information which can aid correct reception and 
realization. 
Similarly in F73 S explains why he asked H if he had had a funeral 
by uttering "Oh I thought you'd gone to one", although here there is 
little additional information about the reason for having expressed 
the proposition. The explanation is 'partial' because it uses the 
pro-form "one" rather than bL funeral#. A subsequent utterance, "But 
you're wearing a black tie", classed as the deAce lyl (discussed below), 
supplements the particular explanation of P though in fact the 
misunderstanding remains unreaized. 
a. 
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Ip exp. 1 is 'partial' when it consists of an agreement with a 
query about p, as in P97 : 
(7) p qued. H: This morning's mail 
(8.1) p exp. prtl. S: Yeah 
In H77 S attempts to explain p but does this very ineffectually. 
It is debatable whether the device used in (3) is lp exp. prtl. ' or ly1f 
an utterance other than the origin or the manifestation which expresses 
a new or related proposition : 
(1) ORIGIN S: How much is it ? 
(2) MANIF. H: It's usually 101p 
(3) p exp. prtl. S: Big ones little ones 
(4) H: What ? 
S asks in (1) what size an unfamiliarly shaped milk carton is. "Big 
ones little ones" is classified as Ip exp. prtl. I because it is intended 
as an attempt to explain p. Because of the ellipsis it is an ineffectual 
Ip, exp. prtl. I and it fails to effect I+ H real. '. When there is a 
divergence between what a participant intends a device to be and what 
that device is understood as being, the device is classified in respect 
of its user's intention rather than its outcome. 
12. lp queried' (lp qued. 1) 
Number of times used in the corpus :6 (4 by H, 2 by 0). 
lp qued. 1 occurs when enquiry is made of the proposition, that is, 
when what the origin is intended to express is questioned. The device 
can alert S to the misunderstanding and it can show that H is becoming 
r 
aware that p might be incorrect and therefore wishes to check what 
meant by his utterance. It can include 'glossing' or can simply be 
a. 
a phrase : 
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A20 H: Oh you mean the one here 
A37 H: Oh you mean how long on for 
P97 H: This morning's mail 
Op qued. 1 can be used by 0 who may also endeavour to find out what 
p is supposed to be, as in L87 in which 0 asks S "You want a print-out 
from the reader? " and "The microfilms", in order to determine the 
referent and to ascertain exactly what S is asking for. 
13. lp refuted' (1p ref. 1) 
Number of times used in the corpus : 
lp ref. 1 occurs when the proposition which S intends to express in 
the origin is refuted. 
14. lp r explained' Op exp. 1) 
Number of times used in the corpus : 16 (2 by S, 13 by H, 1 by 0). 
, pr qxpý.. ' occurs when the received proposition is explained, that 
is, when an explanation is given of what H understands the proposition 
to mean. It constitutes an explanation of the manifestation. In eleven 
out of the sixteen examples in the corpus 'glossing' is present, as in 
the following examples : 
A21 H: I thought you meant which list 
A41 H: I thought you meant the things in the cheesecake 
A44 H: Oh I thought you meant the paper 
A48 H: Oh I thought you meant it was in mono 
These examples are all uttered by H after I+ H real. '. 
H can also use lp r exp. 1 prior to realization, as in A26, I'Rimsky- 
Korsakov war, a man". This utterance identifies the referent of the 
manifestation and thus explains p 
r. H's utterance in A30, "You don't 
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normally have stairs in a bathroom" explains H's attitude of surprise 
r in response to S's ljr qued. 1 which was concerned with H's surprise at 
the origin. H's explanation of the reason for her surprise also explains 
her pr 
The device pr exp. 1 is almost entirely used by H but it is used 
by S in two data.: One of these is A33 : 
(1) ORIGIN S: Sounds like Focus 
(2.1) MANIF. H: Yeah I've been meaning to get it fixed 
for days 
. 2) The picture's been lousy for some time 
/ pause / 
(3-1) S: What the hell are you talking about ? 
/ pause / 
. 2) Pr exp. Ah, you're talking about the television 
-3) 1 meant the music 
S and H are listening to a record while watching television on vision 
only. S has to determine the referent of the manifestation and apparently 
succeeds in doing this before H has worked out what problem S has had 
with his manifestation. H, of course, assumes his manifestation is an 
appropriate response to the origin and does not immediately realize that 
he has misunderstood the origin. 
Rather than use the device vp r exp. 1 it can be implied when another 
device is used. In A43, after S and H have realized the misunderstandingg 
S uses1z, an utterance expressing a new proposition after the close of a 
misunderstanding; this IzI utterance implies Ip 
r 
exp. 1 : 
(1) ORIGIN S: They've band concerts here 
(2) IND. MANIF. H: Why? 
(3) S: Band concerts 
(4) S, H: laugh 
(5-1)(pr z S: Isn't it funny that there's no way you can 
exp. imp. ) distinguish between B, A, N, D and 
B, A, N, N, E, D? 
. 2) Both are right 
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S has appreciated the cause of the misunderstanding and in talking about 
r this cause he implies an explanation of p 
15. pr queried' (, Pr qued. 1) 
Number of times used in the corpus :4 (3 by S, 1 by H). 
, pr qued. 1 makes enquiry of the received proposition, that is, 
it questions how H has understood the origin. lp 
r qued. 1 can be specific 
after the misunderstanding has been realized by both S and H, as in 
A49, "What on earth did you think I meant by ladder? ". It can also be a 
general questions prior to realization, which tries to make sense of 
H's pr, as in A339 "What the hell are you talking about ? ". 
Op r qued. 1 can relate to H's attitude in uttering the manifestation 
as well as to the manifestation itself. In A30 H's manifestation, an 
exclamation, is uttered in a decidedly surprised tone and it is this 
which S queries : 
(2.2) ORIGIN S: It's got scales in it 
(3) MANIF. H: In the bathroom! 
(4) r 13 qued. S: Why is that surprising ? 
lp r qued. 1 can be used by H, checking on his understanding of the 
origint as in A34 : 
(4) Pr qued. H: You mean without that string attached 
about the bottom points 
(5-1) S: No I mean kind of promoted posts 
16.1 pr refuted' (Op r_ ref. 1) 
Number of times used in the corpus : 35 (30 by S, 2 by Ht 3 by 0). 
lp r ref. 1 refutes the received proposition, that is, points Out 
by denial that H's understanding of the origin is incorrect. 
131 
IP r ref. 1 can be 'complete', as in the following examples 
A19 S: Drawer, not door 
A32 S: Not those cards, the playing cards 
B57 S: I didn't mean stay in Newcastle 
B59 S: Not Freud the man 
or can be 'partial', as in the following examples : 
A10 S: No, poached 
A13 S: No, the picnic 
A14 S: No, time 
A21 S: No, which application ? 
In all but two of these examples, (B57, B59), Op r ref. 1 is 'combined' 
with another devices either lp exp. 1, Ix ampl. ' or Ix rpt. l. B57 
includes 'glossing'. 
IP r ref. prtl. I is usually accomplished by "No, ... " but it is 
also the device used when reference is made to a previous utterance, as in 
A5 : 
(2) MANIF. H: 
r (3-1) p ref. prtl. S: 
Going up in the world gettin g rid 
of her bashed mini 
No that's not what I mean 
It might seem that such a refutation is 'complete' rather than 'partial' 
because it is very clear that the manifestation is being refuted. 
However, adjacency between the manifestation and the refutation might 
not always obtain and it is possible that 'that's not what I mean/ 
meant' could be uttered at a distance from the manifestation, in which 
case the referent is not necessarily obvious and the refutation accordingly 
would not be 'complete'. It is possible that H might not understand 
that a refutation adjacent to his manifestation actually refers to that 
manifestation and although such a failure to appreciate cohesive linking 
might often seem unlikely, all refutations which are not 'complete' 
and explicit are deemed 'partial'. 
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Ip r ref. 1 can be accomplished by implication, as in A15 in which 
S confirms the proposition in the manifestation : 
ORIGIN S: What are we playing? 
(2) MANIF. H: 
(3-1) pr ref. (imp. ) S: 
. 2) 
Tennis 
I KNOW stupid girl 
What match is it ? 
Since S knows that tennis is being played she interprets the manifestation 
as stating the obvious and by making this known to H, (3-1), her 
r utterance is tantamount to refuting p. H has to appreciate that S 
would not ask a question to which she knows the answer and that therefore 
H's pr, manifested as the answer to the question, is incorrect. 
rr "No" is not always a refutation of p or of x If the manifestation 
is a polar question, "No" could be S's answer to it, as in B60 
(2.1) MANIF. H: He got the polis 
. 2) : The police ? 
(3-1) S: No 
. 2) :I drove off 
In this example S is answering the question and does not realize that a 
misunderstanding has occurred. 
(b) Devices which relate to the misunderstanding and to the 
awareness of an error in the conversation. 
17. 'P r error signalled' (lp 
r err. sig. 1) 
Number of times used in the corpus : 22 (7 by S, 12 by H, 3 by 0). 
, pr err. sig. 1 aler+her participants to the fact that there is 
something amiss in the conversation. Every direct manifestation signals 
an error in pr since its inappropriacy can alert participants to the 
error in H's understanding. A manifestation, however, is an essential 
primary component of a misunderstanding rather than a device, an optional 
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-secondary component, and it is therefore not categorized as the device 
, pr err, sig. l. 
, pr err. sig. 1 tends to be an expression of puzzlement or a 
non-sPecific query, as in the following examples : 
G75 S: Pardon 
A49, H77 S: What 2 
D71, A49 H: What ? 
B59 H: Uh ? 
A50i P97 S: MMM 
A50 S: Ah hah 
K86 H: But .. oh God 
The device can be accomplished by paralinguistic means, as in B61, 
IS, 0 look astonished /I and by intonational meanst as in A30, "In 
the BATHroom ! ", expressed in a surprised tone by H. "In the BATHroom! " 
is a manifestation but it is the tone in which it is uttered which 
signals the error rather than the proposition expressed in it. 
An utterance which constitutes another de*e can also signal an 
error, as in A41 : 
ORIGIN S: 
(3) MANIF. H: 
My & pr err. Sig. S: 
(5-1) H: 
. 2) 
What else did you put in? 
Cottage cheese ehm 
Oh. mince 
Oh in the FREEZER 
I thought you meant the things in 
the cheesecake 
S answers her own origin question in (4) and this alerts H to the error 
of her interpretation. It effects 1+ H real. '. A different referent 
to that which H understands of the origin is identified in (4); S has 
not, realized that H has misunderstood the origin and the identification 
of a different referent is not a conscious attempt by S to effect 
1+ H real. '. The device is therefore 1P 
r err. sig. 1 rather than the* 
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signalling of a misunderstanding. The device is 'combined, with 
The 'incomplete' Ip r exp. 1 by 0 in J80 is also Ip 
r 
err. sig. l. BY 
uttering 110h I thought you meant" 0 raises in the conversation the 
possibility that a different interpretation can be made of the origin. 
This Ip r exp. incmp. 1 signals an arror, although in fact O's interpretation 
is correct. H does not pick up the signal and does not re-interpret 
the origin. 
18. lpr error acknowledgement' (lp err. ack. 1) 
Number of times used in the corpus :2 (both by H). 
1P r err. ack. 1 occurs when a participant acknowledges or otherwise 
admits to having made an error in understanding the origin without being* 
aware that the error is actually a misunderstanding. The device can be 
seen in L87 when towards the end of the conversation S explains p 
and refutes pr so that H knows a mistake has been made in the conversation. 
When H explains xr she still does not realize that she has misunderstood 
S's request in the origin; she feels that S has not expressed herself 
clearly and that S is now refuting her own utterance : 
(10.1) p exp. S: I want to look at them 
. 2) pr'ref. I don't want a copy 
(11.1) pr err. ack. H: Oh sorry 
. 2) xr exp. I thought you said you wanted them 
photocopied 
Subsequently I+ H real. ' is effected and H duly acknowledges the 
misunderstanding. 
H's state of realization is not known in M91 and therefore H's 
utterance "Ohl' is either lp 
r err. ack. 1 or an acknowledgement of the 
misunderstanding 
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19. 'misunderstanding signal' (Imus. sig. 1) 
Number of times used in the corpus : 19 (12 by S, 2 by H9 5 by 0. 
Imus. sig. I is used by a participant who realizes that the 
misunderstanding has occurred and alerts the others to this occurrence. 
Use of this device does not necessarily ensure that the other participants 
realize the misunderstanding; one or more participants could fail to 
recognize the signal and for them the misunderstanding would remain 
llnvanl i 'JPli - 
Imus. sig. 1 is chiefly accomplished by IV laugh /", as in A7, A22 
and B52. When the misunderstanding is an intentional one I'/ laugh /11 
may be in advance of or concurrent with the manifestation as a Imus. sig. 1, 
as in A36 and A38. 
"No" can be a Imus. sig. 1 as well as being Ip 
r ref. prtl. I, as in 
A20 and B55- "Yes" can be a Imus. sig. 1 when it carries. the implication 
of 'I know that', as in B57. 
lp exp. incmp. &pr ref. prtl. l in D68, "No I meant oh never mind", 
is also Imus. sig. l. It seems to be an effective signal since it is 
followed by an appropriate response by H to the origin. 
The polite utterance in A23, "I think we've eh gone astray here a 
little" is a Imus. sig. l. 
20. 'misunderstanding acknowledgement' (Imus. ack. 1) 
Number of times used in the corpus : 97 (12 by S, 75 by H, 10 by 0. 
Imus. ack. ' occurs when a participant acknowledges or admits to 
a misunderstanding's having occurred. The device can only be used 
136 
after realization. It provides textual evidence for realization. 
Imus. ack. 1 can be accomplished by short expressions, interjections 
and laughter, such as by H in the following examples : 
All, A161 A25, B6o : oh 
B541 B611 K85 :/ laugh / 
Apologies can acknowledge misunderstandings : 
A8 
A21 I A24 : 
Oh sorry 
Ah yes 
Yes 
Oh sorry 
/ laugh 
The device can include reference to p 
A7 Oh seances 
/ laugh / 
A34 : Oh readerships 
A41 : Oh, in the FREEZER 
The device can 'combine' with other devices such as lp qued-I and 
Op r ref. 1, as in the following examples : 
A20 : Oh you mean the one here 
A23 : Oh not Clive Dixon 
Sorry 
A40 : Ah not the kazi 
S and 0 also use Imus. ack. 1, usually accomplished by I'/ laugh 
In J79 S and 0 acknowledge the misunderstanding by I'/ exchange glances /I'. 
This description is an amorphous label for the quizzical and then rueful 
and amused expressions on the faces of S and 0, expressions which 
cannot be precisely formulated yet which at the time were definite 
acknowledgements of the misunderstanding's having occurred, confirmed by 
S and 0 after the conversation had ended. 
In the majority of the data it is easy to identify Imus. ack. 1-but 
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in some data the utterances could be Ip r err. ack. 19 Imus. ack. 1 or 
When the states of realization cannot be verified it cannot be known 
whether an utterance acknowle4es an error or a misunderstanding, as 
in M91, cited above in respect of I? pr err. ack. 1, and as in D69 : 
(1) ORIGIN S: 
(2.1) IND. MANIF. H: 
. 2) IND. MANIF. 
(3) S: 
(4.1) H: 
. 2) 
. 3) mus. ack. 4) mus. ack. : 
5) mus. ack. 
It went down very quickly 
Did it ? 
I don't know 
Well the sea was flat calm today 
Oh yes 
Mmm 
Oh 
Oh 
Yes 
S and H have talked about a boat sinking locally and about the bad 
weather the previous day and the resulting rough seas. In the origin 
S is talking about the state of the sea. "Oh yes" in (4.1) is a 
response to the statement in (3) and it is expressed in a tone which 
suggests that the sea's being flat calm is very obvious ; it is lyl 
(discussed below). Subsequent to this assertive agreement, H becomes 
hesitant. His utterances give the impression that he has re-interpreted 
the origin in the light of S's utterance in (3) and that he realizes he 
has misunderstood the referent as the boat rather than the sea. The 
hesitant agreement I'M=", (4.2), is classed, like (4.1), as Iyl. 
"Ohl, and "Yes" in (4-3 - 4-5) are assumed to be Imus. ack. I and are 
classified as I? mus. ack. l. 
In D70, S's ýp exp. ' details her reason for having asked the 
question in the origin. H responds neutrally to this explanation : 
p exp. S: It's only because I'm waiting 
to go and do some xeroxing too 
? mus. ack. H: Ah 
"Ah", in (6), could be a ly' utterance, a response to the statement in 
4. 
but it is more likely to be Imus. ack. I in view of the Ip 
r err. sig. ' 
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Ix ampl. ' and lp exp. 1 which precede it. 
(c) Devices which relate to utterances which express new propositions 
and to utterances which relate to the manifestation. 
21. lyl (tyl) 
Number of times used in the corpus : 118 (57 by S, 47 by H, 14 by 0). 
ly' is the production of another utterance which is topically 
related to X or to the, manifestation but which is not an amplification 
of x and is not any other of the devices. ly' utterances are additional 
x utterances which express additional propositions but for the purposes 
of this thesis x is limited to the origin and p is solely the proposition 
which has been misunderstood so that additional utterances are all 
termed ly', provided that they are produced prior to realization. This 
provision is important because a number of utterances can be encountered 
both in the development of the misunderstanding and also beyond its 
resolution and it would be misleading to categorize all such utterances 
I as ly . 
While ly' can be any utterance it is often cohesively linked. 
For example, it can be an answer to an indirect manifestation, as in 
A48,11H: Because I've got Peer Gynt on the other side", or an answer 
to the origin question, as in A46, "S: That's what you're doing with 
that water". 
ly' can be an elaboration of the manifestation, as in B59, "H: He 
died ages ago didn't he? 11 or A33, "H: The picture's been lousy for 
some time". 
ly' can be used by S, H and 0. Any contribution to the topic or 
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topics of the origin and manifestation constitutes ly' and therefore 
data which comprise several utterances and speaker-turns from origin 
to, realization tend to contain ly', as in A46, C64, F739 K86 and L-87. 
22. 'manifestation completed' (Imanif. comp. 0) 
Number of times used in the corpus : 0. 
Imanif. comp. 1 occurs when the manifestation, having been interrupted, 
is completed. 
23. 'manifestation repeated' (Imanif. rpt. 1) 
Number of times used in the corpus :4 (all by H) - 
Imanif. rpt. 1 is a repeat of the manifestation and is distinct 
from a second manifestation. It is found in B56, B6o, E72 and G75- In B60 
the repeat is 'partial'; the lexical item-'is standardized and repeated 
in the former and the affirmation is repeated in the latter 
B60 He got the polis The police 
E72 Yes I've done Yes 
In B56 an affirmation is added : 
B56 That's thirty Yes, that's thirty 
In G75 the repeat is exact 
G75 Zeppelins aren't romantic Zeppelins aren't romantic 
24. 'manifestation emphasized' (Imanif. emph. 1) 
Number of times used in the corpus : 
Imanif. emph. 1 occurs when the manifestation, in part or in whole, 
is emphasized. This device would only be used in combination with a 
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repeat or explanation of the manifestation. Emphasis placed on the 
manifestation itself is not a device. 
25. 'manifestation amplified' (Imanif. ampl. ')- 
Number of times used in the corpus :3 (all by H). 
Imanif. ampl. ' occurs when there is a change or addition made to 
the manifestation. The device amends ellipsis, provides additional 
information or re-phrases the manifestation. Its proposition is closely 
linked to the. manifestation and it does not constitute a different 
utterance which has a new, though possibly related, proposition (such 
an utterance would be ly'). 
H amplifies her manifestation twice in A32 : 
(1.2) ORIGIN S: I wonder where the cards are 
(2) MANIF. H: On that table behind you 
S - looks at table - 
(3) S: They're not 
(4) manif. ampl. H: Yes they are 
S - looks at table - 
(5) S: They're not 
(6) manif. ampl. H: Yes they're under the camera, behind 
the light bulbs 
In (4) H re-affirms what she said in the manifestation and in (6) she 
adds further information, specifying where on the table the cards are. 
The device effects I+ S real. ' since it guides S to the cards and enables 
S to appreciate that S and H are talking about different sets of cards. 
In K86 H's amplification adds information to the manifestation : 
K86 How's his marriage --) The second 
This amplification is in response to a query by S. 
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26. 'manifestation explained' (Imanif. exp. 1) 
Number of times used in the corpus : 0. 
Imanif. exp. 1 occurs when what was said in thd manifestation is 
explained. 
27. 'manifestation queried' (Imanif. qued. 1) 
Number of times used in the corpus :1 (by S). 
Imanif. qued. 1 occurs when enquiry is made of the manifestation. 
In K86 S seeks more information than H provides in her manifestation : 
(2) IND. MANIF. H: How's his marriage 
(3) manif. qued. S: Which one ? 
(4) manif. ampl. H: The second 
The information which H provides in response to S's Imanif. qued. 1 
enables S to answer the question posed in the manifestation, though not 
to realize the misunderstanding. 
28. 'manifestation refuted' (Imanif. ref. 1) 
Number of times used in the corpus : 
Imanif. ref. ' occurs when what is said in the manifestation is 
refuted. 
29. tzt (17,1) 
Number of times used in the corpus : 49 (15 by S, 27 by H, 7 by 0). 
It has been stated above that ly' utterances are additional 
utterances which relate to the topics of origin and manifestation and 
which precede realization. In some data, additional utterances also 
follow reklization and although these utterances are not relevant to 
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the misunderstanding they are part of the conversations from which 
the data are drawn. These utterances are lz' utterances. They do not 
play any part in the resolution of a misunderstanding but they can 
make a contribution to the conversation by their cohesive links. 
lz' can answer the origin question, as in A22,11H: The A. I. was 
the hardest" or Al3t "H: Oh nothing, itts all arranged". It can 
include 'glossingIj as in A47, "S: I thought you were doing one of 
your jokes because you often do". 
1z' can develop the misunderstanding, either by teasing as in A24, 
IIH: We're not in your social - we don't aim for the peerage", or by 
taking up the misunderstood topic, as in B61,110: 1 didn't know he was 
leaving". In B53 four 'z' utterances are produced : 
(6.2) z H: No I'm not 
(7-1) z0 Are you divorced ? 
. 2) z No I come from Staffordshire actually 
(8) z SjH, O 
192/ laugh / 
In (6.2) H answers the origin question, "Are you Manx ? ", toi. which her 
manifestation had been "No, eh, I'm divorced actually". 01 then 
parodies the misunderstanding by reversing it and all the participants 
laugh at this parody. Each of these utterances constitutes IzI. 
(d) Devices which relate to extralinguistic activity 
22. 'action' Oaction') 
'action' is any movement, activity, inspection and so on by 
participants which contributes to the development of a misunderstanding. 
It is not linguistic and usually has no intentional communicative function 
but it does aid communication'by allowing, for instance, the identification 
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of referents, and is thus instrumental in the development of misunder- 
standings. 
In A44 'action' enables the referent of the origin to be identified 
(1) ORIGIN S: Is there anything in that, (H) ? 
(2) MANIF. H: Not particularly 
action S- drinks from can - 
(4) H: Oh I thought you meant the paper 
S is reading a newspaper; an opened can of juice is on his desk. 
assumes, the origin refers to his newspaper, in which he has found little 
of interest. When, in response to his manifestation, S uses 'action' 
by picking up the can and drinking from it, he realizes his misunderstanding. 
'action' which is used after realization is the non-linguistic 
equivalent of the device tz' and is termed Iz-action', as in E721 
11 - picks up glasses - ". 
'action' which is used prior to the origin, as in A69 11 - takes 
three 2p pieces from her purse -" is not noted. Some 'actions' which 
are used between the origin and Realization are not noted as devices 
if they have no influence on the misunderstanding. These tend to be 
positional 'actions', such as turning to look at a participant, as in 
L87, or going to the room where S or H is, as in K85- In this latter 
type the 'action' would of course be noted if by joining the other 
participant one sees the referent or otherwise receives further 
information as a consequence of having used the 'action'. 
These thirty devices constitute the secondary textual component of 
misunderstandings. Section 3 discusses which participants use the 
devices. 
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CORRELATION BETWEEN DEVICES AND PARTICIPANTS 
When the devices were listed in Chapter IV it was assumed that 
each device was potentially open to each participant. After consideration 
of the corpus, it is apparent that some devices are used exclusively 
by particular participants, as follows : 
S: 'x comp. 1 (2) 
'x rpt. 1 (13) 
#xr qued. ' (2) 
Imanif. qued. ' 
H pr err. ack. ' (2) 
Imanif. rpt., (4) 
Imanif. ampl. ' (3) 
In addition, a number of devices are used predominantly but not emiusively, ' 
by each participant, as follows : 
S&H: #p r qued. ' (ý: 3, H: 1) 
S&0 "x emph. ' (S: 5,0: 1) 
,x ampl. ' (S: 18,0: 1) 
'x exp. 9 (S: 8,0: 2) 
r ref. ' (S: 5,0: 1) 
'p exp. t (S: 48,0: 2) 
H&0: 'x qued. ' (H: 4,0: 1) 
lxr exp. 1 (H: 10,0: 2) 
lp qued. ' (H: 4,0: 2) 
S, H&0 op r exp. 1 (S: 2, H: 139 0: 1) 
op r ref. ' (S: 30, H: 2,0: 3) 
, pr err. sig. ' (S: 79 H: 129 0: 3) 
Imus. sig. ' (S: 129 H: 29 0: 5) 
Imus. ack. 1 (S: 12, H: 75,0: 10) 
'Y' (S: 57, H: 47,0: 14) 
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In assessing the correlation between devices and participants, 
O's use of devices can be discounted because 0 supports either S or H 
in the use of each particular device according to whether 0 shares S's 
or H's understanding of the origin. If one then also discounts uses 
which are less than half the maximum number of uses, on the grounds that 
the greater number represents the predominant use, the devices can be 
allocated to S and H, as follows : 
H 
x comp. x qued. 
x rpt. xr exp. 
x emph. p qued. 
x ampl. pr exp. 
x exp. r p err. sig. 
xr qued. pr err. ack. 
xr ref. mus. ack. 
p exp. y 
pr qued. manif. rpt. 
pr ref. manif. ampl. 
pr err. sig. action 
mus. sigg 
y 
manif. qued. 
action 
S thus predominantly uses devices which involve clarification of x 
and of ps which question xr and pr, which indicate that xr and p are 
wrong, which question the manifestation and which signal the misunderstanding. 
H, on the other hand, predominantly uses devices which clarify xrIPr 
and the manifestation, which question x and pland which acknowledge the 
r 
misunderstanding or an error in p. Devices common to both S and H are 
r the signalling of an error in p, ly' utterances and hction'. 
One would expect S to clarify what he said and what he intended to ' 
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express and to question what H heard and understood and one would 
expect H to clarify what he heard and understood and to question what 
S said and intended. Each knows his own understanding and does not 
know the other's. One would also expect S to signal the misunderstanding 
and H to acknowledge it because S is more usually the first to realize 
and H is the one for whom realization is effected by various devices. 
r S and H both signal errors in p. S tends to encounter difficulties 
understanding the manifestation while H's difficulties are with the 
origin ; prior to realization, subsequent utterances can prompt them 
rr to signal an error in p. H also uses Op err. sig. 1 prior to his 
manifestation in intentional misunderstandings. 
- lyl and 'action' are not closely linked with the misunderstanding . 
and therefore it is not surprising that both are used by S and by H. 
1z' is not included in this correlation because the number of 1z' 
utterances in the corpus is somewhat arbitrary ; all utterances which 
follow realization are Iz' utterances, except for those which constitute 
other devices, and therefore the number of 1z' utterances depends on 
the recording of the datum and at which point this ceases. 
Devices,, like origin and manifestationg are textual components. 
The non-textual component of realization is discussed and illustrated 
in Chapter VII. 
CHAPTER VII 
NON - TEXTUAL COMPONENT OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS : 
REALIZATION 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Realization is the awareness of whether or not a misunderstanding 
has occurred. Because it is non-textual, that is, it cannot be checked 
against a transcription of what was said, identification of it is 
dependent on the analyst's interpretation of the textual components 
(origin, manifestation, devices). and on commentaries provided by 
participants. Although it is not tangible in the way that utterances 
are, it is an integral part of all misunderstandings; in every misunder- 
standing a particular state of realization obtains for each participant. 
The state of realization spedifies whether or not a participant is aware 
that a misunderstanding has occurred. 
Before realization a participant's state of realization is I- real. '; -- 
when he realizes a misunderstanding has occurred his state of realization 
becomes I+ real. '. Such a change crucially alters his understanding of 
the conversation. For S, I+ real. ' means that he is aware that H has 
misunderstood his origin and also, in those instances in which I+ real. ' 
does not obtain until one or more utterances after the manifestation, 
that his own belief about H's manifestation has been incorrect. For H, 
1+ real. ' means that he is aware that he has misunderstood the origin 
and that S intended to express a different proposition to the one H 
believed had been expressed. 
States of realization may differ for each participant. The states 
of realization which obtain in, for example, H76, are 1+ S real. -H real. $. 
In this misunderstanding S realizes and H fails to realize that a 
misunderstanding has occurred. They therefore leave the conversation 
with differing beliefs about what has been expressed in the 2Eigin. 
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Realization tends to be effected at different times for each 
participant and the order in which it is effected is important. Ifq for 
example, H realizes prior to H, S has the option of effecting I+ H real., 
and correcting H's misunderstanding of the origin. In such an instance 
S is aware both of what he intended the origin to express and of what H 
has misunderstood it as expressing, while H has only one understanding, 
which, unbeknown to him, is incorrect. Conversely, H might realize in 
advance of S and might wish to amend his manifestation and to effect 
I+ S real. '. The particular understandings which participants have of 
the origin, and therefore of the conversation, are not necessarily 
constant; the identification of states of realization accounts for the 
faqt that what each utterance expresses is not necessarily what each 
participant believes it expresses. 
Assessing whether or not participants have realized that a misunder- 
standing has occurred seems like Waddell's "fire in a wooden stove" 
(Twaddell, 1935, in Joos, 1957: 57) in that it requires the analyst to 
make judgement of participants' thinking processes (c. f. Labov & Fanshell 
1977; Grimshaw, 1982). One analyst's interpretation of what is happening 
in a misunderstanding might differ from another's. Although the analyst 
is not a participant in a dynamic conversation, he has to understand 
what the participants are expressing in their utterances. Just as H 
can fail to understand correctly, so the analyst cannot guarantee to 
interpret correctly the participants' utterances, intentions, beliefs and 
misunderstandings (c. f. McGregor, 1985)- 
However, there is often evidence to guide the analyst. The conversation 
which he seeks to interpret is no longer dynamic but has become. a static 
text. The analyst has the advantage of being able to relate prior and 
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subsequent utterances to the one he is interpreting. In many dataq 
therefore, the analyst can be reasonably certain what utterances were 
intended to express and what they were understood as having expressed. 
In presenting the communication model in Chapter III it was argued that 
approximation counted as sufficient understanding and there is no reason 
why this cannot be equally true of the analyst's understanding of 
utterances. 
Assessing whether or not realization has been effected is dependent 
on the analyst's interpretation of utterances. If the assumption that an 
analyst can understand utterances is correct, then the further assumption 
that his understanding of utterances can be used to assess states of 
reaiization ought also be correct. However, provision must be made for - 
those data in which the states of realization cannot be confirmed or 
cannot be assessed at -all. The possible states of realization which can 
obtain in misunderstandings are therefDre as follows : 1+ S, H, O real. ' 
and '- S, H, O, real. I when the states are confirmed ; 1? + S, H, O, real. 
and 19. - S, H, O real. ' when the states are assumed but not confirmed; 
12 S, H, O real. ' when the states cannot even be assumed. 
The invest#ition of realization raises the fundamental problem of 
how an analyst can assess participants' states of realization. This 
problem is discussed in the following section. Once the analyst has 
acquired evidence for the states of realization it becomes possible to 
determine how participants effect realization for each other, that isl 
how they resolve misunderstandings. The final section of the chapter 
discusses the means by which participants effect realization. 
4. 
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2. EVIDENCE FOR REALIZATION 
Evidence for realization is provided by two sources : (i) textual 
evidence which is drawn from the conversation in which the misunderstanding 
occurred and (ii) retrospective evidence which is drawn from participants' 
commentaries after the misunderstanding has closed. 
A major source of textual evidence is provided by those devices 
Which relate to p, pr and to the misunderstanding itself. An explanation 
of pr such as "Oh I thought you meant it was in mono" (A48) makes it 
clear to both S and the analyst that what H thought the origin expressed 
differs from what it was intended to express. Appreciation by H of 
this difference between p and pr means that she realizes that a misunder- 
standing has occurred. The various expressions which constitute Imus. 
ack. 1 also indicate that realization has been effected, such as I'Ah" in A19, 
"Ohl' in B60 and, followed bequentiallyl by lp r exp. 1 in A42 : 
Oh my tea 
I thought you meant my eat tea 
Op r ref. 1 'combined' with Imus. ack. 0 also indicates I+ H real. ' as in 
"Oh not Clive Dixon" (A23). These devices indicate that I+ H real. ' has 
been effected. 
Devices used by S enable ohe to assess that I+ S real-' obtains. 
S must have realized a misunderstanding has occurred if he effects '+ H 
real. ' by the use of Ip exp. 1 and Ip r ref. 1, as in the following example : 
A5 No that's not what I mean 
I mean how much is she selling it for 
If S refutes pr and explains p he must have realized Hts misunderstanding. 
Similarly, if S effects I+ H real. ' by the use of Ix exp. 1 and Ix 
r ref. 1 
he must have realized that H misunderstood the origin because he had 
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misheard it, as in the following example : 
B53 Not MARRIED 
I asked you are you MANX 
Textual evidence is also provided by the nature of responses to the 
manifestation and to utterances seeking a different response to the origin 
than that provided by the manifestation. In D65, for example, S uses 
Ix ampl. ' since the manifestation apparently does not provide an 
appropriate response to the Drigin : 
(1) H: He offered Alan Oates a job on the spot 
(2) ORIGIN S: Where, at Abu Dhabi ? 
(3) MANIF. H: No, at Ronaldsway 
+S real. 
(4) x ampl. S: Where was the job ? 
?+H real. 
(5) y/z H: Abu Dhabi 
S re-phrases (2) and makes it clear that she wishes to know the location 
of the job, as opposed to the location in which the conversation took place; 
this indicates that S has realized H's misunderstanding. S, as analyst, 
confirmed this realization. It is possible that Ix ampl. 1 effects 1+ H 
real. ' since H responds appropriately in (5) but this cannot be confirmed. 
In C63 S uses ly' in response to the origin, commenting further on 
the topic of the origin, a meal which S and H will be attending. This 
effects 11+ H real. ' : 
(1) ORIGIN S: This is going to be a very funny meal 
(2) MANIF. H: Yes but it's nice 
(3) y S: Well George will be all right 
-+H real. 
(4) mus. ack. H: Oh that meal 
+S real. 
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H believed that the referent of "meal" war. the one she was eating which 
S had just cooked but the reference to George, who is amongst the party 
for the meal planned for the evening, effects 1+ H real. $. It is likely 
that H's use of Imus. ack. 1 effects 1+ S real. ' but this cannot be 
confirmed. 
The propositions expressed in utterances can indicate realization, 
as in A26 : 
pr exp, H: Rimsky-Korsakov was a man 
p exp. S: Scheherezade was a woman 
ýH real. 
+S real. 
z H: She was but he wasn't 
S and H know the referents of both the origin and the manifestation 
after these utterances and they both therefore realize that H has 
misunderstood the origin, "Ah, thousand and one nights woman"s to refer 
to the composer Rimsky-Korsakov rather than the character Scheherezade. 
It has been explained above that I? + real. ' or 19. - real. ' obtain 
if realization is probable but cannot be confirmed and that I? real. ' 
obtains when there is neither probability nor confirmation. Confirmation 
froqýarticipants provides retrospective evidence of realization. If 
the analyst is a participant in a misunderstanding and he knows that it 
is a misunderstanding then 1+ real. ' obtains for him, in his role of 
either S, H or 0. In the absence of other devices to indicate the other 
participants' states of realization, the analyst, after the misunderstanding 
has Slosed,, can ask the other participants and can thus obtain evidence 
of their states of realization (e. g. L87, in which the analyst is H 
and is able to confirm O's state of realization by discussing the 
misunderstanding with him after it had closed; regrettably, it was not 
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possible to discuss the misunderstanding with S). 
In some examples participants are not able to confirm their own 
states of realization. In S100 both S and H were unable to decide if 
they had or had not realized the misunderstanding had occurredl though 
both admitted to being aware that the conversation was problematical : 
(1) ORIGIN S: There's coffee again now 
(2) MANIF. H: Have you been off coffee then-? 
(3) y S: There hasn't been any for some time 
S and H are in a common room for which coffee is normally provided. For 
the previous few weeks there has been no coffee, only some attrocious 
tea; S and H had discussed this situation at the time. S, asked after 
the conversation ended, could not under'stand why H had expressed the 
manifestation and wondered if she had phrased her. origin utterance badly. 
H said that she had not been listening properly. 
The inability of participants to know whether or not they have 
realized that a misunderstanding has occurred is surprising but in the 
three data in which C? real. ' obtains and the participants subsequently 
discussed the misunderstanding, I+ real. ' or '- real. ' could not be 
confirmed (? H real. ' in M90, I? S real. ' in 095 and I? S real. ?H 
real. ' in S100). These data would have been classified as I- real-' but 
the participants were very reluctant to confirm that realization was 
definitely not effected. 
Another source of retrospective evidence is the fact that if a 
misunderstanding is reported to the analyst by a participant, that 
ýarticipant must have realized that the misunderstanding has occurred. 
If his state of realization was I- real. ' he could not report the 
misunderstanding (e. g. S in B56). If he realized after the misunderstanding 
I Cýll A. 
closed then he knows that his stcb-, of realization was I- real. '. 
The various sources of textual and retrospective evidence indicate 
the states of realization which obtain. Locating precisely the stages 
at which realization is. effected is not always easy. In the following 
example, B56,0 Might realize after (3); she definitely realizes after 
ORIGIN S: Can I have two egg salad rolls and 
I owe you two 
H- gives S two rolls - 
(2) MANIF. H: That's thirty 
(3) x ampl. S: But I owe you two 
manif. rpt. H: Yes, that's thirty 
pr 
, 
ref ýýtl. 0: No he means two rolls p 6x 
.+0 real. 9 
+0 real. 
S, H real. 
S is buying rolls and is paying for two rolls he bought from 0 on the 
previous day. It is possible that 0 realizes that S means 'two rolls' 
rather than 'two pence' after (3) but there is no evidence of 1+ 0 
real. ' until after (4), to which 0 responds with an explanation of the 
origin. and a refutation of H's pr, thereby demonstrating that her 
state of realization is 1+ 0 real. '. The marker I? +0 real. ' after 
indicates the possibility of O's having realized at this stage. 
It is apparent that participants are able to effect realization 
for-each other by seeking responses other than those which have been 
forthcoming or by responding to utterances in inappropriate ways or 
by using devices. These means are discussed in Section 
_3. 
HOW REALIZATION IS EFFECTED 
An important means by which realization is effected is the recognition 
of the inappropriacy of the manifestation, as in the following datum, Ag : 
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(1) ORIGIN S: Is it wool 
(2) MANIF. H: Very 
+S real. 
(3) x exp. & S: I said wool not warm 
xr r,, - f. +H real. 
(4.1) mus. ack. H: Oh 
. 2) z : Yes I think so 
S has commented that she likes H's jumper. H does not express 'warm' 
in her manifestation yet S correctly understands that this is what H has 
understood of the origin, that is, H has misheard "wool" as 'warm'. 
The 'linguistic inappropriacyl of the intensifier, "Very". effects 
I+ S real. ' and enables S to conjecture exactly how H has misunderstood 
the origin; it is more appropriate to apply "Very" to 'warm' than to 
llwbol" and, additionally, 'warm' is initially phonologically similar 
to "wool". 
Realization is effected by S's recognition of the 'pragmatic 
inappropriacyl of the, manifestation in the following datum, 
H: When we live in Alston I shall get my 
meat for the freezer from Blackett's 
(2) ORIGIN S: Yes you want to chat Graham up 
(3) MANIF. H: Yeah I'm sure he needs a cowgirl 
/ pause / 
(4) +S real. 
(4) pr ref. & S: No, Graham Blackett not Graham Richards 
,+H real. 
Graham (Blackett) in (2) is a butcher; Graham Richards in (4) is a 
farmer. The commentaries retrospectively provided by S and H for this 
datum make their intentions clear and in respect of (4) demonstrate the 
effort which S has to make in order to realize the misunderstanding and 
resolve it. In uttering (2) S is thinking "Graham rather than any 
other Blackett" while H reported of (1) that "as I said that about 
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Blacketts I was thinking that maybe Graham Richards would sell me a 
heifer cheaply". Not knowing that one of the Blacketts is called Grahamq 
she understands the origin as a slight shift in topic from dead meat to 
live meat, this being the shift her own thoughts have made. Her 
manifestation then gives expression to a development of the thought 
and S has somehow to relate the manifestation to his origin in order 
to understand it since it is 'pragmatically inappropriate'. The 
explanation which he subsequently gave of his reasoning is very detailed : 
How should Graham Blackett, a butcher of some repute, 
need in any ordinary sense of the word, a cowgirl ? 
The only Graham I know who might need a cowgirl is 
Graham Richards, farmers up the roads therefore she 
thought when I said Graham, meaning Graham Blackett, 
I was intending, contrastively, another family, i. e. 
not Blackett, rather than what it did mean, which 
was a specified name of the same family 
S needs to have recourse to pragmatic knowledge of the respective roles 
of the two professions and to personal knowledge of the two men having the 
same forename. This knowledge enables him to recognize that the'. 
manifestation is inappropriate; consideration of the manifestation's 
'pragmatic inappropriacyl effects I+ S real. '. 
In order to realize that a misunderstanding has occurred, a 
participant must often recognize that the topic has been shifted or 
changed. When H misunderstands the origin as a result of attributing 
a different referent to it than the one intended by S, the referent of. 
the manifestation will differ from that of the origin. s then has to 
try and relate the manifestation to his origin and, if he cannott to 
determine what is meant by the manifestation. This situation is 
illustrated by the following datum, A33 : 
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(1) ORIGIN S: Sounds like Focus 
(2.1) MANIF. H: Yeah I've been meaning to get it fixed 
for days 
. 2) y The picture's been lousy for some time 
/ pause / 
(3-1) pr qued. S: What the hell are you talking about 2 
pause 
+S real. 
. 2) 
r 
P exp. Ah you're talking about the television 
-3) p exp. I meant the music 
+H real. 
S and H are listening to a record while watching television on vision 
only. S recognizes that the manifestation is 'cognitively inappropriAtp 
in that it has notling to do with the music and S would anticipate a 
response relating to the music. The following utterances (2.2), adds 
to this linappropriacyl while also giving extra information likely to 
identify the referent of the manifestation. Eventually S successfully 
identifies the referent and understands the topic change by H. Complex 
consideration of the linappropriacyl of the manifestation effects 
I+ S real. I. 
In all these examples of recognition of the linappropriacyl of 
manifestations, realization has been effected for S. S then effects 
1+ H real. ' by informing H what the origin was intended to express. 
This is achieved by the use of devices. 
The efficacy of a device in effecting realization varies considerably 
because devices are used either 'separately', in 'combination' or in 
'sequence' and they are further influenced by the order in which they 
are used. The structure of a misunderstanding thus affects its outcome. 
The structure of a misunderstanding comprises ORIGIN + MANIFESTATION 
+ STATES OF REALIZATION + (devices), that is, the primary textual 
components, the non-textual component and the secondary textual component. 
The ways in which these components inter-relate are discussed in Chapter 
VIII, the final section of which focusses further on realization. 
CHAPTER VIII 
THE STRUCTURE OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The primary textual components of a misunderstanding, origin and 
manifestation, and the non-textual component, realiztion, constitute the 
essential structure: what is misunderstood, what evidence there is of 
the misunderstanding and what awareness participants have of whether or 
not the misunderstanding has occurred. The secondary textual component, 
the. devices, constitutes the ways in which participants develop and 
resolve or fail to resolve misunderstandings. 
The combination of textual and non-textual components constitutes 
the structure of a misunderstanding, as follows : ORIGIN + MANIFESTATION 
+ STATES OF REALIZATION (+ devices). Use of devices is optional. The 
order in which the components occur is variable. Only the origin 
has a fixed position. It is always the first component; all the other 
components are a consequence of the origin and they therefore must 
follow it. 
The basic structure of a misunderstanding consists bf the following 
sequence : 
ORIGIN -4 MANIF. -+ +S real. -> S device -+ +H real. (--) H device) 
In this sequence the manifestation is adjacent to the origin; S- 
realizes the misunderstanding has occurred as a result of recognizing 
the inappropriacy of the manifestation; S uses one device; this device 
effects I+ H real. '; H may or may not use a device subsequent to his 
realization. This sequence is deemed the basic structure of a misunder- 
standing because the misunderstanding occurs and is resolved in the 
most expedient way, that is, the least effort required by participants 
to ensure that each realizes the misunderstanding has occurred. The 
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misunderstanding does not continue to be the topic of the conversation 
beyond H's optional device. 
There are two essential requirements of the basic structure. The 
first is that origin and manifestation must be adjacent. The second 
is the order in which realization is effected : I+ S real. ' must 
precede '+ H real. '. Provided that these requirements are met, the 
basic structure can be expanded by the use of more than one device 
and interactively expanded by the use of devices which S and H use 
interactively. Thus, for example, S and H can each use devices between 
the manifestation and the effecting of I+ S real. ', between the effectirz 
of '+ S real. ' and of '+ H real. ' and subsequent to the effecting of 
'+. H real.. 
41% of the misunderstandings in the corpus exhibit basic structure. 
In the remaining 59% the structure is diversified. The-basic structure 
of a misunderstanding can be diversified in four ways : (i) the 
origin and the manifestation are not adjacent ; (ii) 1+ S real. ' does 
not precede '+ H real. '; (iii) the participant 0 makes an individual 
contribution which alters the sequencing of basic structure; and (iv) 
realization is not effected for any or all participants. Diversified 
structure, like basic structure, can be expanded and interactively 
expanded. 
The structure of a misunderstanding is wholly dependent on its 
participants and the ways in which they interact. In the basic structure 
the, manifestation follows the. origin, S recognizes the inappropriacy 
of the manifestation and realizes that H has misunderstood the origin 
he then uses a device to effect '+ H real. '. This is not a blueprint 
which S and H must follow; it is a description of what happens when 
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S and H interact in one particular way. They might very well interact 
differently. One or both might produce utterances between the origin 
and the manifestation, S might not recognize the inappropriacy of the 
manifestation until a number of devices have been used, or, having 
realized the misunderstanding has occurred might choose not to effect 
'+ H real. I or might attempt to do so by using a device which H fails 
to interpret correctly and so on. 
The structure of a misunderstanding is the yardstick of its 
complexity. A misunderstanding which contains interactive expansion 
is more complex thafi one which does not and a misunderstanding which 
has a diversified structure is more complex than one which has basic 
structure. Section 2 of this chapter discusses and exemplifies basic 
and diversified structure. 
States of realization and the points in the sequences at which 
realization is effected crucially influence the structure of misunder- 
standings. Section 3 of this chapter discusses the role of realization 
in the structure of misunderstandings. 
2. BASIC AND DIVERSIFIED STRUCTURE 
The basic structure of a misunderstanding consists of the following 
sequence : 
ORIGIN --, - MANIF. +S real. -4 S device +H real. H 
device) 
In this sequence S realizes that the misunderstanding has occurred as 
soon as he hears the. manifestation. He then effects 1+ H real. ' by 
using one device. H then realizes that the misunderstanding has-occurred 
and may, if he wishes, use a device. The basic structure is exhibited - 
in A3 
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(1) ORIGIN S: Nice, aren't they? (i. e. glasses) 
(2) MANIF. H: Well, they're useful (i. e. drip mats) 
+S real. 
(3) p exp. S: I meant the glasses 
+H real. 
mus. ack. H: Oh yes 
In this datum, the device used by S is 'p exp. 1 and that by H is 'Mus. 
ack. '. S realizes that H has misunderstood her origin as soon as the 
misunderstanding is manifested; H realizes that she has misunderstood S'S 
origin as soon as S uses the device 'p exp. l. The misunderstanding is 
thus expediently dealt with. 
The basic structure can be expanded within the same sequencing 
pattern by an increase in the number of devices used in each position. An 
I 
increased number of devices need not increase the number of utterances 
since devices can be 'combined' in one utterance. Thus S uses 'combined' 
devices such as Ix exp. & xr ref. ' (Ag) or IpF ref. prtl. &p exp. ' (A12, 
A13P A14, A16t A17). The number of utterances is increased when S uses 
lsequential', devices, that is, devices in adjacent utterances in one 
participant-turn. The use of 'sequential' devices which follow I+ Sreal. ' 
and effect '+ H real. ' in data exhibiting basic structure with 2Zpnsion 
include Ip, exp, p exp. 1 (A6) and 'p r ref. prtl,, p exp. ' (A5). 
H does not always respond after realization but when he does he 
chiefly uses- bus. ack. ', either 'separately' (Ag), 'combined', such as 
Imus. ack. &p qued. ' (AZO) or 'sequential', such as Imus. ack., xr exp. ' 
(A18). 
The basic structure is also expanded by the use of a device by H 
in the same participant-turn as the manifestation, provided that this 
follows the manifestation and does not separate theorigin and the 
manifestation. In A19, for example, H uses a device after her indiract 
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manifestation : 
(1) ORIGIN S: Could you fasten that drawer properly 
(Z) IND. MANIF. H: Yes right 
action H- holds door handle 
+S real. 
(3) pF ref .&p exp. S: Drawer not door 
mus. ack. H: Ah 
+H real. 
The basic structure of this misunderstanding is expanded in two ways: 
(i) H uses a device between her manifestation and the effecting of 
I+ S real. '; and (ii) S uses a 'combined' device, Ipr ref. &p exp. ', 
between the effecting of '+ S real. ' and '+ H real. '. 
Expansion occurs when more than one device is used in a participant- 
turn, including the use of a device by H after his manifestation in 
the same participant-turn. Interactive expansion occurs when devices 
are used in a sequence of participant-turns rather than in a single 
participant-turn. A misunderstanding which has basic structure with 
interactive expansion is exemplified by A30, which exhibits the following 
structure : 
ORIGIN --> MANIF. &H device (pr err. sig. ) -4 S device (Pr qued. 
) 
--ý H device (p 
r exp. ) --> +S real. -ý S device (x exp. ) -4 +H real. 
If the sequencing of components in a misunderstanding differs from 
the sequence exhibited in basic structure, the structure of that 
misunderstanding is diversified. The structure of a misunderstanding 
can be diversified in four wayst each of which is discussed below : 
(i) When the origin and the manifestation are not adjacent the 
structure is, diversified. Expansion. or interactive expansion can 
separate the origin and the manifestation. If a misunderstanding 
contains two or more origins and/ or two or more manifestations its 
structure is not necessarily diversified; it is only diversified if 
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a device is used between the components, as in A45, which exhibits 
the following initial structure :- 
ORIGIN, ORIGIN -+ S device (y) --ý MANIF. 
The structure is expanded by ly' and this, device separates the origin 
and the manifestation. The fact that there are two origins does not 
affect the datum's structure because the two origins are adjacent. 
In the following datum, A49, interactive expansion separates the origin 
from the manifestation : 
ORIGIN H device (p r e=. sig. ) ---ý S device (y) --ý MANIF. 
The structure of A49 is thus diversified. 
. 
(ii) When I+ S real. ' does not precede '+ H real. ', the structure 
. 
of the misunderstanding is diversified. For example, '+ H real. ' 
precedes '+ S real. ' in A46. The structure of this datum is diversified 
with considerable interactive expansion : 
ORIGIN -4 MANIF. 4S device (y) -4 H device (y) --ý S device (y) 
-4 H device (action) -> S device (y) H device (y) -4 S device 
(y) 
r exp. +S real. H real. -ý H devices (y, xH device 
(mus. ack. ) 
When the misunderstanding is intentional '+ H real. ' always precedes 
S real. ' and additionally, '+ H real. ' always precedes the manifest- 
ation. The structure of an intentional misunderstanding is therefore 
invariably diversified. The following datum, A36, exemplifies the 
diversified structure of an intentional misunderstanding : 
ORIGIN --> +H real. --ý H device (mus. sig. ) , MANIF. 
-4 +S real. S device (mus. ack. ) 
The structure of a misundbrstanding in which S and H realize at the 
same time that a misunderstanding has occurred is also diversified, as 
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in A43, which exhibits interactive expansion : 
ORIGIN --ý IND. MANIF. --> S device (x rpt. prtl. 
) --> + S, H real. 
-), S, H device (mus. ack. 
) --> S device'(Pr exp. imp. ) 
(iii) When the participant 0 makes an individual contribution, 
the sequencing of the basic structure is altered and the structure of 
such a misunderstanding is diversified. 0 is present in 191'o of the 
corpus and his presence involves both an additional state of realization 
and the potential use of devices by an additional participant. When 
more than one 0 participant is involved the number of states of 
realization and the number of potential devices is further increased. 
When 0 does not make an individual contribution but simply 
reinforces the signalling and/ or acknowledgement of a misunderstanding 
at the same time and by the same device as S or H, the structure of that 
misunderstanding is basic. In addition, 1+ 0 real. ' must be effected 
at the same time as either '+ S real. ' or '+ H real. '. Thus the 
I 
structure of B52, for example, is basic with interactive expansion 
ORIGIN -4 MANIF., MANIF., MANIF., MANIF. + S, 0 real. 
-4 S, 0 device (mus. sig. ) --ý S device (x rpt. &x emph. ) 
+H real. --: ý S, 0 device (mus. ack. ) --: ý H device (mus. ack. ) 
The four adjacent manifestations effect '+ S, 0 real. ' and 0 uses the 
same devices at the sane time as S. In the following example, B510 
0 is linked with H rather than S; 1+ 0 real. ' is. effected at the same 
time as '+ H real. ' and 0 uses the same device at the same time as both 
S and H. The structure is therefore basic with expansion : 
ORIGIN --> MANIF. 4+S real. S device (x exp. &x emph. & 
xr ref. ) --: o + H, 0 real. -ý, S, H, 0 device (mus. ack. ) 
These instances of basic structure in which 0 makes no indiviclual 
contribution are in contrast with instances in which 0 does make an 
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individual contribution and thereby influences the development of the 
misunderstanding. In B56, for example, 0 realizes in advance of S and 
H and uses a device to effect '+ S, H real. '. The structure of B56 
is therefore diversified with interactive expansion : 
ORIGIN -: ý MANIF. -ý S device (x ajapl. ) -4 ?+0 real. -4 H device 
(manif. rpt. ) +0 real. 40 device (pF ref. prtl. &p exp. ) 
+ S, H real. 
The structure is diversified in this datum because 0 makes an individual 
contribution. 
(iv) When realization is not effected for any or all participants, 
the structure of that misunderstanding is diversified. A participant's 
state of realization is always I- real. ' until realization is effected. 
Rather than having a discrete place in the structural sequence like 
other components, '- real. ' extends over the sequence after the origin 
and up to 1+ real. ' being effected. When '+ real. ' is not effected 
#- real. ' continues to be the state of realization which obtains. 
Consequently the structural sequence of any misunderstanding in which 
realization is not effected lacks a primary component. It should be 
noted that it is only the sequence which lacks the primary component# 
state of realization; the structure does not lack it, in that '- real. ' 
obtains, extending over the sequence. 
Diversified structure is exhibited in those misunderstandings in 
which any of the following states of realization obtain :- SIHI 0 real. ', 
I? 
-S / H/ 0 real. ' and "? S/ H/ 0 real. '. For example, the structure 
of H77 is diversified because H does not realize that the misunderstanding 
has occ=ed 
ORIGIN -ý MANIF. --), +S real. 4S device (p exp. prtl. ) 
--*,, -. H device (pr err. sig. ) 
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When the state of realization is not known and cannot be assumed 
'? real. ' obtains. The structure of misunderstandings in which 1.9 real. ' 
obtains for all participants resembles that of misunderstandings in 
which '- real. ' obtains for all participants in that no I+ real. ' 
appears in the sequence. In S100 both S's and H's states of realization 
are unknown and the diversified structi=e is as follows : 
ORIGIN -; ý MANIF. --: t, S device (y) 
This structure resembles that of G74 : 
ORIGIN -: p, IND. MANIF. 4S devices (y & pr err. sig., Y) 
-4,0 devices (y, y, y) S device (y) --> 0 device (y) 
The difference is that G74 contains interactive expansion but both data 
fail to contain a state of realization in their structural sequences. 
The sequencing of devices within the various structures varies 
from datum to datum so there is little constraint on what should be 
used and in what order. 'Mus. ack. ' is usually the last in any sequence 
in which it is used but it is occasionally followed by ,Pr exp. ' (A49) 
or ,xr exp. ' (B61) by H. Devices which relate to x tend not to be used 
in sequences containing devices which relate to p (but cf. A22, B58, 
D70, F73, M91 and P97). Explanations and repeats tend to follow queries. 
The positioning of components and the choice of which devices 
constitute the secondary components in every misunderstanding are 
dependent on participants and their states of realization. If 1+ real. ' 
obtains for a participant that Participant understands both what is 
intended and what has been misunderstood. Such knowledge enables him 
to use devices or to choose not to use particular devices. Without 
such knowledge a participant is limited in the devices he can use*. 
The important role of realization is discussed in the following section. 
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I REALIZATION 
Realization has a crucial role in the structure of misunderstand- 
ings. Each participant's state of realization governs his understand- 
ing of the origin and of the conversation and therefore influences the 
development of the misunderstanding. 
Px-lor to the effecting of realization, each Participant believes 
that there is only one understanding of the origin, namely, the 
understanding which each participant himself has :S believes that H's 
pr is equivalent to P, H believes his pr is equivalent to P and 0 
believes both his pr and H's pF are equivalent to p. When I+ real. ' 
is effected for a participant, that participant becomes aware that his 
belief is unfounded and that pr is not equivalent to P. 
The order in which realization is effected determines the 
subsequent structure of a misunderstanding. If S realizes first he has 
three options : (i) he can effect '+ H/ 0 real. ', as in A5; (ii) he 
can conceal the misunderstanding but endeavour to ensure that H's pr 
is equivalent to p, as in M90; or (iii) he can conceal the misunder- 
standing and allow the topic raised in his origin to be changed, as in 
178. If H realizes first he has two options : (i) he can effect 
9+ S1 0 real. ' and thereby admit to the misunderstanding, as in A41; 
or (ii) he can conceal the misunderstanding, as in K82. With both 
these options H can then respond appropriately to the origin. When a 
misunderstanding is intentional H realizes before any other participant 
and produces a manifestation for joke purposes. The subsequent 
development in this instance depends on the other participants' states 
of realization; H's realization initiates the manifestation rather 
thanlevices. If 0 realizes first, he has two options : (i) he can 
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effect '+ S/ H real., as in B56; or (ii) he can conceal the misunder- 
standing. There is no example-in the corpus of O's concealment of a 
misunderstanding although in L87 0 realizes first and effects '+ H real. ' 
but not '+ S real. '. 
The structure of a misunderstanding is influenced by realization 
even when realization is not effected. In G75 the participants are 
aware of a problem in the conversation but in spite of the complex 
discussion of the conversation none of the participants realize-that a 
misunderstanding, which stems from H's having misheard the origin, has 
occurred : 
(1.1) 0 
* 2) 
(2) ORIGIN S: 
(3) y ol: 
(4) y S: 
(5) y02: 
(6) y S: 
(7) MANIF. H: 
(8) pr err. sig. S: 
(9) manif. rpt. H: 
(10) )F qued. S: 
(11) xr exp. prtl. H: 
&x- qued. 
(12) xr ref. prtl. S: 
(13) y ol: 
(14) xr exp. prti. 02: 
W) X, exp. prtl. H: & err. sig. 
(16) x r: r. prtl . 02 
r xr exp, (17) x rer. prtl. S: 
(18) y 03: 
(19) y S: 
(20) y H: 
(21) y01: 
(22) y S: 
(23) y ol: 
He blew up my nose and he gave me a headache 
It was nasty 
It's supposed to be like a sort of a zephyr 
Well he was a phhhhh 
A gale 
Is that supposed to be romantic? 
It gets dogs going I believe 
Zeppelins aren't romantic 
Pardon 
Zeppelins aren't romantic 
Who mentioned zeppelins? 
You just did, didn't you? 
No 
This is one of those conversations 
You did 
I know, but only because I thought (S) did 
No, you started that one 
No, I'm afraid not (H) 
They could be thought extremely phallic 
What can? 
Phallic ? 
Zeppelins 
Zeppelins 
Oh those big things that go like that 
- extends arms wide - 
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01 and 0z each use lyl once and S uses IvI twice between the 
origin and the manifestation. The manifestation relates the misheard 
word,, "zeppelin", to the quality attributed to the correct 'Word, "zephyr"# 
in the origin by 0 and S in their utterances. The manifestation is 
inappropriate and out of context so S uses Ip r err. sig. 1, to which 
H uses 'manif. rpt. l. From this point onwards, seven out of the next 
eight utterances involve attempts to relate the inappropriate 
manifestation to the conversation. S queries the source of xr in the 
conversation, H'partiallyl explains it, S *partially' refutes it. 0 
then uses 'y'; her comment, "This is one of those conversatio ns", 
recognizes that a problem exists but makes no contribution to any possible 
resolution. 02 then 'partially' explains xr again, in terms of 
explaining the place of the utterance in the conversation. H agrees 
with this explanation, using to Xr exp. prtl. I. Again, the 'partial' 
explanation is of why he expressed his manifestation, "because I thought 
(S) did", which is also IpF err. sig. '. The signal is not taken up 
because S knows she did not utter anything about "zeppelins" ; 
consequently she 'partially' refutes xr, following 0 
21 
s use of the same 
device. H's device could have been taken up more usefully if S had 
asked for further details of when she was supposed to have mentioned 
"zeppelins", but neither she nor 02 do anything other than refute H's 
r x. Subsequent utterances take up the topic of "zeppelins" and the 
misunderstanding remains unrealized for all participants. 
Were it not for the fact that the datum was tape-recorded, the 
misunderstanding would never have been discovered. Only after 
listening to the tape a number of times was "zephyr" heard and the 
connection made between that and the misheard "zeppelin". If the 
participants had concentrated on what H heard, xr, rather than on when 
in the conversation he claimed to have heard xr, and from whom, they 
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might have realized, that the misunderstanding had occurred. Failure 
to realize results in a sequence of devices relating to the conversation 
which then gives way to a change of topic. The structure of the 
misunderstanding would have been very different if H had explained 
that he heard S say 'It's supposed to be like a sort of zeppelin'; 
such an explanation may very well have effected realization, in which 
case the conversation would have proceeded without further difficulty. 
Instead, owing to the ineffectual use of devices, realization is never 
effected and part of the conversation is directed to attempts to make 
sense of the manifestation. 
G74 is another datum in which '- real. ' obtains for all the 
participants. This datum is particularly interesting because two of 
the participants discuss in some detail a potential misunderstanding 
which is averted because the potential H does not manifest it and 
instead realizes it after using 'pr err. sig. l. This participant 
becomes 0 in the later, actual misunderstanding. The conversation 
begins with a request by S which H answers and which 0 wrongly believes 
is addressed to himself : 
(1) S: 
(2) H: 
(3) S: 
Can I just borrow (0) for a few minutes 
Yeah sure 
I'll not be a tic 
What ? 
What ? 
Oh you were talking to (H) then were you? 
No I was just broaching the subject 
A question of ownership 
That's right, yeah 
O. later explains how he understood (1) : 
0: 1 thought thought you were going to 'go on 
Can I just borrow (0) for a minute such 
and such is what I thought you were going 
to do so you eh 
4. 
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S and 0 then discuss the reason why 0 'misunderstood' S's request in., (l). 
Being linguists, the two use terminology with which H, a non-linguistp 
is not likely to be familiar : 
(14) S: You're just so used to me having dysphasic 
(15) 0: No the tonicity tonicity was wrong 
(16) S: Dysphasic syntax 
(17-1) 0: Can I just BORrow 
.. 2) You had the tonic on borrow, right? 
-3) You should have had the tonic on 
(0) 
(18 1 S: Can I just BoRrow (0) for a minute ý :2 That's what I said 
-3) Can I just BORrow 
(0) for a minute 
(19 0: Yeah right 8 
What you should have said was can I just 
borrow 10ý for a minute 
. 
At this stage of the conversation the actual misunderstanding occurs. * 
S, perhaps in defence of his apparently incorrect tonicity, appeals to H 
(20) ORIGIN S: Did you understand it? 
(21) IND. MANIF. H: No not a word 
(22 1ýy& p' err. sig. S: That's right that's why you said yes :2y: Great 
"it" in (20) refers to the request in (1), which H did understand; 
evidence of his correct understanding of the request is displayed in 
his response "Yeah sure" in (2) and in his observation in ( 6), "A 
question of ownership". H, however, understands the referent of "it" 
to be the lengthy discussion on the intonation of the request and on 
why 0 had 'misunderstood' this request; he has not understood this 
discussion and he answers accordingly. S does not realize that H has 
misunderstood the origin; judging by (22.1) S assumes that H did 
understand "It" and he anticipates the answer 'yes' to his question. 
His use of 'y & pr err. sig. i y' expresses the fact that H has already 
given evidence of understanding "it" by responding to that original 
question with "yes". S's origin might be motivated by a wish to defend 
I'l 
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his initial utterance and the manner in which he expressed it; the 
question was understood by the addressee and therefore the lengthy 
discussion which deliberates on what was wrong with the way it was 
expressed ought to reflect on O's abilities as a hearer rather than 
on S's as a speaker. S's response to the manifestation is one of 
protest, which is probably due to his having anticipated a different 
answer to the. origin. This protest acts as a, pr err. sig. 1 but H 
does not take up the signal; a response from him is not required and 
he ceases to play any further part in the conversation. H has not 
understood the discussion on tonicity and because he has not said 'yes' 
to any part of it he ought to realize that he has misunderstood the 
referent of the origin. Had S used ,pr qued. ' by asking, for example, 
IWýy did you answer yes if you didn't understand it? IH would have 
been obliged to answer and realization would probably have been 
effected. 
Thus in both these data, G75 and G74, the state of realization 
which obtains for all participants is '- real. '. In G75 the participants 
attempt to solve a problem in the conversation without appreciating 
that the problem is a misunderstanding. The states of realization 
influence the utterances which follow the origin and the manifestation : 
the devices used are limited to queries and explanations of x and x 
and to 'y', utterances which develop the topic. In G74 the participants 
are not really aware of a problem in the conversation. S and 0 
jokingly attribute the inappropriacy of the manifestation to the fact 
that being a teacher is affecting H. The states of realization 
result in a series of ly' utterances after one 'combined' 1Y & Pr err. 
si g. '. In both data the conversation ends with S and 0 (01,02 and 03 
in G7_5) having a different understanding of the origin than H. 
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In other data participants are aware of a problem in the 
conversation and successfully*resolve that problem by using devices 
which ultimately effect *+ real. ' for one or more particip, -ýnts. The 
structure of L87 is diversified with considerable interactive expansion. 
The interactive use of eight different devices in the datum illustrates 
how much effort can be required of participants before the origin 
is correctly understood : 
(1) ORIGIN S: 
(2) IND. MANIF. 1 H: 
(3) y S: 
(4) y H: 
(5-1 
.2 
.3 
y 
.4 
.5 
(6.1) y 
02) MANIF. 
. 2) p qued. 
(8 )pr ref. prtl. 
& pPý err. sig. 
(9) y 
(10 1p exp. : 2ý pr ref. 
(11 1ý' em ack. :2 
xr exp. 
fl 
(12) p exp. 
(13) p qued. 
(14) p exp. prtl. 
(15-1) mus. ack. 
. 2) mus. ack. 
-3) mus. ack. 
H: 
0: 
. 
Could I have a photocopy of these wills 
please 
/ pause 
Yes 
Now then, the yellow cards are Episcopal 
wills and the pink ones with yellow stripes 
are as well I assume 
/ pause / 
Eh 
You're new aren It you? 
Well I'm sure they axe 
They probably ran out of yellow cards 
These are the ones I want 
If you can give me a piece of scrap paper 
I'll write them out for you and you can 
think about them 
Thanks 
gets paper and gives it to S- 
pause / 
turns to 0- 
Can we do photocopies of wills? 
Yes, well, print-outs 
- turns to S- 
You want a print-out from the reader? 
No 
0: That's how we copy wills 
S: I want to look at them 
:I don't want a copy 
H: Oh sorry 
I thought you said you wanted them photocopied 
S: I want to look at the photocopies you have 
+0 real. 
0: The microfilms 
S: Yes 
+H real. 
H: Oh 
I see 
S orry 
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The conversation takes place in a Reference Library in which H has 
just started working. The original manuscripts of wills are not 
issued to the public; instead, microfilms of the wills are issued for 
consultation. One type of will, Episcopalian, are indexed on yellow 
cards and also on pink cards with yellow stripes, while another type 
are indexed on white cards; H does not know about this procedure. 0 
is a colleague of H's and though his job is not concerned with the 
issuing of material he knows considerably more about it than H does.. 
Microfilms can be copied by being printed out from a particulax 
microfilm-reader, as opposed to ordinary photocopying. 
The misunderstanding is-that H. does not understand correctly what 
S is requesting because S does not use the correct words for what she 
wants. H adopts S's terminology but applies her own meaning to it in 
her second manifestation; the subsequent utterances are all concerned 
with correcting this semantic anomaly. 0 uses ly' in (7-1) and glosses 
"photocopies" as "print-outs". He uses 'p qued. I and asks S if this 
that is, "a print-out", is what she wants. It is not what she 'Wants 
and S therefore uses 'p r ref. prtl. &pr err. sig. 1; these devices ýut 
the onus back on 0 to find out what is required. 0 uses ly', an 
utterance which describes how wills are copied. This lyl utterance 
gives S tangible material on which to work. She uses 'sequential' 
vp exp., pr ref. 1 to establish what she does and does not want. H 
acknowledges the error in her pr and explains x r,, At this stage H 
still does not realize that the misunderstanding has occurred and 
instead thinks that S has changed her mind about what she wants. S 
uses Ip exp. ' again, still with the troublesome word "photocopies". 
0 then realizes the misunderstanding has occurred and uses Ip qued. 't 
incorporating the correct word "microfilms". S responds to this with 
Op exp. prtl. ', confirming that the microfilms are what she wants. 
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'+ H real. ' is at-last, effected; H uses 'mus. ack. 1, 
Because none of the participants realize for some time that H has 
misunderstood S's origin, they all have problems in communicating. S 
endeavours to be issued with particular material, H endeavours to find 
out if what she believes S wants can be issued and 0 endeavours to 
ascertain exactly what S wants. The three participants all contribute 
to the development of the misunderstanding and it is 0, who is best 
acquainted with the topic under discussion, who is the first to realize 
that H has misunderstood "photocopies" as'photocopying'rather than 
"microfilms". O's realization enables him to effect I+ H real.. Once 
H has realized, there is no need to effect '+ S real. ' because H is 
in ý position to issue the appropriate material. Eight different 
devices are used, several more than once, before the misunderstanding 1. 
is resolved. 
The efficacy of a device, that is, the ability of a device to 
effect realization, thus varies according to how it is used and how it 
is interpreted. No device is absolute: it cannot be claimed, for 
example, that 'p exp. ' will invariably effect realization. As L87 
demonstrates, 'p exp. ' may not be a clear explanation of p. Even when 
S's 'p exp. ' is apparently an unequivocal explanation of p, as in A5# 
its efficacy is dependent on H's ability to understand it correctly 
no less than when it is anlincompletel 'p, exp. 1, as in D68, or a poor 
expression of 'p exp. ', as in H77. The efficacy of every device 
depends on its recipient, just as the understanding of the origin does. 
Devices may be 'combined' and I sequential' and may be used in 
interactive expansion ; it is therefore possible that they cumul effect a 
realization, In misunderstanýings in which a number of devices are 
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used the device which ultimately effects realization may do so as a 
consequence of the devices which have preceded it. Determining which 
device effects realization is not always straightforward, even when 
not many devices are used in a conversation. In A25, for examplet 
the manifestation effects '+ S real. '; S then uses lp exp. ' which is 
followed by H's use of 'action' before H realizes and duly acknowledges 
the misunderstanding. S is looking at a paper : 
ORIGIN S: I'd better see what's on 
MANIF. H: I'd quite like to watch Rhoda at nine 
o'clock 
+S real. 
p exp. S: I meant the Millennium 
action H - looks at paper and sees it is a 
local one giving list of Millennium 
celebration events - 
-+H real. 
mus. ack. H: Oh 
The explanation given by S might or might not have been sufficient 
to effect '+ H real. '. H uses 'action' by looking at what S is 
reading and this, together with S's explanation, effects realization.. 
It is impossible to know whether lp exp. 1 alone would have. effected 
realization. 
The device 'y' is particularly variable in its efficacy. It can 
support the misunderstanding or can effect realization. In R99 both 
S and 0 use 'y' ; S's 'y' might have supported the misunderstanding 
had O's ly' not followed it : 
(1) ORIGIN S: Stephen appeared before me the other week 
(2) MANIF. H: What, for speeding ? 
?+0 real. 
(3) y S: No, it was a domestic case 
?+0 real. 
(4) 
17 0: He's a solicitor 
+H real. 
(5) mus. ack. H: Oh, he was representing someone 
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S ia a magistrate; Stephen, an acquaintance of S, H and 0, is a lawyer. 
If 0 had not used 'y' in (4), ýadding relevant information to the 
origin, H may well have inquired into the state of Stephen1s marriage, 
in the light of S's 'y' utterance in (3). It is likely that such an 
inquiry would ultimately have effected realization. 
The confusion which use of the 'y' device can cause is clearly 
illustrated in C64. H misunderstands the origin and from then until 
H's use of Imus. ack. ' the conversation proceeds at 'cross purposes' : 
(1) H: 
(2) ORIGIN S: 
(3) IND. MANIF. H: 
action s 
(4) y S: 
(5) y H: 
(6) y S: 
(7-1) y H: 
Twelve please 
Are you with her? 
Yes 
pause 
holds up three 5p pieces (part of 
25P given by "her", the other woman) 
That's for two 
She gave you 25p 
Yes that's right 
/ pause / 
Twelve please 
H real. 
.2 mus. ack. : Oh she was with that man 
.3z: She paid for them 
.4z: I'M Paying for myself 
?+S real. 
gets on a bus with two friends, a man and a woman. The woman pays 
the fares for the man and herself, leaving H to pay her own fare. The 
two go through to sit down and H offers S, the bus driver, her fare. 
H misunderstands the origin as a straightforward inquiry into 
whether she is travelling with "her", which she is, rather than 
correctly understanding it as meaning travelling with "her" in terms 
of the fare already paid, which she is not. Her answer to the questiont 
the indirect manifestation "Yes", causes S to assume that one fare has 
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been paid by the other woman to include H and he tries to explain 
this to H by using 'sequential' devices 'action, y'. H further 
misunderstands this as being a complaint that the fare paid was 
insufficient and her own 'y' utterance points out that more money was 
paid than the amount held up by S, which of course S knows and duly 
confirms in a 'y' utterance. H then tries to ignore the conversation 
and to start it again with a ly' utterance which repeats her utterance 
which preceded the origin, that is, a request for a 12p fare. She then 
realizes the misunderstanding and acknowledges it, making it clear 
that the other woman was with the man and had paid for him. It is 
assumed that S also realizes at this stage of the conversation but his 
state of realization cannot be verified. 
'Compounding' occurs because of the failure of both S and H to 
realize the misunderstanding for some time. Use of the device tyl in 
this datum complicates the interaction rather than helping to resolve 
the misunderstanding. H misunderstands the first 'y', in (4), which 
is itself the product of S's misunderstanding of the indirect 
manifestation, and from then on the misunderstanding becomes increasingly 
complicated. There is no obvious reason for the effecting of '+ H real. '. 
Having elected to start the conversation again H presumably re-interprets 
the utterances already exchanged and suddenly understands what S was 
asking in the origin. H resolves this misunderstanding in spite of 
the devices rather than because of them, although the proliferation 
of ly' utterances eventually makes H aware that there is a problem 
in her understanding of the conversation. 
'Compounding' also occurs in D71. This datum highlights the fact 
that the effecting of realization is not necessarily straightforward 
given the range of devices at the participants' disposal : 
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(1) ORIGIN S: Who deals with Appeals 
(2) x qued. H: Peel ? 
(3) x exp. prtl. S: Yeah 
(4) MANIF. H: David 
(5) x rPt. P-rtl- S: 
&x emph. 
(6.1) ? y/ mus. ack. H: 
S real. 
APPEAL 
+H real. 
Oh 
?+H real. 
2) ? pr err. sig. What? 
action H- sees bundle of papers - 
,? +H real. 
-3) z H: Oh they're mine 
S and H are civil servants; H deals with "Appeals" in the department 
while David works in a separate branch of the department and is the 
area inspector for the town, 'Peel". S has a bundle of papers which 
relate to "Appeals" and is looking for the right person to give them 
to. 
H is not sure that he has heard the. origin correctly and he uses 
'x qued. 1 to check it. Because he has misheard the origin it is 
actually xr which he expresses although he assumes it to be x, an 
assumption then borne out by S who uses Ix exp. prtl. I by confirming 
H's query, having in turn misheard it himself. H then answers the 
origin question with a manifestation which effects I+ S real. '. S 
then uses 'x rpt. prtl. &x emph. ', which ought to effect '+ H real. '. 
H, however, appears not to be closely attending. His "Oh" is as likely 
to be a neutral comment, a lys utterance, as a Imus. ack. 1 and his 
"What ?" seems to be 'p r err. sig. 1 in that he does not appear to 
understand what is happening in the conversation. He then uses 'action' 
by seeing the papers which S is endeavouring to return to the right 
person and he answers the origin question correctly by claiming the 
papers as his. It is assumed that by this stage he has realized the 
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misunderstanding but this cannot be verified. 
The incorrect explanation of x guarantees the manifestation. Had 
S heard "Peel" correctly and had he explained x as "Appeal' ' the 
misunderstanding would have been avoided. The misunderstanding would 
have been extended much longer in the conversation were it not for the 
fact that David's job is very different from the clerical staff's 
work in handling appeals. This job distinction is what effects I+ S real.,; 
had, for example, another David worked in the office the conversation 
would have closed with the misunderstanding remaining unrealized and 
S would have taken the papers to the other David, who would have 
rejected them and sent him back to H. Because the only David in the 
office is the inspector responsible for Peel, S realizes the misunder- 
standing. Situational information can thus play a large part in the 
resolution of a misunderstanding. 
Which devices are most frequently used and which devices are the 
most efficacious? Appendix 2 gives details of the number of times S, 
H and 0 each use the various devices. Additionally, the number of 
devices which immediately precede realization and which therefore 
contribute strongly if not totally to the effecting of realization are 
detailed; the efficacy of devices used 'separately' rather than in 
'combination' is also detailed. It is thus possible to compare the 
relative efficacy of devices although there are two major shortcomings 
to such a comparison : (i) realization is often effected cumulatively 
throughout a conversation and the identification of a particular device 
which has effected it is therefore not always accurate; (U) the 
smallness of the corpus means that any comparison can only be indicative 
rather than conclusive. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to indicate 
the relative frequency and efficacy of devices. 
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The most efficacious device used 'separately' by S is Ix comp. 't 
which effects realization on each occasion it is used. However, its 
10% success rate cannot be fairly compared with other devices because 
it is used only in data in which the origin is interrupted and is 
therefore much more specific than other devices. Additionally, it is 
only used twice in the corpus and two uses provide insufficient 
evidence from which to claim total efficacy in comparison with other 
devices which are used more frequently. 
The most frequent device used by S is 'y'. It is used ý, 7 times 
and is efficacious on 23yo' of the occasions when it is used. The disparity 
between its frequency of use and its efficacy is explained by the 
diversity of its potential contributions to conversations, as illustrated. 
by R99 and c64. 
The second most frequent device used by S is 1p exp. ', which is 
used 48 times. S effects realization by 1p exp. ' more often than by 
any other device ; the device is efficacious on '6.7/o of occasions of use. 
It is often combined with 'p r ref. 1, either 'partial' or 'complete'. 
Used 'separately', 'p exp. 1 is efficacious on 46% occasions of use. 
,pr ref. ', howevert is not efficacious at all when used 'separately'. 
It is primarily a complementary device, supporting the other devices 
with which it is used. 
Ix ampl. ' and Ix rpt. 1 are efficacious on 44% and 6, (yl, of occasions 
of use respectively. Giving H another chance to hear the origin or 
giving him additional information are by no means sufficient to effect 
realization. 
In respect of the devices which H uses to effect realization, 
manifestations are included in the statistics. A manifestation is 
I. 
3: 8>. 
not a device because it is a primary component rather than a secondary 
one. However, it is included in Appendix 2 because it is an utterance 
which can effect realization. H is rarely aware that his manifestation 
is effecting realization because he only realizes himself prior to the 
manifestation in intentional misunderstandings. H's manifestation 
effects realization 61 times, which is 53% of occasions of use. 
The device. mpst. frequently used by H is bus. ack. 1, which is used 
-7 75 times. As one would expect, Imus. ack. ' is rarely efficacious (. 55 
of occasions of use) because it is usually the last device in a sequence 
and follows '+ real. ' for all participants. It is therefore only 
efficacious when H realizes in advance of S and in acknowledging the 
misunderstanding happens to effect '+ S real. '. 
The next most frequently used device is lys, which is used 47 times 
and is efficacious on25)/o of occasions of use. H's most efficacious 
device. is 'p r exp. ' (69jo of occasions of use) but this device is only 
used 13 times. 
The devices used by 0 rarely effect realization. Those devices 
I 
which are efficacious, 'x exp. ', 'p exp. 1, lyl and Ix ampl. 1, with 
lp r ref. ' used in 'combination' with other devices, are in keeping 
with the efficacious devices used by S. 
\1 
The frequency of use and the efficacy of devices are governed by 
the way participants use and understand them. Misunderstandings have 
basic or diversified structures; the structure of each misunderstanding 
is. created by its participants. The establishment of a typology of 
misunderstandings must accommodate the variability which arises out Of 
this creativity. The following chapter presents and discusses one 
possible typology of misunderstandings. 
CHAPTER 'I X 
A TYPOLOGY OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the types of misunderstandings which occur 
in the corpus. 
A typology of any phenomenon must be applicable to all examples 
of that phenomenon and must be capable of distinguishing between 
different types of examples. The determination of the criterion which 
differentiates types is therefore very important. 
The collection of a corpus for this thesis required a fundamental 
typology of what counted as a misunderstanding and what did not. 
Distinction was made between linguistic and non-linguistic misunderstand- 
ings, between misunderstandings which involved native speakers and 
those which involved non-native speakers, between general and marked 
conversational settings and between misunderstandings which contained 
both origins and manifestations and those which did not. The former 
distinctions in each case together identify what counts as a misunder- 
standing in this thesis. Having collected and analysed a corpus, an 
attempt is now made to develop a typology which refines the preliminary 
distinctions so that the similarities and differences between the one 
hundred misunderstandings in the corpus can be determined. 
Several factors are potential criteria for refining the fundamental 
typology: (i) H's intentionality; (Ii) Cause; (M) Structure; 
and (kv) Outcome. These potential criteria are discussed below; 
to (M) are rejected and (iv) is adopted as the criterion for the 
typology. 
(i) H's intentionality The distinction of whether or not a misunder- 
standing is intentional divides those misunderstandings in which pr A-P, 
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r a non-intentional misunderstanding, from those in which p=p but H 
pretends that pr ý p, an intentional misunderstanding. According to 
this criterion, the corpus is divided into five types which are 
intentional, nine which are not and one which is possibly intentional. 
The implication is that the five are similar to each other and different 
from the ninety-four,, which'in turn are similar-to'each other; the 
one possibly intentional misunderstanding would have characteristics 
of the two types. This distinction is not borne out by the corpus, in 
which the main difference between intentional and non-intentional 
misunderstandings is that I+ H real., always precedes the manifestation 
and '+ S real. ' in intentional misunderstandings whereas it only 
occasionally preceds '+ S real. * in non-intentional Misunderstandings. 
All the misunderstandings in the corpus, be they intentional or non- 
intentional, exhibit differences in structure and outcome. 
Therefore, one can note whether or not a misunderstanding is 
intentional but the criterion of H's intentionality is not a sufficient 
criterion for a typology. 
(ii) Cause It is possible that different causes of misunderstand- 
ings will distinguish different types. Distinction can be made between 
misunderstandings in which the cause is attributable to S, those in 
which it is attributable to H and those in which it is attributable to 
S and H. The problem with a distinction of this kind is how to attribute 
causes to participants. If, for example, S expresses the proposition p 
in an x utterance which is ambiguous, is the cause of a subsequent 
misunderstanding S's ambiguous x, H's failure to disambiguate x correctly 
or* a combination of the two? 
The causes of misunderstandings can be determined without necessarily 
185 
attributing them to participants, but this does not skirt the problem 
of multiple causes. It is not easy to isolate a primary cause from 
a number of contributory causes. Contextual and situational influences 
lend weight to the misunderstanding of an utterance which, were it 
produced in another conversation, might not be misunderstood. If that 
utterance were syntactically ambiguous or contained a homonym, the cause 
would be that ambiguity or homonym; equal importance, howeverp would 
have to be accorded to the surrounding utterances or environment in 
which the conversation took place. Thus a sliding scale of pertinence 
of causes would be required; such a scale could only be based on the 
analyst's intuition and would therefore be too subjective to provide 
a satisfactory criterion for a typology. 
(M) Structure Since all misunderstandings have a structure 
which is composed of primary and secondary components in various 
combinations, the criterion of structure seems promising. Distinction 
between basic and diversified structure, made in Chapter VII, separates 
411. from 591o of the corpus. Further refinement is possible if 21pInsion 
and interactive expansion , the number of devices used and the order 
in which all the components occur are taken into account. Howeverl 
the variability which would emerge would be too extensive to make 
structure a feasible criterion. Categories for each of the possible 
orders and structural contents would be numerous and diverse and could 
increase with each new datum encountered. These reasons therefore 
preclude the adoption of structure as a criterion which can be easily 
applied to all data and which differentiates between data. 
(iv) Outcome The communication model gives three possible 
outcomes to misunderstandings : )F = x, P' AP; xr A x, P' AP; 
xr=A, Prýp. The states of realization develop these outcomes so - 
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that the outcome for each participant is distinguished; the states of 
realization specify whether or not each participant is aware that 
pF ý p. States of realization are applicable to all misunderstandings 
and differentiate the outcome of each in terms of how participants 
understand the conversation in which the misunderstanding occurs. 
There are a finite number of states of realization : 1+ S/H/0 reaV 9 
S /11/0 real. ',. I? + S/H/O 'real. *.., I"? - S/H/*O ' al. 1 and, re I? S 
/H/O 
real. ". The'eriterion which is adopted, in the typology developed In 
this thesis-is. thmrefore the states; of. realization which obtain. 
The typology is presented in the following section. Section 3 of 
this chapter discusses the analysis and the typology in which it 
culminates; several problems are discussed and the findings axe 
examined. 
2. THE TYPOLOGY 
The states of realization specify whether or not each participant 
is aware that a misunderstanding has occ urr ed. Before realization is 
effected, a participant's state of realization is I- real. '; when he 
realizes that a misunderstanding has occurred, his state of realization 
is I+ real. '. Realization is subject to binary classification because 
real. ' or I- real. ' must obtain in every misunderstanding. However, 
because the analyst cannot always be certain or cannot even assume 
whether or not realization has been effected, the states of realization 
I? .+ real. ' and I? - real. ' are deemed to obtain when the analyst is 
not certain and "? real. ' when the analyst cannot even assume. 
The state of realization which obtains in every misunderstanding 
is initially I- real. '. After the origin in intentional misunderstandings 
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H real. ' obtains. In non-intentional misunderstandings I- real. ' 
obtains until after the manifebtation at least and often after utterances 
subsequent to the manifestation. The states of realization which 
characterize a misunderstanding are those which obtain at the close 
of the misunderstanding, that is, in realized ones when the fact of the 
misunderstanding and in unrealized ones when the topic raised in the 
origin cease to be the topic of conversation. If both or all participants' 
states of realization are not 1+ real. ' or I? + real. ' they have 
different understandings of at least the origin and possibly of more 
of the conversation. 
Types of misunderstandings are differentiated by the states of 
realization which obtain. For example, in one type both S and H 
realize and are therefore aware that H's pr was initially not equivalent 
to S's p but that by the close of the misunderstanding H's PF is 
equivalent to p (e. g. Al). In another type 1+ S real. I and '- H real. 
obtain: S is aware that H's pF is not equivalent to his p while H is 
not aware of this; H thus understands the conversation differently to 
S, who, unlike H, is aware that H's understanding differs from his (e. g. 
H76). In another type neither participant realizes so that not only 
do they understand the origin differently but also they do not know 
that they have different understandings of that origin; their 
conversation proceeds with theseý-`different understandings (e. g. F73). 
Interestingly, H reported that he did eventually realize the misunder- 
standing in F73 some time after the conversation had ended; the 
state of realization which characterizes the datum is Aevertheless 
S real. -H real. ' since that was the state which obtained when the 
misunderstanding closed. 
The following table details the types of misunderstandings in 
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the corpus. The types are listed alphabetically according to which 
states of realization obtain. The quantity of data in each type and 
the corpus number of each datum are given 
TYPE STATES OF REALIZATION QUANTITY NUMBER 
A +S real. +H real. 50 Al - 50 
B + S real. +H real. + 0 real. 11 B51 - 61 
c ? + S real. +H real. 3 C62 - 64 
D + S real. ?+H real. 7 D65 - 71 
E ? + S real. +H real. ? +0 real. 1 E72 
F - S real. -H real. 1 F73 
G - S real. -H real. - 0 real. 2 G74 - 75 
H + S real. -H real. 2 H76 - 77 
I ? + S real. -H real. 1 178 
i + S real. -H real. + 0 real. 2 J79 - 80 
K - S real. +H real. 6 K81 - 86 
L ? - S real. +H real. + 0 real. 1 L87 
m + S real. ?H real. 4 M83 - 91 
N ? + S real. ?H real. 2 N92 - 93 
0 ? S real. +H real. 3 o94 - 96 
p ? S real. ?+H real. 1 P97 
Q ? S real. +H real. + 0 real. 1 Q98 
R ? S real. +H real. ? + 0 real. 1 R99 
s ? S real. ?H real. 1 sloo 
The analysed data are presented in Appendix 1 according to their 
types. The order of presentation within each type which contains more 
than one datum depends on the eitructure of each datum. Misunderstandings 
which have basic structure are followed by those which have basic 
structure with expansion and then by those which have basic structure 
with interactive expansion. Next come the misunderstandings which have 
diversified structure, followed in turn by those which have diversified 
structure first with expansion and then by those with interactive 
expansion. Ordering within these distinctions is determined by the 
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number of different devices used; data containing fewer devices precede 
data containing a greater number of different devices. 
This system of ordering the data shows the increasing complexity 
of misunderstandings within types. Although the typology differentiates 
misunderstandings irrespective of their structure, the states of 
realization which obtain axe a product of the structure. In a 'Type-A' 
misunderstanding which has basic structure, 1+ S real. +H real. ' 
will have been, effected more simply, that is, by recognition of the 
inappropriacy of the manifestation and by the use of one device, than in 
a 'Type A' misunderstanding which has diversified structure with 
interactive expansion. In both misunderstandings the outcome is ultimately 
that both participants realize the misunderstanding has occurred, in 
contrast with two other misunderstandings, for examplev which might 
respectively resemble the two 'Type A' misunderstandings in terms of 
structure, apart from the effecting of realizationj but which have 
different outcomes. 
Types A-S characterize the misunderstandings in the corpus. The 
typology can be extended to cover all potential combinations which are 
not encountered in the corpus, such as 1? +S real. ?-H real. ' or 
'- S real. -H real. +0 real. '. Since 0 is present in only 19% 
of the corpus, potential combinations will chiefly be those which 
include 0. 
The misunderstandings in 61% of the corpus are realized and a 
further 1176 are assumed to be realized, by both or all participants. 
The majority of misunderstandings are therefore realized; most 
participants are able to detect and resolve misunderstandings which 
occur in their conversations. Nevertheless, there remain a substantial 
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number of misunderstandings which participants fall to deal with 
wholly successfully. 37o are not realized by either or all participants 
and 12% are, or are assumed to be, realized by one but not both or 
all participants. In the remaining 1_T/o one or more states of realization 
are unknown. A number of conversations thus proceed in which at 
least one participant has, or may have, an incorrect belief about at 
least one utterance, the origin, and in some cases about the utterances 
subsequent to that origin insofar as they pertain to the incorrect pF. 
Participants can thus leave a conversation without being aware 
that their understandings of what has been expressed differ from 
co-participants' understandings. However, they may subsequently 
become aware that their understandings have differed. H realizes the 
misunderstanding in F73 some time after the conversation has ended. 
Such post-conversation realization shows that some participants work on 
understanding utterances after it has ceased to be necessary to do so. 
The language user seems to worry about failures and errors in under- 
standing and to ponder on them afterwards until they axe resolved, 
even though resolution can make no difference to the closed conversation. 
In the corpus, S realizes before H in 74% and H before S in 22% 
of those misunderstandings in which I+ real. ' is known or assumed for 
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all participants One would expect S to realize before H in such a 
high proportion of the data because S knows what propositon he intends 
to express and he has His manifestation to guide his understanding 
of what His pF might be; H only has his incorrect pr until further 
utterances indicate that his pr differs from S's P. 
When H realizes before St H has the option of concealing the 
misunderstanding. In A41, A42 and A44 1+ H real. * is effected by a 
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device used by S after the manifestation ,S not having realized that 
a misunderstanding has occurr6d; in all these data H elects to effect 
1+ S real. '. In the $Type KI data, those in which '- S real. +H real. ' 
obtains, H chooses not to effect 1+ S real. '. In two of the six data 
of this type, the manifestation interrupts the origin and on S's 
completion of the origin H realizes the misunderstanding and does not 
draw it to S's attention, though in K85 H acknowledges the misunder- 
standing by laughter, an acknowledgement which is not recognized as 
such by S. 
Regardless of whether or not correct understanding is essential, 
as it is, for example, when S seeks an answer to a particular question, 
S has a tendency to ensure that p and pr are equivalent and that '+ H real. ' 
obtains. 'Type HI misunderstandings, those in which I+ S real. -H real. ' 
obtains, are in marked contrast to this tendency. In H76 S allows 
the conversation to close after the manifestation, opting to let the 
misunderstanding be sustained rather than effect '+ H real. '. In H77 
S realizes after the manifestation and uses an ineffectual Op exp. prtl. l 
which prompts IPr err. sig. 1 by H. Irrespective of any response by H, 
S succeeds in finding out the answer to her, origin question and drops 
the topic rather than explain p more thoroughly; H's response has 
become redundant. 
In the two 'Type JI misunderstandings, those in which 1+ S reaL 
-H real. +0 real. ' obtains, both S and 0 elect to leave the misunder- 
standing unrealized by H. In J79 0 uses IpF ref. prtl. 1 and Imus. sig. 1 
and both S and 0 use 1mus. ack. 1 but H neither picks up the signal 
nor registers the acknowledgement and the topic is changed. Neither 
S nor 0 make any concerted effort to effect *+ H real. '; when H does 
not respond to the partial refutation and signal S and 0 acknowledge 
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the misunderstanding between themselves and the topic is changed. 
Of the eleven 'Type BI misunderstandings, those in which I+ S real. 
+H real. +0 real. ' obtains, 0 is linked with S in six of the data 
(B52j B53, B54, B55t B589 B61), with H in two (B51, B57) and 
separately in advance of both S and H in one (B56). In one datum 
0 either realizes ahead of S and H or is linked with S (B60). In 
the final datum (B59), 0 becomes H2 because he produces a manifestation. 
This datum should technically be a 'Type At misunderstanding because 
the states of realization which obtain are I+ S real. +, H? ' real. % 
However. it is included in *Tvl)e BI because H2 is a third Darticipant 
in the way that 0 is. H2 is an 0 who misunderstands with H but who 
expresses a manifestation, unlike other 0 participants who misunder- 
stand but remain silent. S effects realization for both H1 and I? at 
the same time. 
Because they are dependent on the way ýarticipants use and 
understand them, devices are not automatically efficacioust but is there 
any correlation between particular devices and particular types? The 
tables in Appendix 3 show all the devices used by S, H and 0 in each 
datum, grouped in types. The tables also show the order in which 
devices are used and specify the device which immediately precedes 
the effecting of realization. 
The majority of Ip exp. 1 devices are used in 'Type At, frequently 
with 'p r ref. l. 'y' is used in many of the types from 'Type CI to 
'Type SI. When realization is not effected or not immediately effected# 
other utterances develop the topic of the, origin or manifestation 
and some of these 'y' utterances effect or contribute to the effecting 
of realization. 
193 
As one would expect, Imus. ack. 1 is predominantly used in 'Type 
A' and 'Type BI misunderstandings, those in which both or all participants 
realize the misunderstanding has occurred. 
When the outcome of the communication is xr = X, pr / P, the 
device used is more likely to relate to p and when it is Ix r/x, pr/P, 
the device used is more likely to relate to x. Participants thus tend 
to recognize a mishearing as the cause of a misunderstanding and they 
correct that mishearing; the correction then enables H to discover 
what p was intended to be. 
Although the corpus has been successfully analysed and typologized, 
there is no guarantee that the methods will be equally successful when 
applied to data from other sources. Consequently, in order to test 
the adequacy of the methods. data from other research on misunderstandings 
are analysed and typologized in Chapter X. 
CHAPTER X 
APPLICATION OF THE MODEL TO ADDITIONAL DATA 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In order to test the adequacy of the analytic and typological 
methods, seven misunderstandings cited by other researchers are analysed 
and typologized in accordance with the model described in this thesis. 
These data derive from different sources (constructed and actual; native/ 
non-native participants; native/ native participants) and the emphasis 
in the original discussions has variously been on discourse structure 
and on the causes and consequences of misunderstandings rather than 
specifically being on the structure of the mmisunderstanding. It is 
hoped that the model will be able to handle these disparate data and 
thus be demonstrably applicable to a wider range of misunderstandings 
than those of the corpus. 
The-data which are analysed and typologized in this chapter are 
as follows : (i) an actual misunderstanding discussed by Schwartz (1977) 
in his sociolinguistic characterization of how speaker-hearers are able 
to deal with misunderstandings, (ii) a constructed misunderstanding 
cited by Zaefferer (1977) in his theoretical pragmatic discussion of 
reading choices and decision analysisq (iii) an actual misunderstanding 
discussed by Jefferson (1972) in her ethnomethodological work on 'Side 
sequences', Uv) an actual misunderstanding discussed by Milroy (1984) 
in her work on inter-ethnic and inter-dialectal communication breakdowns, 
(v) an actual misunderstanding analysed by Burton (1981) in her work on 
discourse analysis, (vi) an actual miscommunication, believed to be a 
misunderstanding, analysed by Grimshaw (1982) in his work on comprehensive 
discourse analysis and (vii) an actual misunderstanding analysed by 
Varonis & Gass, (1985) in their discussion of native/ non-mative. 
communication difficulties. The data are analysed in this order because 
they become increasingly more complex. 
Ia Cz 
L-W. / 
2. ANALYSIS AND TYPOLOGY OF ADDITIONAL DATA 
. 
(i) Schwartz (1977; ýn 1978: 3) 
Schwartz's "interpretive method" yields an elaborate commentary on 
the three utterances which constitute his example of a misunderstanding. 
The commentary is supported by additional data but is specific to the 
example given so that the cause of that misunderstanding, the roles of 
the participants and the content of the utterances are detailed. Schwartz's 
description of what is happening in the conversation accords with the 
following analysis : 
ORIGIN S: Did you hear what's happening to the 
mail strike ? 
(2) MANIF. H: No, what ? 
+S real. 
pr ref. prtl. 
&p exp. 
S: No, I'm asking you 
+H real. 
The manifestation is Icognitively inappropriate' in that it fails to 
provide an informative answer to the origin question and is instead a 
response to a phatic question. Recognition of this inappropriacy 
effects I+ S real. ' and S then partially refutes H's pr and explains pt 
that is, he points out that he was asking H rather than uttering a phatic 
question serving as a preliminary introduction to informing H about the 
mail strike. S's use of these 'combined' devices effects I+ H real. '. 
The misunderstanding is Type A (I+ S real. +H real. ') and has basic 
structure with expansion. 
(ii) Zaefferer (1977: 338) 
The datum which Zaefferer discusses is constructed and serves to 
illustrate the use of decision analysis to explain and predict a particular 
reading choice, that is, explain and predict why a particular understanding 
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is reached. The discussion, wholly theoretical, centres on cause and 
there is no consideration of the possible constituents of a misunderstanding. 
Although the datum is constructed, it is poskible to analyse its structure, 
as follows : 
ORIGIN S: There are even fishes that nurse their 
young 
(2) MANIF. H: You're kidding me! 
(3 1) y S: No : 
2) pr qued. Why ? 
(4) Pr exp, H: Fishes aren't mammals 
?+S real. 
(5) p, exp. S: But of course, dolphins for instance 
+H real. 
The origin is a btatement about aquatic creatures. H misunderstands 
"fishes" to refer to the biological notion of 'fish', viz. a vertebrate 
with cold blood which breathes through gills and lives in waterl and 
his manifestation is an exclamation that S is kidding him. S denies 
this and then uses Ip r qued. 1 intorder to find out why H believes he is 
being kidded. H explains his pr by pointing out that 'fish' is not 
mammalian and presumably this effects I+ S real. '. S then uses Ip exp. 1 
and cites an example of what he includes in the class of 'fish'. This 
premimably effects 1+ H real. '. The misunderstanding is of a type not 
encountered in the corpus, "? +S real. ?+H real. ', and it has 
basic, structure with interactive expansion. 
According to Zaefferer, "we can state that the outcome of B's 
interpretation of A's utterance of (1) is a reading which implies that 
by uttering (1) A was kidding B, while the correct reading implies that 
A was not" (1977: 339). In other words, p is a serious statement while 
in pr the statement is a joke or a tease. In fact, it seems that the 
misunderstanding is not about the seriousness of (1) but is about what 
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"fishes" refer to; H seems to treat (1) as a joke because he cannot 
reconcile his pr with the actual world. The task of providing an 
explanation for how a misunderstanding occurred is not easy because it 
depends on the analyst's interpretation of the datum and this datum 
makes the problem particularly apparent : as it has been constructed, 
one would not expect it to be open to any interpretations other than 
those which Zaefferer intends it to illustrate, yet other interpretations 
remain possible. 
(iii) Jefferson (1972: 331) 
Jefferson's datum is from a tape recorded therapy session and 
is cited by her as an example of a 'misapprehension sequence'. She 
analyses the datum as (4) statement, (5-1,5.2) misapprehension and 
(6) clarification (1972: 304) : 
(1) H: Daddy almost beat me up! 
(2) 0: Good 
(3) H: 11Yuh c1n have it if yuh wannit. Damn kid" 
mhh 
(4) ORIGIN S: Are you serious or are you kidding? 
(5.1) IND. MANIF. H: No I'm serious 
. 2) MANIF. He said I could have the room if I wanted 
it, he didn't kid me 
+S real. 
(6) pr ref. prtl. S: No I mean uh about beating you up 
&p exp. 
+ H9 ?+0 
real. 
(7) Y/z 0: How dry I am (sung) 
(8.1) mus. ack. / z H: Oh no 
. 2) mus. ack. / laugh 
-3) z He just said ah 
(9) z 0: 1 heard a real smutty joke 
(10) z H: I don't care, if you wannit you can have it 
In the origin question S wishes to know if H is serious or kidding about 
whether his father almost beat him up. H misunderstands this and believes 
198 
that S is asking if he is serious or kidding about his father's allowing 
him. to have a particular room. His response in (5-1) is an indirect 
manifestation because it answers the origin appropriately and gives no 
evidence of any misunderstanding of that. origin. H follows the indirect 
manifestation with a direct manifestation, explaining what his father 
said to him, using a reported speech version of the utterance he had 
attributed to his father in (3). Recognition of the 'cognitive inappropriacyl 
of this manifestation effects I+ S real. ' and S then uses the 'combined' 
devices Ip r ref. prtl. &p epx. 1 to effect I+ H real. '. Since 0 is 
present in the conversation 1+ 0 real. ' is presumably effected also, 
but at no time does 0 produce an utterance which relates to the misunder- 
standing and there is therefore no confirmation of his state of realization. 
H in (8.1) either acknowledges the misunderstanding or uses a IzI 
utterance and answers the implied question 'Did your father beat you up V. 
He does acknowledge the misunderstanding by laughter in (8.2) and then 
uses a IzI utterance in (8-3), continued in (10) after O's unconnected 
interruption, explaining again what his father said. 
The misunderstanding is probably Type B (1+ S real. +H real. 
+0 real. ') but because of the difficulty of confirming O's state of 
realization it might be a type not yet encountered in the corpus 
1+ S real. +H real. ?+0 real. '. Its structure is basic with 
interactive expansion, though the only interactive expansion is O's 
utterance in (7) which has no coherence with the preceding or following 
utterances. 
Uv 
. 
(iv) Milroy (1984: 21) 
Milroy's datum is an actual diary-recorded cross-dialectal 
misunderstanding. S is a S. W. Donegal native while H and 0 both speak 
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standard English : 
(1) ORIGIN 
(2) MANIF. 
r p err, sig. 
(3) y 
S: How long are youse here ? 
H: Till after Easter 
looks puzzled - 
pause / 
+0 real. 
0: We came on Sunday 
+H real. 
? mus. ack. & y S: Ah, youse're here a while then 
+H real. 
H and 0 interpret the origin as 'How long will you be here for Vbut 
S intends it to express 'How long have you heen here for V. Consequently 
the manifestation is Icognitively and linguistically' inappropriate for 
S but not for H, 0 and any analyst unfamiliar with Hiberno-English dialect. 
S's use of Ip 
r 
err. sig. 1, achieved by looking puzzled, apparently forceý 
0 to re-consider the conversation and this effects 1+ 0 real. ', 
confirmed by Milroy: The breakdown was, after a time lag, noticed and 
repaired. It is by no means certain that a linguistically unsophisticated 
speaker such as A (both B and C were linguist&) could have located the 
breakdown and effected the repair" (1984: 21). Though the breakdown is 
repaired in the sense that 0 provides an appropriate response to the 
origin in (3), it is not certain if this ly' utterance effects 1+ S real. ' 
or 1+ H real. 19 although it is likely that 1+ H real. ' has been effected. 
Consequently, it is not possible to specify "Ah" as Imus. ack. 1 or as 
part of the ly' utterance which follows it. The type is once again a 
new one : 19. S real. ?+H real. +0 real. ' and it has diversified 
structure with interactive expansion. 
(v) Burton (1981: 79) 
The datum from Burton's corpus was discussed in Chapter III, together 
I 
with her analysis of it. In accordance with the model discussed in, 
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this thesis, the datum is analysed as follows : 
(1) ORIGIN S: I'm going to do some weeding 
(2) MANIF. H: Yes please 
(3) pr err. Sig. S: What 
(4) manif. rpt. H: Yes please 
?+S real. 
(5) pr err. Sig. S: You don't listen to anything I say 
mus. Sig. ?+H real. 
(6) xr exp. H: I thought you said you were going to 
pour some drinks 
,+S real. 
(7) xr ref. prtl. S: No I said I'm going to do some 
&x exp. weeding 
+H real. 
The precise location of I+ S real. ' and I+ H real. ' cannot be determined. 
It-is possible that S, realizes after the manifestation is repeated but 
rather than realizing the misunderstanding he may simply be aware that 
the, manifestation is not appropriate. Depending on whether or not S 
does realize, he uses either Ip 
r 
err. sig. 1 or Imus. sig. 1, which might 
effect I+ H real. ' or. might make H aware that he has made a mistake in 
the conversation. S certainly realizes the misundastanding on hearing 
H's explanation of what he heard the utterance to be and H certainly 
realizes after S has 'partially' refuted this and has explained what 
was actually said. The misunderstanding belongs to 'Type A' (I+ S real. 
+H real. 1)and its structure is diversified with interactive expansion. 
(vi) Grimshaw (1982: 41-47) 
Grimshaw subjects his tape-recorded datum to comprehensive discourse 
analysis. He believes that it is a form of miscommunication but cannot 
place it in his taxonomy of miscommunications. He is the participant 
0, but his participation does not help him to analyse the datum.: 
"As a participant, I did not, apparently, know 'what was going on'. 
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As an analyst I believe something was going on -I still don't know 
exactly what was" (1982: 37). Analysis of the datum as a misunderstanding 
in the sense used in this thesis is made in the light of Grimshaw's 
description of the datum in terms of pýtralinguistic cues, kinesic cues, 
expansion and interactional cues, together with the retrospective 
commentaries of S and 0. The transcription is slightly altered in that 
it no longer details the portions of utterances which overlap with each 
other : 
(1) ORIGIN S: To what extent are these, the THREE theories 
that she selectedt TRULY representative 
of THEORIES in this area? 
IND. MANIF. H: - nods head - 
(2) manif. ampl. S: They are indeed 
(3) y incmp. 0: That's it that's it 
(4) MANIF. H: Yeah yeah no more theories 
(5) r p err. sig. & S: Oh, they are THE theories ? (surprised) 
pr qued. 
(6) y incmp. 0: That's about it I mean 
Mm anif ý, rpý. prtl. H: Yeah yeah they are the 
manif. ampl. 
(8) x ampl. S: They are not REALLY representative then 
(9.1) y H: Uhl well, they there are there are 
variations there are variations on theories 
uh but I don't know of any MAJOR contender 
. 2) y There may be bi I don't know of ANYTHING, 
that looks much ýFifferent from the things 
she has looked at in the dissertation 
-3) y I mean there's nothing 
(10) y incmp. 0: Ah, wellt there 
(11.1) x ampl. / y S: / indistinct /a sample of one in each 
. 2) y O. K. 
(12.1) y 0: Yuh 
. 2) y incmp. No, WELL EXCEPT for the case that 
(13)x ampl. /y incmp. S: So NOBODY nobody would attack her on 
THAT ground then if she 
(14) y H: No 
(15-1) y 0: Oh no I don't think so 
. 2) y I THIýg the ONLY thing that would be 
substantially different would be a REAL 
social STRUCTURALIST who would say you 
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DON'T t. ave to worry about CONDITIONS, 
-what you have to do is FIND the LOCATION of 
these people in the social STRUCTURE and THEN 
you'll FIND out how they're going to 
BEHAVE without having to get'into their 
heads at AIJ4 and and that hasn't been tested 
uh except in VERY gross kinds of ways with 
MACRO data, which is generally not been 
very satisfactory yeah 
(16.1) y S: Hm hm 
. 2) y: Hm hm 
(17-1) y H: Right 
. 2) y: Spillerman's stuff 
In (1), according to Grimshaw, S wishes to check the representativeness 
of the theories selected by the candidate whose dissertation is under 
discussion. S herself subsequently commented that she wanted to check 
that the candidate would not be attacked on the grounds of insufficient 
coverage of the appropriate theories. H's response, a nod of the head, is 
an indirect manifestation because although it apparently expresses 
agreement that the theories are representative, it actually confirms 
that the coverage of theories in the dissertation is exhaustive and that 
no other theories warrant attention ; this interpretation of the head 
nod is made in view of Grimshaw's discussion and in view of H's subsequent 
utterances. This is the first example encountered of a paralinguistic 
feature constituting a primary textual component. 
S's response in (2) to the indirect manifestation appears to be a 
confirmation of pr which S believes to be equivalent to p. It is 
analysed as the device Imanif. ampi. 1 because it amplifies the head nod. 
It should be remembered that because S has not realized the m isunderstanding 
her amplification of the manifestation 'compounds' the misunderstanding 
since what she is amplifying is not what she believes she is amplifying. 
O's comment in (3) is a lyl utterance and is 'incomplete'. H in 
produces a, manifestation, augmenting his earlier indirect manifestation 
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and S's amplification of that by stating that there are no more theories. 
Grimshaw reports that S llsounýs some what surprised" in (5) and this 
surprised tone is Ip 
r 
err. sig. l. Her 
had either H or 0 asked why she should 
there were no other theories to be cov, 
was expressed in the manifestation and 
the 'combinedl. devices Ip r err. sig. & 
'incomplete' lyl utterance in response 
signal could have been taken up 
be surprised at the fact that 
ered. S in (5) is checking what 
the utterance therefore constitutea 
pr qued. l. 0 produces another 
to the query and H then in (7) 
either 'partially, repeats the manifestation or produces an incomplete' 
amplification of it. Rather than wait for H's answer S interrupts and 
reverts to her origin question again, using Ix ampl. '. In this 
amplification the question becomes weighted in that it is no longer 
'To what extent ... V but has become 'They are not ... V. 
In response to this amplification, H produces three ly' utterances. 
He explains that there are no other theories of any importance which 
pertain to what is covered in the dissertation although there are 
variations on these theories. 0 makes another attempt to enter the 
conversation with an 'incomplete' lyl utterance and then in (11.1) S 
produces an utterance, the first part of which is indistinct and cannot 
be recovered. This utterance is either another attempt to amplify the 
origin or is a separate lyl utterance. S follcws this in (11.2) with 
a lyl utterance, "O. K. ", in which she apparently expresser, acceptance 
of the responses to her. origin and therefore satisfaction that the 
dissertation has covered the relevant theories. 0 produces two ly' 
utterances, the second of which is 'incomplete'. The first expresses 
agreement, with the conversation presumably, and the second offers an 
exception which is later elaborated upon. 
S in (13) produces an utterance which is either a lyl utterance, 
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introducing the propositon that the candidate would not be attacked on 
the grounds of insufficient coverage, or is an amplification of x if one 
takes the origin to include the proposition that S wishes to be sure 
that the candidate has dealt with representative theories and would not 
be open to attack, as she claims in subsequent, retrospective commantary. 
Making a decision about which of these two devices is being used 
requires consideration of the nature of the proposition expressed in the 
origin. Does the proposition which S expresses in (1) cover this matter 
of the candidate's vulnerability as well as the question of representativenes 1) S4 
Since S claims her reason in asking the question was to ascertain the 
candidate's likelihood of being later attacked, it does seem a part of 
the proposition and therefore the device used in (13) would be Ix ampl. l. 
However, the commentary was retrospective and it cannot be guaranteed 
that S did have such a complex proposition to express in (1) in the 
first instance. lyl therefore remains a possible alternative device. 
The misunderstanding is a type not encountered in the corpus 
S real. -H real. -0 real. ' and it has diversified structure with 
interactive expansion. 
Varonis & Gass (1985: 332-333) 
Varonis & Gass (1985) discuss miscommunication between native and 
non-native speakers. They discuss an extensive example of miscommunication, 
a service telephone encounter between a non-native speaker who, for 
E. S. L. purposes, has been detailed to enquire about the cost of a 
television, and a native speaker who works in a television repair shop. 
Varonis & Gass (1985: 327) argue that analysis of native/ non-native 
conversations "must minimally invoke notions of correct interpretation, 
confidence in interpretation, goals of a conversation, shared beliefs, 
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and linguistic as well as cultural systems". They state whether most, 
though not all, utterances are correctly or incorrectly interpreted 
and whether the participants are or are not confident about their 
interpretations. They describe the conversation and indicate that the 
native speaker changes goals five times while the non-native speaker 
misunderstands eleven times. 
The model discussed in this thesis handles the conversation as 
f ollows : 
(1) H: Hello 
(2.1) S: Hello 
. 2) ORIGIN Could you tell me about the price and size 
of Sylvania colour TV ? 
r (3) p err. sig. H: Pardon 
(4) x rpt. S: Could you tell me about the price and size 
of Sylvania TV ... color ? 
(5.1) p qued. H: What did you want ? 
. 2) p qued. A service call ? 
(6.1) x ampl. S: Seventeen inch 
. 2) pr err. sig. Hunh ? 
(7-1) p qued. H: What did you want ? 
. 2) p qued. A service call, or how mucif to repair a TV? 
(8.1) p exp. prtl. S: Yeah 
. 2) P exp. prtl. Eh TV color 
(9) IND. MANIF-1 H: Seventeen inch 
(10) y S: G.. K. 
/ pause 
(11) IND. MANIF. 
2 
H: Well is it a portable ? 
(12) y S: M hm 
3 (13-1) IND. MANIF. H: What make is it ? 
3/ pause 
/ 
. 2) manif. ampl. What is the brand name of the TV? 
(14) y S: Ah, Sony please 
(15) y H: We don't work on Sony's 
(16.1) y S: Sss 
. 2) y Or Sylvania 
(17) y H: Sylvania 
(18) y S: Un hunh 
(19) y H: Uh Sylvaniag O. K. that's American made 
(20.1) y S: Uh hunh 
e2) y O. K. 
2o6 
(21.1) y H: All right 
. 2) y: -Uhh, portables 
have to be brought in 
(22) y S: M hm 
(23) y H: And there's no way I can tell you how 
much it'll cost until he looks at it 
(24) y S: M hm 
(25) y H: And it's a twelve fifty deposit 
(26) y S: O. K. 
(27) y H: And if he can fix it, that applies to 
labor, and if he can't he keeps the twelve 
fifty for his time and effort 
(28) y S: M hm 
(29.1) IND. MANIF. 
4 
H: How old of a TV ? 
. 2) mani f .4 ampl. Do you know offhand? 
(30-1) y S: O. K. 
. 2) x ampl. Nineteen inch ? 
(31-1) manif: 
4 
rpt. H: How old of a TV is it? 
. 2) manif 
4 
ampl. Is it a very old one or only a couple 
of years old? 
(32.1) y S: Oooooh 
. 2) y So-so / pause 
. 3) manif. qued. Umm, about how old 
? 
(33) MANIF. 5 H: The only thing you can do is bring it 
in, you know, and let him look at it In 
go from there 
/ long pause 
(34) x ampl. S: New television please 
clears throat / 
?+H real. 
(35) ? mus. ack. & H: Oh, you wanna know / long pause / how' 
p qued. much a new television is ? 
(36)p exp-. ý ORIGIN 
2, 
S: Yeah I wan' buy one please 
/ pause / 
(37) P2 qued. H: Do we wanna buy one? 
(38) p2 exp. prtl. S: Uh huh 
long pause 
H real. 
(39) P2 qued. H: Is it a Sylvania ? 
(40) p 
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exp. prtl. S: Sylvania TV color 
6/ 
long pause / 
(41.1) MANIF. 2 H: Well, even you know even 
if we buy lem 
(of ORIGIN we don't - we don't give much more In 
twenty-five dollars for lem 
*2) y Cause time we fix lem up and resell 
'm 
we can't get more In - 
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(42) y S: 
(43) y H: 
(44) pr qued. S: 
(45-1) 
. 2) y 
(46.1) y S: 
. 2)x ampl. & ORIGIN3 : 
(47) P3 qued. H: 
(48) P3 exp. prtl. S: 
(49) MkNIF. 7 H: 
(of ORIGIN3) 
M hm 
Hundred dollars out of lem time we 
put our timeln parts in it 
Is it the ... seventeen inch ? 
/ long pause / 
Well I'd - you know the only thing I 
can tell you to do is you'd have to come 
to the shop, I'm on the extension at home 
The shop's closed 
MM 
Nineteen inch 2 .. you don't have 
? 
/ short pause / 
Do we have a nineteen inch ? 
Yeah 
No, I've got a seventeen inch new RCA 
(50-1) y S: O. K. 
. 2) y Thank you 
.3 y Bye 
(51) y H: Mbye 
(52) y S: M hm 
This datum is morq6omplex than any hitherto analysed. It is 
considerably longer and it contains material such as back-channelling 
which tends to be omitted from diary-recorded data. 
Although the non-native speaker is the one who has difficultY in 
understanding the native speaker, it is the native speaker who misunder- 
stands the non-native speaker's utterance (2.2). This is the origin 
and failure to resolve this initial misunderstanding results in multiple 
'compounding'. The origin is the consequence of S's having made a 
mistake in phoning a repair shop rather than a retail shop. 
In response to the oriEin H uses lp 
r err. sig. 1 which prompts a 
r epeat of the origin by S. In response to this repeat, H uses 1p qued. 1 
twice in an attempt to determine what S is requesting. S answers the 
questions by an amplification of x, detailing a television size. S- 
then in (6.2) says "Hunh ? ". This is taken to be lp 
r 
err. Big. ' because 
2o8 
it raises doubt about what H is saying. In (7-1) and (7.2) H uses 
lp qued. 1, again in an attempt to determine what S is requesting. By 
answering "Yeah" to these questions S uses 1p exp. prtl. 1 since he 
acquiesces to the interpretations raised by H. However, the 'partial' 
explanation does not help H because she has offered two possible 
interpretations (neither of which happen to be correct) and S has made 
no distinction between them, acquiescing to them both. The misunderstandng 
is 'compounded' by "Yeah" since S has misunderstood (7.2), having failed 
to realize that H has misunderstood (2.2). S uses another lp exp. prtl. ' 
and specifies "TV color" but this does not establish p either. 
At this stage in the conversation, (9), H produces an. indirect 
manifestation. Wishing to determine the nature of the problem with S's 
television che attempts to identify the size of the television. This 
indirect manifestation is the first of several. S responds to it with 
a Iyl utterance, 110. K. ", which is an inappropriate response ; because 
of the 'compounding' S believes H is offering a seventeen inch set 
whereas H is trying to determine if S Is set is lbeventeen inch". H 
is attempting to elicit details about the set S%%Cthinks S wants to be 
repaired. In (11) H produces a second indirect manifestation, asIcing 
'S if his television is portable. Again S responds with an inappropriate 
ly' utterance. H then produces a third indirect manifestation, querying 
the brand of S's television. When no response is forthcoming, H 
amplifies this third indirect manifestation; "make" is changed to "brand 
name of the TV". 
Following this Imanif. 3 ampl. 1, S and H exchange ty, utterances, 
from (14) to (28), discussing brands of television and H's procedure for 
dealing with television repaiis, a procedure which S presumably does 
not understand but with which he appears to agree, given his back- 
.e 
209 
channelling and neutral responses. In (29.1) H produces her fourth 
indirect manifestation, inquir ing about the age of the television, and in 
(29.2) H produces an amplification of this. Again, S responds with a 
ly' utterance, "O. K. ", which is followed by an amplification of x, the 
origin.. This amplification is the specification of the size of television 
which is what S wishes to know about. H responds with a repeat of her 
fourth manifestation and a further amplification of this manifestation. 
Again S produces lyl utterances which are inappropriate because they 
are neutral responses which fail to answer H's questions. After a 
pause, in (32-3), S queries the fourth manifestation, wishing to know 
the age of the television about which he believes H is talking. The 
'compounding' is very complex and neither participant is able to understand 
the other's utterances correctly. 
At this stage, (33), H produces her fifth manifestation, which is 
direct. She makes it clear that S will have to bring his television in 
for the man to look at, thus manifesting in the conversation the fact 
that she has misunderstood S's origin requesting price and size details 
for televisions. After a long pause, S amplifies x, presumably deciding 
like H in C64 in the corpus, to ignore the confusing conversation and 
start again. He asks specifically for "New television plaase". This 
may affect I+ H real. ' because in (35) H seems to acknowledge the 
misunderstanding and to query p: 110h, you wanna know /long pause/ how 
much a new television is ? ". S responds to this with Ip exp., so that 
at this stage the misunderstanding ought to be resolved since both S and 
H appear to know what S intended of his origin'. 
However, in addition to being Ip exp-I, (36) is a second origin. 
H fails to understand the explanation correctly and queries the p it 
I 
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expresses. In (38) S agrees with the interpretation which H queries 
12 and therefore uses p exp. prtl. 1. A further query by H and a further 
'partial' explanation by S are then followed by H's seventh manifestation. 
It is this utterance, (41.1), which makes "Yeah I wan' buy one please", 
(36), an origin. In the initial origin, (2.2), S's p is a request 
for information about the price and size of a Sylvania colour television. 
H's pr is that S's request is for information about the price and details 
regarding televisions servicing or nepairing. In (36) S explains this 
p but H misunderstands the explanation and her pr is that S wishes 
to know if the shop will buy a television. This is a second misunder- 
standing rather than 'compounding' because it is not a consequence 
of the initial misunderstanding in way that, for examplej S's 11O. K. 11 
in (10) 'compounds' H's misunderstanding, manifested in "Seventeen inch" 
in (9). Failure to realize H's misunderstanding means that S cannot 
correctly understand H's utterances and hence the misunderstanding is 
'compounded'. When S explains that he wants to buy a television, 
however, H misunderstands his request and sets in motion_an exchange 
of utterances relating to the new proposition of television purchasing. 
After three ly' utterances S uses Op r qued. 1, endeavouring to relate 
what H is talking about to what he wants. 
H is presumably aware that there is a lack of communication and 
she suggests in (45.1) and (45.2) that S should visit the shop to sort 
out the problem, pointing out that she is speaking to him from her 
home. S9 however, continues to try to express his proposition and 
uses Ix ampl. I in (46.2), "Nineteen inch?.. you don't have? ". This 
utterance is also a third origin because subsequentlyl in (49), H 
produces another manifestation explaining what set she herself has. 
After the origin in (46.2) H queries the proposition expressed therein 
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and S 'partially' explains it by confirming H's interpretation. H 
then produces the seventh manifestation, "No, I've got a seventeen 
inch new RCAII. H's pr here is that S wishes to know which TV set H 
personally has and she manifests this misunderstanding, in detailing her 
set. Following this, the conversation is brought to an end. 
This analysis differs from Varonis & Gass's because the participants 
do not r(elize the misunderstanding, whereas Varonis & Gass give the 
impression that H does become aware of what S intends. In other respectst 
however, the analyses correspond with each other : 
First, she believes Carlos wants information about 
getting a TV serviced. Then, she understands that 
he is interested in a new TV. However, when she tests 
her hypothesis, she misinterprets his response and 
understands that he has a TV that he wants to sell 
her. After a seemingly incongruous remark on the 
part of Carlos, she appears to abandon her goal of 
helping him completely. Finally, she realizes that 
he is interested in buying a new TV, but before that 
conversation can proceed, Carlos ends it 
(Yaronis & Gass, 1985: 34o). 
Varonis & Gass believe that H eventually. becomes aWare that S wishes to 
4. 
buy a television. The analysis above suggests that a further misunderstand- 
I 
ing occurs because H believes that S is asking about H's own television. 
Without eliciting commentary from the participants it is not possible 
to determine which interpretation is correct. It is possible, however, 
to present alternative ahalyses, such as lyl MANIF. 
7. 
for (49). 
The analysis presented above shows how negotiation is undertaken 
by the participants. Eleven different devices are used a total of sixty- 
t. wo times, there are three origins and seven manifestations. It is 
clear from this that no matter how much interactive negotiation is 
undertaken by participants, use of devices does not necessarily resolve 
It is possible that excessive use of devices such as is displayed in 
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this datum characterizes conversations between native and non-native 
speakers. Certainlyl the two use devices which in other conversations 
would be likely to effect 1+ real. '. Indeedl I? +H real. ' seems to 
be effected after (34), an amplification of x by S. H appears to 
acknowledge the misunderstanding and to query p and S explains P so 
that H should realize the misunderstanding. Because H misunderstands 
S's explanation, H's realization is cancelled and she reverts to the 
state of '- H real. '. This progress from 1+ real. ' to '- real-' has 
not been encountered in the corpus. It can only happen, one would 
assume, when the person who realizes then misunderstands further, 
thereby changing beliefs about the preceding conversation. The ultimate 
outcome of the data is I- S real. -H real. ', according to the analysis 
above, 'Type Fl. 
The analysis developed in this thesis is able to handle the datum 
but the lyl device may need to be modified so that there is a distinction 
between utterances expressing propositions and utterances which 
constitute back-channelling. 
0 
DISCUSSION 
The fact that the 'y' device may not be specific enough is only 
problematic in respect of the Varonis & Gass datum but it nevertheless 
warrants revision. An additional device of 'back channelling' could 
be incorporated into the model, although there could be problems 
distinguishing between 'back channelling' and agreement with or 
confirmation of X, xrtp and p 
r. 
Apart from the lack of precision in the ly' device the analytic 
model is able to handle all the data. The typology, however, is less 
a. 
adequate because out of the seven data, four new types have been 
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encountered. Each of these types is within the framework established 
by the typology and can be included. However, the number of types 
could potentially become so large that the typology would cease to 
distinguish between misunderstandings in an economic and clear way. 
The typology must therefore be revised so as to preserve the 
overall distinction between states of realization in a hierarchical 
system, which subsequently details the various states of realization 
of each participant. The difference, for exampleg between I+ S real. 
+H real. ' and I+ S real. +H real. +0 real. ' is simply that in the 
latter a third participant was involved ; the states of realization 
are I+ real. ' for all participants in both instances. 
In the revised typology there are four main distinctions : 1. 
I+ real. ' Data in which all participants realize or 
are assumed to realize that the misunderstanding 
has occurred (thus including 19. + real. '), 
real. ' Data in which all participants fail to realize 
the misunderstanding has occurred (thus 
including 19. - real. '), 
I+/- real., Data in which one or more participants realize 
and one or more participants fails to realize 
(including I? + real. ' and 19. - real. 'T, 
ý 
IV "? real. ' Data in which the state of realization of one 
or more participants cannot be assumed. 
Within these four types provision is subsequently made for each 
participant's individual state of realization, according to the 
following scheme : 
2. 
SIHIO 1 le + real. - real. ?+ real. ?- real. ? real. 
Typologizing a misunderstanding is first made according to what 
combination of states of realization obtain : I, II, III or IV. Each 
individual state of realization is then characterized by the appropriate 
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letter : a. b, c, d or e. The order of this characterization is fixed 
as follows : S, then H, then '0 
11 
then 02 through to 6n. After the 
last participant's state of realization has been detaileds-a point 
indicates the end. 
The revised system is applied to the original typology as follows : 
I aa. Al A50 
I aaa., B51 B52. B54 -B 56, B58 - B6o 
I aaaa. B53, B57, B61 
I ca. C62 - C64 
I ac. D65 - D71 
I cac. E72 
II bb. F73 
II ddd. G74 
II ddddd. G75 
III ab. H76 - H77 
III cb. 178 
III aba. J79 - J80 
III ba. K81 - K86 
III daa. L87 
IV ae. m88 - M91 
IV ce. N92 - N93 
IV ea. 094 - 096 
IV ec. P97 
IV eaa. Q98 
IV eac. R99 
IV ee. sloo 
The additional data are typologized as follows : 
aa. Schwartz, Burton 
aac. Jefferson 
cc. Zaefferer 
II bb. Varonis & Gass 
II bbb. Grimshaw 
IV eca. Milroy 
This revised typology can be applied to an infinite number of 
data and because it is more systematic than the original typology it 
should be easy to apply and to interpret. 
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Fourteen data are 'Type IV'. This type exists because the analyst 
cannot always confirm states of realization and cannot always assume 
them. The data in 'Type IV' would have been placed in other types 
had there been confirmation provided by the participants. Thus the 
model is accurate for 87% of the data while the remaining 13% are assembled 
together. The model should therefore be replicable and is comprehensive 
in that it makes structured allowances for data which cannot be confirmed. 
The theoretical implications of this research are discussed in 
Chapter XI, in which conclusions areLdrawn. 
CHAPTER XI 
CONCLUSIONS AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
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In the early chapters of this thesis it was argued that the study 
of communication has been hampered because the processes by which 
speaker-hearers communicate cannot easily be examined. The speaker's 
intentions and the hemes understandings are not accessible to the 
analyst except by post hoc deduction and therefore researchers such as 
Zaefferer (1977), Gumperz & Tannen (1979) and Stubbs (1983) have argued 
that by investigating what happens in miscommunication it should be 
possible to discover the processes which enable speaker-hearers to 
accomplish successful communication. This approach is developed here 
in respect of misunderstandings, which constitute one type of miscommunication. 
'Misunderstanding' has been defined as a phenomenon in conversation 
between native speaker-hearers which occurs when a proposition expressed- 
by S in an utterance is incorrectly understood by H, who subsequently 
produces an utterance which is based on or derives from this incorrect 
understanding. The major premise of this thesis is that when speaker- 
hearers are involved in misunderstandings they provide evidence of how 
they undertake communication because in order to detect and resolve 
misunderstandings speaker-hearers monitor one another's intentionst 
utterances and understandings and they negotiate interactively to ensure 
that they manage to communicate successfully. Thus, by studying the 
behaviour of participants during misunderstandings, insight into 
participants' communicative behaviour can be provided. 
In order to facilitate such a study, an analytic system was devised 
which was capable of describing the structure of misunderstandings* 
This analysis was then used to establish a typology which could 
distinguish between different types of misunderstandings. Given the 
lack of any previous systematic analysis of misunderstandings, a 
corpus of one hundred data was assembled. This corpus was collected 
.e 
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from diary-recorded and tape-recorded sourcesq as detailed in Chapter II* 
A corpus-based approach ensures that one's findings are more likely to 
be representative of the phenomenon although they cannot be exhaustive. 
A systematic analysis of the corpus has demonstrated the possibility 
of det&rsining the salient structural characteristics of misunderstandings 
thereby enabling the analyst to investigate how participants behave whe'n 
their attempts to communicate are not, initially at least, successful. 
The analysis was based on a model of communication, discussed in 
Chapter III, which was developed from theoretical models of the kind 
outlined by Lyons (1977). The model specified the following sequence 
Speaker's proposition (p) -> utterance produced by 
speaker Cx) --. * utterance received (that is, heard and 
decoded) by hearer (x r) 
r --7 proposition 
received (that is, 
understood) by hearer (p ) 
The analytic method, which is ou4-lined in Chapter IV, is based on the 
ways in which participants refer to p, x, xr and pr, as well as to the 
possibility or fact of an error or misunderstanding in the conversation. 
The analysis thus features the amalgamation of textual and non-textual 
components as major sources of evidence for how participants deal with 
misunderstandings in the interactive context of everyday discourse. 
Textual components, that is, the utterances, paralinguistic and extralinguis- 
tic features, can be checked against a transcription of what was said 
and done. Non-textual components, that is, intentions and understandings, 
can only be recovered by the analyst after consideration of the textual 
components. Since intentions and understandings are as pertinent to 
c. ommunication as utterances, it is important that an analysis of structure 
should incorporate them : non-textual components crucially determine the 
textual components and are therefore as much a part of the structure as 
the textual components. 
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Misunderstandings. were shown to consist of a number of components 
which are inter-related. Two primary textual components were identified: 
(i) the origin, that is, the utterance by S which is misunderstood and 
(ii) the manifestation', that is, the utterance by H which is based on 
or derives from his misunderstanding of the. origin. These components 
were discussed in Chapter V. The manifestation gives the analyst an 
indication of what H's pr, that isl understanding of the origin, might be. 
Some indication of what H's pr might be was provided by the secondary 
textual component., termed devices. Devices are the various utterances, 
paralinguistic and extralinguistic features which constitute the remaining 
substance of the misunderstanding. Thirty devices have been identified 
in this thesis and of these thirty, twenty-five have been found in the 
corpus. The thirty devices, which are discussed and illustrated in 
Chapter VI, are as follows: xv the origin utterance, can be (1)lcompleted', 
(2) 1 repeated', (3) 'emphasized', (4) 'amplified', (5) 'explained', 
(6) 'queried' and (7)lrefuted'; xr, what the hearer understands and 
decodes, can be (8) 'explained', (9) 'queried' and (10) Ii7efutedl ; p, 
what the speaker intends to express, can be (11) 'explained', (12) 'queried', 
and (13) 'refuted'; pr, what the hearer understands to have been 
expressed, can be (14) 'explained', (15) 'queried' and (16) 'refuted'; 
an error in understanding can be (17) Isignalled'and (18) 'acknowledged', * 
the misunderstanding can be (19)lsignalledland (20) 'acknowledged'; an 
utterance exprefEing another proposition can be produced (21) before 
participants are aware of the misunderstanding; the manifestation can 
be (22) 'completed', (23) 'repeated', (24) 'emphasized', (25) 'amplified', 
(26) 'explained', (27) 'queried' and (28) 'refuted'; an utterance 
expressing another proposition can be produced (29) after participants 
have become aware of the misunderstanding; a participant might undertake 
(36)laction'. The devices which constitute the secondary textual 
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component cover the range of conversational behaviour in respect of 
misunderstandings. Of these, (13), (22), (24), (26) and (28) are not 
in the corpus. 
One non-textual component was argued to be essential to a misunder- 
standing. This component concerns each participant's state of realization, 
as discussed in Chapter VII. The state of realization details each 
participant's awareness or lack of awareness of the misunderstanding's 
occurrence. The following states of realization were identified: '+ S 
real., +H real., +0 real., ?+S real., ?+H real., ?+0 real-9 
-S real., -H real., -0 real., ?-S real., ?-H real., ?-0 real., 
?S real., ?H real. and ?0 real. '. These states appeared in a number 
of combinations, such as I? S real. +H real. ?+0 real. ' (TypeR). 
These components were shown to combine to form a misunderstanding 
as follows : ORIGIN --> MANIFESTATION --> STATES OF REALIZATION -> 
(devices). The first three are essential while the last is optional, 
although at least one device is usually present in a misunderstanding. 
The components follow a number of sequences, always commencing with 
the. origin :a basic sequence which could be expanded or interactively 
expanded and a diversified sequence which could also be expanded and 
interactively expanded. These sequences are detailed in Chapter VIII. 
The analysis is a "process analysis", which, as Widdowson points 
out (1979: 71), should be able to "yield information about how participants 
see the discourse at a particular point in its development and what 
controls their options at this point". The participants' own explanations 
in their discussions of what they intended and what they understood 
provide information about how. they see the discourse (cf. Gumperz (1982) 
on the importance of employing participant judges). The states of - 
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realization also indicate how participants see the discourse and they 
control the options open to participants. The options open to a 
participant can be construed as the devices available to him. 
In the light of the information provided by the analysis of the 
structural characteristics of the misunderstandings in the corpus, a 
typology was presented in Chapter IX. The typology was based on the 
states of realization whicl/obtain in each misunderstanding and it 
enabled the analyst to distinguish nineteen types of misunderstanding. 
Since a corpus-based analysis is representative rather than exhaustiveg 
additional data were analysed and typologized in Chapter X, in order 
to test the adequacy of the model. The typology was found to be 
descriptively adequate for the corpus but when the additional data were 
typologized revision proved necessary because the number of types 
became too large and therefore the typology became unwieldy. By 
preserving fundamental distinctions between I+ real., - real. +/ - real. 
and ? real. ' and by detailing individual participants' states of realization 
as a secondary consideration, all data could be typologized by the 
method adopted. 
The additional data tested in Chapter X were drawn from the research 
of other linguists, sociolinguists and pragmaticists concerned with 
misunderstandings, whose work has tended to discuss individual examples 
which pertain to their particular interests, such as sequencing and 
participant roles (Jefferson, 1972; Schwartz, 1977), inter-ethnic and 
inter-dialectal miscommunication (Milroy, 1984; Varonis & Gass, 1985)1 
causes (Zaefferer, 1977; Schwartz, 1977) and discourse analysis (Burton, 
1: 981; Grimshaw, 1982). This work has lacked the kind of systematic 
approach which this thesis seeks, to Aevclaf. 
Jefferson (1972) and Schwartz (1977), for example, both discuss 
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a sequence which corresponds with the basic sequence identified in this 
thesis; the misunderstood utterance is followed by an utterance based 
on the misunderstanding which is followed by a correction. Analysis 
of the corpus has shown that this is only one of a number of possible 
sequences, which become increasingly more complex. Jefferson and Schwartz 
have also pointed out that misunderstandings tend to be resolved 
immediately and if they are not, then they tend not to be resolved at 
all. Examination of the corpus has confirmed that this tendency is only 
true in some instances and that a number of misunderstandings are not 
resolved immediately but after several utterances and/ or participant 
turns. Jefferson (1972), Schwartz (1977) Grimshaw (1982) and Varonis & 
Gass (1985) all argue that the detecting and resolving of misunderstandings 
are communicative skills. This thesis has attempted to detail these 
skills and to show how participants employ them. 
Although the meaning of an utterance is not constant and inviolable, 
S, at the time of producing an utterance, intends it to express a 
specific proposition and will often ensure that the proposition which 
H receives is as close to this as possible. If this were not the case 
there would be fewer devices used and fewer efforts to effect realization. 
The various devices used by participants in a misunderstanding demonstrate 
that participants work to ensure that pr matches p when they are aware 
or suspect that this matching is not the case. The many examples of 
refutation of pr 'complete' or 'partial', and explanation of P, as in 
"No, I meant ... highlight this. For the S who uses these 'combined' 
devices the communication of a specific proposition is at stake and he 
wishes H to understand it as correctly as possible and to be aware that 
his understanding, his pr, is incorrect. H, too, will often explain 
what he understood the origin to mean. Between these two distinct 
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understandings, p and pr, can lie a number of utterances which eventually 
effect realization in many instances and thus resolve the misunderstanding. 
In view of the interactive efforts which they make, participants 
seem to wish to be understood correctly. Their apparent conviction 
that the 'right meaning' is, idtially at least, communicated suggests 
that a particular meaning is, initially at least, intended of an utterance. 
Close approximation is considered to be sufficient in negotiating the 
understanding of the received utterance, which means that the intended 
meaning becomes diffused. One person's understanding of an utterance, 
composed of lexical items syntactically linked and uttered with particular 
prosodic and paralinguistic features, does not replicate exactly another's 
understanding of that same utterance but both parties are satisfied that 
close approximation counts as understanding. 
The fact that origin utterances are open to potentially several 
possible understandings, one of which is taken up by H, supports the 
contention put forward by John Pellowe (discussion and correspondence) 
that the meaning of an utterance is often determined by the hearer rather 
than the speaker. Thus in Al H understands "How far" to refer to degree 
of engagement of hand-brake rather than degree of distance and in A42 
H understands "teal' as "eat teal', a meal, rather than a cup of tea. The 
speaker, however, is often reluctant to concede the hearer's meaning to 
him. In Al S knows that H has not understood the intended meaning, 
receiving instead an incorrect pr, and she therefore amplifies the origin 
to be sure that the intended meaning rather than H's understanding is 
the one which obtains. In A42 S does not know that H has determined a 
different meaning for the origin than the one intended but by producing 
an utterance contributing another proposition, arising out of surprise 
at the manifestation, the intended meaning of "tea" is appreciated by H. 
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Thus, although a hearer may be able to determine the meaning of an 
utterance, when the speaker is aware that the hearer's determination is 
astray, he will, by the use of. devices, attempt to imposehis intended 
meaning. 
The devices used by participants in the corpus and additional data 
demonstrate that speaker-hearers have numerous resources for negotiating 
correct understanding but the many types, differentiated by participants, 
states of realization, make it clear that these numerous resources are 
not necessarily sufficient. The cause of a misunderstanding, the 
linguistic and cognitive limitations of and constraints on participants, 
the content and illocutionary force of each utterance produced and the 
textual and situational influences on each utterance all play significant 
roles in the outcome of each misunderstanding. 
Social reasons such as apathy, embarrassment or reluctance to 
cause embarrassment explain the lack of realization in some of the 
partially unrealized data. In others and in the fully unrealized data, 
the means by which realization could have been effected are inadequate. 
Realization that a misunderstanding has occurred is effected by recognition 
of the inappropriacy of responses and by the use of devices to draw 
attention to such inappropriacy. In order to detect lingiistict pragmatic 
social and cognitive inappropriacy, participants draw on the knowledge 
which they have built up as speaker-hearers in a real world; such 
knowledge includes language, spatial and temporal awareness and a vast 
amount of multifarious information relating to people, conventions, facts 
and suchlike. In addition to this knowledge, cognitive factors such as 
belief and anticipation influence participants. The variables which 
are pertinent to understanding are thus considerable and it is not 
surprising that. utterances are misunderstood and that participants do not 
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1. 
always realize that misunderstandings have occurred. 
Participants use a number of devices but there is no guarantee 
that any particular device will successfully effect realization. Success 
is dependent on one participant's use of words, that is, choice of 
device, clarity of expression and so on, and also on the other participant's 
understanding of the devices used. A misunderstanding occurs because 
the origin, utterance has not been understood correctly but the process 
of understanding is not limited to that one utterance : every utterance 
has to be understood and every utterance is potentially open to being 
understood, misunderstood or not understood at all. 
There is no automatic neat sequence by which one participant responds 
to the other's utterance in accordance with various linguistic and pragmatic 
rules ; this can and usually does happen but it is always possible for 
one participant, H, to misunderstand and to produce an utterance which 
he believes is appropriate but which is not. When, as in*A33, the 
misunderstanding occurs because a referent is wrongly identified, the 
elliptical origin which contains a homonym leaves H with more than one 
interpretive option. The fact that S produces such an origin utterance 
contradicts the commonly held assumption that a speaker takes care in 
the production of his utterance so that it will be understood. Prince 
(1981: 224) calls this care "the tailoring of an utterance by a sender 
to meet the particular assumed needs of the intended receiver". The 
comment in the origin of A33, "Sounds like Focus", is not tailored to 
meet H's needs and in addition it contradicts the assumption that an 
utterance at the start of a conversation identifies its referent. This 
assumption tends to limit problems of referent identification to 
subsequent utterances (Chafe, 1976: 32) but S can actually treat an item 
as 'given' from the start of the conversation simply because he knows 
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what he intends and he does not consider the fact that H may not 
necessarily know this too. H can often work out the referent so that 
no misunderstanding occurs, just as S can often work out the referent 
of the manifestation with only the contradiction between that and the 
origin to guide him. Each assumes the other will understand and on 
many occasions consideration of assumptions only begins when it appears 
that some of error has been made. ( 
Speakers do not always make allowances for hearers. They do not 
invariably undertake 'information packaging' ; because the information 
is clear to them they assume it is similarly clear to the hearer. 
Hearers, on the other hand, do not always heed speakers. H might not 
fully pay attention to S's utterance, thereby failing to satisfy the 
basic condition of attending to an utterance in order that a conversation 
is not void (see, for example, Searle's "normal input and output 
conditions" (1969: 57) and Keenan & Schieffelin's "Prerequisites for 
establishing a discourse topic" (1976: 349). H may not have paid attention 
but there are occasions when he will nevertheless respond to what he 
has heard or assumes he has heard. In Al? and S100 H is not attending 
but nevertheless responds and because S's utterance has not been properly 
heeded H's response is a manifestation, a misunderstanding having 
occurred. In A17 the misunderstanding is explained away as "I'm not 
with it today". It is a feature of conversation that participants are 
not always fully cognizant with the utterances to which they respond; 
responses are frequently produced in preference to remaining silent, 
requesting clarification, repeats or suchlike. What is remarkable is 
the capacity of participants to monitor utterances, to realize that 
misunderstandings have occurred and to resolve a great many of them. 
226 
The detection of the inappropriacy of a response is a crucial 
communicative skill (c. f. Gumperz's work for practical applications). 
It is obvious that anticipation is a major factor in communication 
since inappropriacy contitutes a response other than the one which is 
expected in view of preceding utterances, surroundings, participants 
and so on. Lyons points out that speaker-hearers are able to disambiguate 
utterances but that the assumptions on which such disambiguation might 
rest are not known : 
it we cannot as semanticists neglect the fact that the 
speaker can assume, and normally does so unconsciously, 
that particular lexemes will be interpreted by the 
addressee in one sense rather than another by virtue 
of the subject-matter of the utterance in question 
and previous utterances in the conversation. So far, 
however, little progress has been made in giving a 
theoretically satisfying account of this phenomenon 
(Lyons, 1977: 582-3). 
The phenomenon is, however, more complex than Lyons presents it as 
being, because on the evidence of the corpus the speaker is often able 
to detect when the addressee has failed to interpret the utterance in 
its intended sense so that he both appreciates that his assumption that 
H would correctly understand his utterance has been wrong and he realizes 
H has misunderstood that utterance ; on several occasions S also 
correctly assumes what H's incorrect understanding has been. By using 
devices S is often able to ensure that H does eventually interpret the 
utterance in its intended sense, but successful resolution of a 
misunderstanding depends on how well H understands the devices. 
Conversational implicature, proposed as a means by which participants 
correctly understand certain non-literal utterances, is not a sufficient 
explanation of how these utterances are understood. Such understanding 
is dependent on a participant's ability to understand correctly* In 
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K84, for example, H produces a conversational implicature as a consequence 
of having misunderstood the origin. Because S has not realized that a 
misunderstanding has occurred, he fails to understand the implicature 
and instead understands the literal meaning of the utterance. 
Communication is undoubtedly a highly complex process and while 
there are the means to achieve a successful outcome, success ultimately 
depends on the participants who employ these means. One participant 
must choose the particular device or devices most likely, in his opinion, 
to effect realization and the other must correctly understand the devices. 
Both must be alert to the possibility that errors have been made and 
are continuing to be made. This problem would seem to be particularly 
pertinent in native/ non-native communication, which was not included 
in the corpus but was in the additional data. The participants' failure 
to use and correctly understand devices which could have resolved the 
misunderstanding and its multiple 'compounding' sets the Varonis & Gass 
(1985) datum apart and it may well be the case that misunderstandings 
between participants from different linguistic backgrounds exhibit a 
larger number of ill-used devices. 
This thesis has attempted to establish the salient structural 
characteristics of misunderstandings and has done so by means of a 
corpus-based analysis with the corpus being limited to misunderstandings 
between native speakers. It would be interesting to analyse a further 
corpus of less restricted data so that inter-ethnic and inter-dialectal 
misunderstandings could be examined and compared. Additionally, 
misunderstandings between participants from different socio-economic 
backgrounds and misunderstandings in different settings, such as 
telephone conversations, committees, interviews and so on, could be 
examined. It is probable that differences in the structural sequencing 
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will characterize misunderstandings in these different settings and 
between more diverse participants, rather than the emergence of new 
devices. The relative frequency of misunderstandings in particular 
settings and between particular participants could also be assessed. 
One of the major problems with research of this kind is that one 
must be wary of undue reliance on intuition and unsubstantiated 
assumptions by the analyst. p, pr and states of realization in this 
thesis are all derived from the analyst's intuitive interpretation 
which is usually supported by explanations provided by the utterances 
themselves or by retrospective commentary. The analysis makes provision 
for alternative interpretations when the analyst cannot be certain that his 
assumptions are correct. 
The analysis presented in this thesis indicates how complex misunder- 
standings can be and consequently how much interactive effort can be 
required of participants in order that misunderstandings'can be resolved. 
Communication crucially involves the negotiation of what is intended 
and what understood; participants draw on a specific range of devices to 
undertake this negotiation. The fact that they do not always succeed 
emphasizes the inherent difficulty of communication: each participant 
is an individual who speaks and hears from his own perspective. 
Successful communication thus ultimately depends on each individual's 
ability to take into account how the other individual may be interpreting 
the conversation. This facility to negotiate interactively is clearly 
a crucial social skill and future research might usefully focus on this 
particular facet of communicative behaviour as a means to a better 
understanding of how speaker-hearers use language. 
FOOTNOTES 
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(Introduction, p. 1) : e. g. the following letter by J. H. Pugh of 
Birningham, published in The Sunday Express, 20th May, 1984: 
"We have friends who visit us from time to time or we visit them. 
When we do they pick us up as we have no car. Our phone rang one 
evening and it was our friend who asked 'Would you like. to visit 
us this evening? If so, we will be over in 20 minutes. ' We had 
our coats on and were ready to leave when they arrived, looking 
puzzled. 'Are you going out then? 'they said. It transpired 
that their phone message had really been 'Would you like two 
visitors this evening? ' We had a good laugh and settled down. " 
2. (Chapter I., P. 13) Scenarios can always be provided in support 
of linguistic claims. Here, the utterance 'Pass the fuel flask 
please' could be misperceived as 'Pass the field glasses please' 
and could be understood if, for example, a Land Rover, in which a 
spare can of fuel was carried, had stopped because it was low on 
fuel; an interesting view could be ahead, in which case 'field 
glassed might conceivably be requested. 
(Chapter i, P. 27) : An example of a non-linguistic misunder- 
standing is as follows :a queue of people are at a bus stop where 
buses which follow different routes stop ;a bus draws up; the 
people at the front of the queue get on but those in the middle 
are waiting for a different bus so they continue standing; those 
at the end of the queue want to get on the bus but in waiting 
their t urn in the queue they miss the bus, not realizing that it 
is now their turn to board that bus. They have misunderstood the 
situation; language is not involved. 
(Chapter I, p. 27) : The following misunderstanding between A, 
a native English speaker, and B, an Egyptian, was reported to me 
by the English speaker : 
1 A: What does Martin do? 
2 B: Something to do with zebras 
3 A: Oh zebra crossings 
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B: Yes, something to do with genetics 
A associated "zebras" with traffic and thought that (2) was a joke 
about town planning. B does not make UO connection with traffic, 
not having made the joke which A credits her with, and interprets 
"zebra crossings" as the genetic crossing of zebras, which is 
presumably a-long the lines of what Martin, presumably a zoologist 
or geneticist, does. It is possible that this misunderstanding 
could have occurred between two native speakers but as it did not 
it is not included in the corpus. 
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(Chapter II, P. 35) :I am indebted to Ruth Kempson and Yorick 
Wilks for their permission to cite this misunderstanding. 
(Chapter IV, p. 69) :I 
this mathematical joke. T 
terms :A Witch of Agnesi 
type of line which a curve 
a three dimensional shape; 
of certain curves. 
am indebted to R. M. McHarrie who devised 
he joke involves the following geometric 
is a type of curve; an asymptote is a 
approaches; a hyperboloid in one sheet is 
eccentricity describes the characteristics 
(Chapter V, p. 88) : Whether a native Australian English speaker 
is strictly eligible to be reckoned a native English speaker is a 
moot point. The misunderstanding would not have occurred between 
two speaker-hearers who shared the same cultural and therefore coinage 
system since the misunderstanding is of the referent of "They're so 
big" and two native speakers would not say that of the 2p piece. 
However, linguistic differences are not involved as they are in the 
"zebras" example, cited in Footnote 4, and the datum is included 
in the corpus. 
(Chapter IX, p. 190) : The remaining percentages are those data 
in which S and H realize at the same time and those in which 0 realizes 
before S and H. 
APPENDICES 
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APPENDIX 1 
CORPUS OF ANALYSED DATA 
The corpus of analysed data is presented in accordance with the 
typology described in Chapter IX (see page 188). 
Typographical Conventions 
(1): - single utterance in one participant-t urn 
(lol, Z, n) several utterances in one participant-turn 
(S), (H), (0) reference by name to S, H, 0 
signifies utterance is a question 
signifies utterance is an exclamation 
signifies slight pause within utterance 
signifies longer pause within utterance 
CAPITAL LETTERS signifies emphatic stress 
(ýOf signifies emphatic stress on names of 
S, Ht 0 
marker of pauses between utterances and 
of paralinguistic features such as 
/ laugh / 
marker of extralinguistic features 
such as - goes into room - 
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TYPE A: +S real. +H real. 
Basic Structure, 
Al. 
A2. 
S, (f), and H, (m), are talking about leaving car handbrakes 
on when driving. 
H: I did that the other day just a little 
ORIGIN S: How far? 
MANIP. H: Only partly on +S real. 
x ampl. S: How far did you travel? +H real. 
z H: Baldwin to Douglas 
Source: S=C. E. H. -J. 
P- How far did you travel with your handbrake on? 
Pr. How far on was your handbrake? 
S real.: I+ S real. ' effected by recognition of cognitive 
inappropriacy of (-2T; anticipated response giving 
distance. 
H real.: I+ H real. ' effected by S Ox amploll as evidenced 
by appropriate response in (5)- 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription. 
H, (f) I has just closed the garage door, jamming the stiff 
bolt acrossy prior to getting in the carp with S, (f), and 
closing the car door. 
ORIGIN S: Are You sure it's shut? 
MANIP. 
p exp * 
z-action 
Hz Yes I jammed it 
+S real, 
S: I meant the door +R real* 
R- opens car door and slams it shut 
z 
A3 9 
S: You just had to push the lock down to check 
Source :H=C. E. H. -J. 
: Are you sure the car door is shut? 
P? : Are you sure the garage door is shut? 
S real.: I+ S real. ' 
_effecteý 
by recognition of pragmatio 
inappropriacy of 22 (car doors are not "Jammed" 
shut), as evidenced by S Ip exp. '* 
H real.: I+ H real. ' effected S Ip exp. to 
Confirmed ir; -subsequent discussion of transcription. 
St (f); Ht Mq is putting drip mats under wine glasses 
on a table. 
(1) ORIGIN Ss Nicep aren't they? 
(2) MANIF. H: Well they're useful +S real. 
(3) p exp. S: I meant the glasses +H real, 
(4) mus. ack. Ht Oh yes 
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Source S-C. E. H. -J. 
F These glasses are nice, aren't they? 
P These drip mats are nice, aren't they? 
S real. % I+S real. t effected by recognition of cognitive 
inappropriacy of C2); anticipated response on 
aesthetic merit of Classes* 
H real.: I+ H real. 'effected by S Op exp. Ij as evidenced 
by H Imus. ack. l. 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription. 
Basic Structure with Expansion 
A4- S, (m); Hy (f); Graham Blackett is a butcher, Graham 
Richards is a farmer. 
H: When we live in Alston I shall get my 
meat for the freezer from Blaokett's 
(2) ORIGIN S: Yes you want to chat Graham up 
(3) MANIF. H: Yeah I'm sure he needs a cowgirl 
pause +S real. 
r (4) p ref. & S: No, Graham Blackett not Graham Richards 
p exp. +H real. 
Source Reported by S and H, 
P Yes you want to chat up Graham Blackett, the butcher* 
p Yes you want to chat up Graham Riohar , 
ds, the farmer* 
S real.: I+SS real, ' effected by recognition of pragmatic 
inappropriacy of (3), (butchers do not usually need 
cowgirls while farmers might)q as evidenced by S 
lp r ref. &p emp. l. r H real.: 1+ H real. teffected b3 1p, ref. &p expel. 
Confirmed izý'subsequent discussion of transcription. 
S and H provided the following commentary : 
By S after (2) 
By R after (3) 
By S before (4): 
Aft or 
"Graham rather than any other Blaokett" 
"As I said that about Blackett's I was 
thinking that maybe Graham Richards would 
sell me a heifer cheaply" 
"How should Graham Blaokettj a butcher of 
some repute, need in any ordinary sense 
of the wordy a cowgirl* The only Graham 
I know who might need a cowgirl is 
Graham Richardsp farmerl up the road, 
therefore she thought when I said Grahamp 
meaning Graham Blacketty I was intendingg 
contrastivelyq another fami p i. e. not 
Blackett, rather than what it did meang 
which was a specified member of the same 
family" 
"On diaoussiony H did not know that Graham 
Blackettl butcher, was called Graham" 
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A5 - S, 
(f), and Hp (f), are discussing a friend who is selling 
her car. 
(1) ORIGIN S: I wonder what she's selling it for 
(2) MANIF. H: Going up in the world getting rid of 
her bashed mini 
+S real. 
r (3-1) p ref prtl* S: No that's not what I mean 
*2) p exp. I mean how much is she selling it for 
,+R real. 
I'll have to remember that to tell it 
to Claire for her misunderstandings 
Source Reported by S 
PI wonder how much she's selling her car for 
pr I wonder why she's selling her car 
S real.: I+S real. ' effected by recognition of cognitive 
inappropriacy of F2); anticipated response giving 
price of car. 
pr H real.: I+H real. ' effected by S ref. prtl., P exp-I 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription*- 
A6* Sj (f)y an Australiang is paying Ht (f)p for some 
photocopying. 
(1) H. That's six pence 
S - takes three 2p pieces from her purse - 
(291) ORIGIN S: I thought they'-dbe more 
*2) ORIGIN They're so big 
(3) MANIF. H-0 It's six pence a sheet regardless of size 
,+S real 
(4-1) p exp. S I meant the money 
. 2) p exp- It looks as if it should be more valuable 
than it is 
-+H real. 
(5-1) mus. ack. H: Ah 
. 2) z : That's true of all money these days 
Source H-C. E. H. -J. 
PI thought the 2p coins would be worth more because 
r 
they are so big 
PI thought the photocopies would cost more because 
the sheets of paper are so big 
S real.: I+ S real. I effected by recognition of cognitive 
inappropriacy Tf (3 1 as evidenced by S Ip exp.,, 
p expl; anticipated response relating to coinage. 
H real.: I+ H real. ' effected by S Op exp. 1 
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A7 0 and Sq Mv 
at the sohool 
H joins them. 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) ORIGIN 
(4) MANIF. 
have been talking about seances carried out 
which S and H, (f), attended, the Crescent; 
0: That's the sort of thing they do at 
the Creseent 
H: What ? 
Ss Seanoes 
H: Say what ? 
mus- sig- S: /1 augh / 
(6.1) mus. ack, H: Oh seances 
. 2) mus. ack. :/ laugh / 
+S real. 
+H real. 
Source S-C. E. H. -J. 
p Seances (are the sort of thing they do at the Crescent) 
pr say ances (as a test of pronunciation) 
S real.: I+ S real. # effected by recognition of cognitive 
inappropriacy of (47; anticipated response commenting 
on seances. 
H real*: I+ H real, t effected by S Imus. sig. Ov as evidenced 
by H Imus. ack. l. 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription* 
A8. SP (f), has been telling Ht (f)9 about how much photocopying 
needs to be done; 'dying blondiet refers to a man with 
blonde hair; H has dreamed about this man having collapsed 
in the reading room. 
(1) ORIGIN S: And your dying blondie has a couple as well 
(2) MANIP. H: Do you think he does? 
pause / 
+3 real. 
(3) p exp. S: I meant as in your dream +H real. 
(4-1) mus. ack. H: Oh sorry 
. 2) mus. ack. Ah yes 
-3) mus. aok. Yes 
Source S=C. E. H. -J. 
p The blonde mang whose death you dreamed about, has 
r requested a couple of pages of xeroxing as well P The blonde man who dyes his hair has requested a 
couple of pages of xeroxing as well 
S real.: 1+ S real. teffected by recognition of cognitive and 
linguistic inappropriacy of (2); anticipated response 
commenting on xeroxes; substitution word "does" not. 
appropriate for man dying or for requesting xeroxeso H real.: t+ H real. ' effected by S Op expl, as evidenced by 
H Imus. ack., mus. ack. p mus. ack. l. 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription. 
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AO 
" 4219 Sv (f), has commented that she likes H'sp (f)v jumper 
(1) ORIGIN S: Is it wool? 
(2) MANIP. H: Very 
+S real. 
(3) x exp. & S: I said wool not warm 
xr ref. +H real* 
(4-1) mus. ack. H: Oh 
. 2) z : Yes I think so 
Source HMC. E,, H, -J,, 
F Is the jumper made of wool? 
P Is the jumper warm? 
S real.: 1+ S real. ' effected by recognition of linguistic 
inappropriaoy of (2)'(inappropriate to apply 
intensifier to something which does not admit degree). 
H real*: 0+ H real. $ effected by S tx exp. &xr refelo 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription. 
A10. Hy (f)v is telling By (m), about a wedding she has been too 
(1) H: One of the courses at the wedding reception 
was salmon caught by the bridegroom's 
father a few days before 
(2) ORIGIN Ss Poached? 
(3) MANIF. H: I can't remember how it was cooked 
+S real. 
r (4) p ref-prti. S: No, poached 
&x rpt. +H real. 
muso ack, H: Oh 
Source H-C. E. H. -J 
P Was the salmon caught by poachers? 
p Was the salmon cooked by poaching? 
S real.: I+ S real. ' effected by recognition of cognitive 
inappropriacY of (3 ; anticipated response giving 
details of how salmon was caught. 
H real.: I+ H real. ' effected by S spr ref. prtl* &x rpt, 19 
Confirmed iz; -subsequent discussion of transcription- 
All. Hy (f), is doing 
pen to fill in a3 
. 2) ORIGIN 
(2) MANIF. H: 
a crossword : S9 (f), has borrowed her 
application form. 
You can have your pen in a minute* 
I just have to address the envelope 
and then we're away 
Where are you goine. 
+S real. 
S: Nowhere 
p exp, inemp. just meant 
+R real. 
Mus. ack. H: Oh 
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Source S-C. E. H. -J. 
pI just have to address the envelope and then the 
r 
applicatio. n is ready to be set in motion 
pI just have to address the envelope and then I'm 
away somewhere i. e. going out 
S real.: t+ S real. ' effected by recognition of cognitive 
inappropriacy of (2) anticipated response relating 
to application. 
H real.: 1+ H real. ' effected bS ly' response to (2) and 
SIp exp. incmp. 11 as evidenced by H Imus. ack. t. 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription. 
A12. S9 (f)p is in the lounge, having watched on television a 
film which has just finished H, (f), has just gone into 
the adjoining kitchen* 
(1) ORIGIN S: Do you want anything (H)? 
(2) MANIP. H: I'm just getting my milk 
+S real. 
r (3) p ref. prtL S: No, I meant on 
&p exp. H real. 
(4-1) mus. ack. H- Oh 
. 2) z; No t hanks 
Source H=C. E. H. -J. 
p Do you want anything on television? 
pr Do you want anything from the kitchen? 
S real.: I+ S real. * effected by recognition of cognitive 
inappropriacy of (2) ; anticipated response relating 
to television programme. r H real.: I+ H real. ' effected by S Ip ref. prtl. &p exp*I 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription. 
A13. St (f), and H, (m)q have been discussing (i) types of food 
mixers, S being about to buy one, and then (ii) a forthcoming 
picnic planned by H; the conversation is briefly interrupted 
while S serves customers. 
(1) ORIGIN S: What shall I get then? 
(2) MANIP. H: Well I think Kenwood are pretty good 
+S real. 
r (3) p ref. prtl. S: Nog the picnic 
&P exp +H real. 
(4-1) mus. ack. H: Oh 
z: Oh nothing, it's all organized 
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A14- 
Sourc e: S-C. E. H. -J. 
P- What shall I get for the picnic? 
pr = What mixer shall I get? 
S real.: I+S real. ' effected by recognition of cognitive 
inappropriacy : anticipated response requesting 
food or drink items. 
. pr H real.: I+ H real. * effected ref. prtl. I& p expl. 
as evidenced by R Imus. ack. 1 and appropriate 
response in (4.2). 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription. 
Sj (f) -. H, (f), is consulting the newspaper -to see what 
television programmes are an for the remainder of the evening. 
(1) S: What' s the film? 
(2ol) H: Limelight 
. 2) Claire Bloom and Charlie Chaplin 
(3) ORIGIN S: Must be late 
(4-1) IND. MANIF. H: Yes it is 
o2) MANIF. t It was the last one before he died 
+S real. 
(5) p r ref, prtlo S: Nog time 
&p expo +H real. 
(6.1) mus. ack. H: Oh 
. 2) mus. ack : 
/laugh/ 
Source H-C. E. H. -J. 
p The f ilm must be on television late in the evening 
pr The film must have been made late in Charlie 
Chaplin' s career 
S real.: I+S real. ' effected by recognition of cognitive 
inappropriacy anticipated response giving time 
of film. r H real.: I+H real. ' effected 
, 
by S Ip ref. prtlo &p exply 
as evidenced by H Imus. ack., mus. ack. 1, 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription. 
A15. Hp (f)? joins S, (f)q from an adjoining room where the 
television is; a tennis match is being broadcast. 
(1) ORIGIN S: 
(2) MANIF* H: 
(3-1) mus. sig. S: 
(pr ref. impL) 
. 2) x ampl. 
What are we playing? 
Tennis 
+S real. 
KNOW stupid girl 
What matoh is it? 
+R real. 
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Source %H-C. E. H. -J. 
p- What tennis match is on television? 
pr. What game is on television? 
S real. i I+S real. ' 
, effected 
by recognition of cognitive 
inappropriacy; anticipated response detailing the 
opponents in a tennis match, 
(, Pr H real.: I+ H real. 1.2ffected by S Imus. sig. 1 ref. 
implied'), 1ý ampl. l. 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription. 
A16. S, (f), and H, (m), are talking about Dvorjak's music. 
(1) S: Have you head his cello concerto? 
(2) H: No 
(3-1) St It's very nice 
. 2) ORIGIN I've been playing it a lot in the last 
few weeks 
(4) MANIF. H: You can play the cello! 
+S real. 
r (5) p ref. prtl. S: Nop the record 
&P exp. H real. 
(6) mus. ack. H: Oh 
Source S-C. &H. -J. 
p I've been playing the record of Dvorjak's cello 
r concerto a 
lot in the last few weeks 
P I've been playing DvorJak's cello concerto on the 
cello a lot in the last few weeks 
S real.: 1+ S real. ' effected by recognition of cognitive 
inappropriacy; anticipated response relating to 
Dvorjakp not to S and a cello, 
H real.: 1+ H real. ' effected by S pr ref. prtl. &p exply 
as evidenced by H Imus. ack. l. 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription. 
A17. H, (f); By (f), has commented on the fact that her Office 
typewriter has stuck and has then attended to customers who 
have received a letter from her; she then returns to her desk. 
(1) ORIGIN s: Itts alarming when that happens 
(2.1) IND. MANIF. HI MM 
. 2) MANIFO When it sticks 
+S real. 
r (3) p ref. prti. s: Nog when people come in with a letter 
&P exp. you've written to them 
H real. 
(4: 1 mus. ack. H: Oh that 
2z: Yes 
.3z: I'm not with it today 
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Source S-- C. E. H. -J. 
p It's alarming when customers produce a letter 
r which you've written 
to them 
P It's alarming when the typewriter sticks 
S real.: 1+ S real. $ effected by recognition of cognitive 
inappropriacy of-(-2. '2); anticipated response 
relating to customers and letters. 
H real.: 1+ H real. * effected by 3 pr ref. prtl. &p eXp-1 
as evidenced by H Imuso ackel. 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription. 
A18. (f) ; Ho (f). 
ORIGIN S: Take your paper bin 
(2) MANIF. H: Which paper? 
S real. 
(3) x ampl. 3: Your wastie bin 
+H real. 
(4-1) mus. ack. H: Oh 
*2) xr exp. : I thought you said take your paper in 
Source H-C. E. H. -J. 
p Take your paper bin 
pr Take your paper in 
S real.: I+S real' effected by recognition of cognitive 
inappropriacy of (2); anticipated action or 
reference to bin. 
H real.: I+H real. ' effected by S Ix amplol. 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcriptiono 
A19 * Ht 
(f), has gone 
and is about to 
(1) ORIGIN S: 
(2) IND. MANIF. H: 
action H 
r (3) p ref Ap exp. S: 
into S'st (f)q bedroom to say goodnight 
go out again. 
Could you fasten that drawer properly 
Yes right 
- holds door handle 
+S real. 
Drawer not door 
+H real. 
(4) mus. ack. H: Ah 
z-action H- closes drawer - 
(5-1) z 3: Thanks darling 
.,, 2) z: Jim a fussy drawers 
Source H=C. E. H. -J. 
P Cou3dyou fasten that drawer properly 
pr Could you-fasten that door properly 
3 real.: I+ S real. ' , 
effected by H lactiontg indicating 
incorrect referent identification by H* 
H real.: I+ H real. ' effected by 3 Ipr ref. &P exP-'- 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription- 
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A20. Ho (f)v is visiting from Edinburghp travelling on a student 
rail fare ; friends of SIB, (f), are organizing a day trip 
to Edinburgh from Newcastle, where the conversation takes 
place, 
(1.1) ORIGIN S: That day trip to Edinburgh's really good 
*2) ORIGIN It Is under a pound 
(2) MANIF9 H: Oh so that's why he asked mo if I was 
coming back last night +S real* 
r (3) p refo prtl. S: No 
& mus. Big. 
+H real. 
(4) p qued. Hs Oh you mean the one here 
& mus. ack. 
Source :H=C. E. H. -J. 
p: That university day trip to Edinburgh is really good- 
r 
It's under a pound 
p The British Rail day trip fare to Edinburgh is 
really good. It's under a pound 
S real.: 1+ S real. ' effected by cognitive and pragmatio 
inappropriacy of -(-2); anticipated response 
relating to university trip; the trip is in the 
future and nothing to do with H's journey on the 
previous day. 
r H real.: t+ H real. ' effected by S sp ref. prtl. & muso sig-1- 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription. 
A21. Sp (f), and Martin both have lists recording decisions on 
planning applications; H, (m)q who is speaking to someone 
on the telephone, has been asked about a particular decision- 
(1) H. - (S)p have you got the list? 
(2.1) S: I've got Martin's 
. 2) ORIGIN Which one do you want? 
(3-1) MANIF. H: Either 
. 2) MANIF. I don't mind 
+S real. 
(4) Pr ref. prtl. S: No2 which application? 
&x ampl, +H real. 
(5-1) mus. ack. H: Oh sorry 
, 2) mus. aok* :/ laugh / 
-3) pr exp.. :I thought you meant which list 
Source S. C. E. H. -J. 
p Which application on the list do you want? 
Pr Which list do you want? 
S real. t I+ S real. $ effected by recognition of cognitive 
and pragmatic inappropriacy of (3-19 3*2); 
anticipated response giving application number; 
applications are dealt with singly. 
H real. t '+ H realo' effected by S Opr ref. prtlo &x amplo' 
as evidenced by H Imus. ack. 9 mus. ack., pr exp. t 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcriptiOno 
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A22. S, (f)y has asked 
H: 
. 2) 
(2) ORIGIN S: 
(3) MANIF. H: 
(4-1) mus- sig- S. - 
. 2) p exp. 
-3) x rpt. &x emph.: 
H, (m), about his research. 
I've done the A. I. and the psychology Part 
Now I'm doing the linguistics side of it 
Which is the hardest? 
No it's not actually .. no it's 
+S real 
laugh 
I meant a question 
WHICH is the hardest? 
+H real. 
(5-1) mus. ack. H: / laugh / 
*2) mus. ack. s There you are .. a misunderstanding 
(6) mus. ack. S: Mmm 
(7) z H: The A. I. was the hardest 
Source S=C. E. H. -J. 
P Which is the hardest - A. l., psychology or linguistics? 
pr ( ... linguistics) which is the hardest 
S real.: I+ S real*' effected by recognition of cognitive and 
linguistic inappropriacy of (3); anticipated 
response naming one of the three subjects; referent 
assumed which cannot be recovered from (2) 
H real.: I+ H real. ' effected by 3 tmus. sig. 2 p expey x rpte 
& emph. 9, as evidenced by H Imus. aek., muse ack. l. 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription- 
A23. Clive Dixon and Clive Derwent work in the same office as Sq 
(m)q and H, (f); Clive Derwent is on secondment and is living 
in a rented cottage while Clive Dixon is a permanent emploY0eq 
whose sister-in-law has recently moved into a rented cottage 
which H, looking for somewhere to rentq had inspected previously- 
(1) ORIGIN S: Of-course when Clive finishes his work 
you could always 
(2.1) MANIP. H: 
. 2) y 
-3) y 
-4) Y 
-5) Y 
. 6) y 
-7) Y 
. 8) y 
(3-1) mus. Sig. S: 
. 2) p exp. 
(4-1) mus. ack. 
pr ref. 
. 2) mus. ack. (5) z S: 
(6) z H: 
Persuade the sister-in-law to get out 
/ laugh 
Yes 
But one of the reasons I turned it down7 
well, took my name off the list really 
I think his sister-in-law was ýalwaYs going 
to get it 
But one of the things I didn't like was 
the road 
One bend worried me 
It was really sharp and the road fell away 
+S real. 
I think we've, ehy gone astray here a little 
I was thinking of Clive Derwent 
+H real. 
Oh, not Clive Dixon 
Sorry 
Because you were interested in his cottage 
once, weren't you? 
Yes 
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Source H=C. E. H. -J. 
p When Clive Derwent finishes his secondment work 
r you could always 
(take over his cottage) 
p When Clive Dixon finishes his work on his 
sister-in-law's cottage you could always (take 
over the cottage after getting rid of her) 
S real.: I+ S real. ' effected by recognition of cognitive 
inappropriaoy of (2ol) and the subsequent 7 'Y' 
utterances; anticipated response relating to 
Clive Derwent and his cottage. 
H real.: I+ H real. ' effected by S Imus. sig. p p exp. l. 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription. 
Basic Structure with Interactive Ebcpansion 
A24. S, (m), and H, (f), are talking about a photograph of a 
castle in a book of castles. 
M Ss I've been to that one 
(2) H: Which? 
(3-1) S: Richmond 
. 2) ORIGIN One of my brother's former girlfriends 
lived there 
(4) MANIF. H: Golly! 
(tone = pr err. +S real. Big. ) 
(5) p exp S: In the town 
+H real. 
(6.1) mus. ack. H: Oh 
. 2) mus. ack. Sorry 
-3) mus. ack. 
/ laugh 
(7-1) mus. ack. S: / laugh 
. 2) z t Wetre not in your social 
-3) z We don't aim for the peerage 
Source H=C. E. H. -J 
p One of my brother's former girlfriends lived in 
r 
Richmond. 
p One of my brother's former girlfriends lived in 
Richmond Castle 
S real.: I+ S real. ' -e- 
ffected by recognition of cognitive 
inappropriacy of (4 exclamation of surprise 
not anticipated. 
H real.: I+ H real. $ effected by S Ip expl. 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription. 
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A25- H, (f) ; S9 (f), is looking at a newspaperp a local one 
giving a list of events in celebration of the Millennium- 
(1) ORIGIN Ss I'd better see what's on 
(2) MANIF. H: I'd quite like to watch Rhoda at 9 O'clock 
+S real. 
(3) P exp. S: I meant the Millennium events 
action H- looks at paper and sees it is a local 
one giving list of events - 
+H real. 
mus. ack. H: Oh 
Source H- C. E. H. -J. 
pI had better see what Millennium events are on 
prI had better see what is on television 
S real.: I+ S real. ' e- ffected by recognition of cognitive 
inappropriacy of (2); anticipated response relating 
to Millennium events. 
H real.: I+ H real. ' effected by B Ip expl &H laotionle 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcriptiono 
A26,39 (f), and Hq (f)p are listening to a record* 
(1) S: What's this? 
(2.1) H 
. 2) 
(3) ORIGIN Ss 
(4) MANIF. H: 
r (5) p ref. prtl. S: 
&p exp. 
Soheherezade 
Rimsky-Korsakov 
Ah, thousand and one nights woman 
No$ man 
Nop it was a woman 
(6) p- exp Hs Rimsky-Korsakov was a man +S reale 
(7) P exp. S: Scheherezade was a woman 
z H: She was but he wasn't 
H real. 
Source H=C. E. H. -Jo 
p Scheherezade is the woman in 1001 Nights 
pr Rimsky-Koroakov is the woman who wrote Scheherezade 
S real.: I+ S real. ' effected by H pr expte 
H real.: I+ H real. ' effected by S Op exp. 2 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription# 
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A27. 
A28. 
S, (m), has asked Hp (f)) what she and her flat-mate do 
in the evenings; 0 is sitting with S and H. 
M H: We get in and sit by the fire all night 
S - looks at 0 who is lighting a cigarette 
(2) ORIGIN S: That Is a bad habit 
(3) MAKIP. H: I know but it's a nice one 
+ S real. 
action S - points to cigarette 
+ H real* 
(5) r p exp. inemp. Ht I -thought you meant 
(6) mus. ack. S: / laugh / 
Source sH-C. E. H. -J. 
p- Smoking is a bad habit 
pr = Getting in and sitting by the fire all night is 
a bad habit. 
S real. s I+ S real. ' effected by recognition of cognitive 
inappropriacy of (3); anticipated response bY 0 
rather than H 
H real.: I+ H real. ' 
- effected 
by S laotiontv indicating 
referent of (2). 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription. 
S2 (f), and H, (f), are going off to do 'Meals on Wheels'; 
they also intend going out in the car later in the afternoon. 
(1) ORIGIN S: We can get fuel now 
(2.1) MANIF. H: We'd better get it on the way back 
*2) y It Is twenty past eleven now 
,+S real. 
(3) p exp S: I mean on the way back 
+H real. 
(4) xr exp. H: You said we can get it now 
(5) p exp. S: I meant on the way back 
source :H=C. E. H. -J. 
p: We can get fuel now while we're out this morning 
pr We can Get fuel now on the way to doing Meals 
on Wheels. 
S real.: I+ S real. ' effected by recognition of cognitive 
inappropriacy of (T. 3); anticipated response 
agreeing with proposal rather than having same 
proposal put forward as an alternative. 
H real.: '+ H real. ' effected by S 'p exp. 1 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription. 
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A29. s, (f)v and Hy (m)v are eating mini-Easter eggs several 
weeks after Easter. 
(1) ORIGIN S: They've spoilt them really 
(2*1) MANIF. H: By having them all the year round 
, 2) y That's just what I was thinking yesterday 
,+S real 
(3-1) y S: Yes though these are probably old stock 
. 2) pr ref. prtl* No, what I meant was that they eh the 
&p exp. wrappers are all coloursy blue, red and 
green 
-3) They used to be just one colour and it 
was fun'trying to get the blue one 
+ 11 real* 
(4) mus. ack. H: Oh 
Source S=C. E. H. -J. 
p They've spoiled them by having multi-coloured 
r wrappers P Theylve spoiled them by selling them all the 
year round 
S real.: I+ S real. ' effected by recognition of cognitive 
inappropriacy of (2.1); anticipated response asking" 
why they were spoiled. r H real.: I+ H real. * effected by S IP ref. prtl. &p expol Yt- 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription. 
A30. S, (f)p and Hp (f) 
are discussing the 
M H: 
(2*1) 
2) ORIGIN 
(3) MANIP. H: 
(tone = pr err. 
Sig. ) 
(4) pr quedo 3: 
(5) pr exp. H: 
having just moved into new accommodation, 
bathroom. 
It looks like it's a big bathroom 
Yes it is 
It's got scales in it 
In the bathrooml 
Why is that surprising? 
You don't normally have stairs in bathrooms 
+S real. 
(6.1) x exp. S: I said scales 
+H real. 
. 2) z: Fool! 
Source S-C. E. H. -J. 
p The bathroom has scales in it 
pr The bathroom has stairs in it 
S real.: t+ S realýt effected by H pr exp. lo 
H real.: I+ H real. ' effected by S Ox exp. l. 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription. 
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A31. Sj (f), and Hy (f), are talking about lunch in the 
Chaplaincy, whithe3ý they are headed. 
(1) ORIGIN S: What do they do? 
(2) MANIF. H: You just go in and get what you want 
+3 real. 
r (3) p ref. prtl. S: No no ehm what 
&x ampl. inemp. 
r (4) p err. sig. H: What what 
(5) P40 expe S: I meant what do they serve 
+H real. 
(6.1) z H: Soup, hot pies, rolls, yogourt 
, 2) z That sort of thing 
(7) z S: Oh good 
Source S=C. E. H. -J. 
p What do they serve? 
pr What is the procedure for eating? 
S real. l 1+ S real. t effected by recognition of cognitive 
inappropriacy of (-2-7; anticipated response 
giving type of food served. 
H real.: 1+ H real. t effected by S lp expol. 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription. 
A32. Having moved house, Sp (f)y has received some G. P. O. change 
of address cards; she has just fetched playing cards to 
play with H, (f). 
(1.1) S: I suppose I'd better write those cardsq 
. 2) ORIGIN 
(2) MANIF. H: 
action s 
(3) y S: 
(4) manif. ampl. Ht 
action S'. 
(5) y S: 
(6) manif. ampl. 
.1 
H: 
r ref. &p exp. 
those change of whatsits cards 
/ pause / 
I wonder where the cards are 
On that table behind you 
- looks at table 
They're not 
Yes they are 
- looks attable 
They're not 
Yes they're under the oameray behind 
the light bulbs 
+S real. 
Not those cards, the playing cards 
+R real. 
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Source :H-C. E. H. -J. 
p=I wonder where the playing cards are 
r p. I wonder where the change of address cards are 
S real.: I+ S real. ' effected after exchange of 
contradictory ly' utterances and Imanif. 
amps. ', the last of which details the location 
of the cards. 
H real.: I+ H real. ' effected by S 1pr ref. &P exp. l. 
Confirmed irý-subsequent discussion of 
transcription. 
A33. S9 (m), and H, (m), are listening to a record while 
watching television on vision only; 'Focus' are a 
POP group, 
(1) ORIGIN S: Sounds like Focus 
(2.1) MANIF. H: Yeah I've been meaning to get it 
fixed for days 
, 2) y The picture's been lousy for some 
time 
/ pause 
(3-1) pr quede S: What the hell are you talking about? 
pause / 
+S real. 
.2 pr exp. Ah you're talking about the television 
-3) p exp. I meant the music 
,+H real. 
Source Reported by S 
? The record sounds like the group Focus 
p It sounds like the focus adjustment is a 
problem with the television. 
S real.: 1+ S real. * effected after consideration of 
(2*11 2.2) and recognition of their cognitive 
inappropriaoy; anticipated response relating 
to the music. r H real.: 1+ H real. ' effected by S Op exp-9 P exP-'- 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of 
transcription. 
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A34- 
(1) 
Si (f), and H. (m)q are talking about the lack of 
university jobs 
ORIGIN S: * It's amazing how few kind of senior 
(2.1) IND MANIF. H: 
, 2) y 
(3) y S: 
r (4) p qued. H: 
(5-1) Pr ref. prtl* S: 
&p exp. 
. 2) y incmp. 00 
posts are advertized isn't it 
mean 
Well there aren't any 
That's the o. that's why the whole 
thing's got clogged up 
Yeah 
You mean without that string attached 
about the bottom points 
+3 real* 
No I mean kind of promoted posts 
I mean those 
H real. 
Source Tape recorded 
P It's amazing how few senior lectureship posts 
r are advertiped 
p It's amazing how few posts are advertized which 
don't stipulate bottom points on the scale. 
S real.: S real. ' effected by H pr qued. t. :r 
H real.: 1+ H real. ' effected bSp ref. prtl. &p exp-1- 
Diversified Structure With Expansion 
A35 ? Intentional 
Sp M; H, (m). 
ORIGIN 
MANIP* 
mus. ack. H: Oh readerships 
(7) z S: Are done internally rather than 
(8) z H: Yeah, well I think again it's probably 
this expense thing you know 
r p ref, prtl, 
&p exp * 
(4) z 
S: What is V. A. T.? 
-? +H real* 
(if intentional) 
H: Value Added Tax 
+S real, 
S: No I mean what is it? 
,+H real* 
H: Eight per cent 
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Source Overheard 
P How much is V. A. T.? 
pr What do. the initials V. A. T. stand for? 
S real.: I+ S real. ' effected by recognition of cognitive 
inappropriacy of (2) ; anticipated response 
giving percentage figure. r H real.: I+ H real. ' effected by S Ip ref. prtl. & 
p exp., or I+ H real. ' precedes if 
intentional. 
A36. Intentional 
Sj (f) ; Hp 
0: There's no such thing as a one parent 
family 
o2) Jesus is the only example 
(2) H: There's some doubt about that 
(3) ORIGIN S: My grandmother swears she was raped 
by a Roman soldier 
+H realo 
(4ol) mus. Sig. H: laugh 
. 2) MANIF. Your grandmother must be living in 
the past 
S realo 
(5) mus. acko S-0 laugh 
Source H-C. E. H. -J. 
p My grandmother swears Mary was raped by a 
r 
Roman soldier 
P My grandmother swears she was raped by a 
Roman soldier 
S real.: I+ S real, ' effected by recognition of cognitive 
inappropriacy of (4.2); anticipated response 
relating to Mary rather than grandmother. 
H real.: '+ H real. ' precedes (4-1,4.2) 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of 
transcription. 
A37- S, (f), and H, (m), are talking about a play; H is 
urging S to go and see it. 
M HS It's very short 
(2) ORIGIN SS How long is it on? 
(3-1) MANIF. H: It finishes about ten to ten 
-2) Plenty of time for a drink / pause /+S, H real. 
-3) p qued. & Oh you mean how long on for 
mus. ack. 
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Source :S=C. E. H. -J. 
p= How much longer does the play run for? 
pr . How long is the play from start to finish? 
S real.: I+ S real. l. effected by recognition of 
cognitive inappropriaoy of (3-ly 3.2) 
anticipated response giving number of days 
or weeks. 
H real.: I+ H real. ' effected after re-oonsideration 
of (2). 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of 
transcription. 
A38. Intentional S, (m), is trying to organize a planning case to be heard 
as soon as possible ; Hp (m), organizes the agenda for 
the meetings at which cases are heard. 
(1) ORIGIN S. - How far do you go with your dates? 
H real. 
(2*1) mus. sig. H: laugh 
. 2) MANIF. Well, usually 
+S real. 
r (3) p ref. prtl. S: No, how many have you got arranged? 
&x ampl. 
Source : Overheard 
p How far ahead have you got dates for meetings 
r arranged? p How far do you go with the girls you date? 
S real.: I+ S real. ' effected by recognition of cognitive 
inappropriacy of-(-2.2) anticipated response 
giving calendar date. 
H real.: I+ H real. ' precedes (2.1y 2*2) 
Diversified Structure with Interactive Expansion 
A39- Intentional 
S, (f), is in one room in her flat; H, (f)q visitiagg 
is in the adjoining kitchenp together with a stray cat. 
M H: Shall I put the kettle on? 
(2*1) S: Mm 
. 2) ORIGIN Where is it? 
+ 11 real. 
(3) MANIF., H: on the tray 
+S real. 
(4) p r ref. prtl. S: No nop the cat 
&p exp. 
(5) mus. ack. H: I know 
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Source H=C. E. H. -J. 
P Where is the cat? 
pr Where is the kettle? 
S real.: I+ S real. ' effected by recognition of cognitive 
inappropriacy of (3) ; anticipated response 
giving details of where in the kitchen the cat 
might, be (aware that kettle is on small tray) 
H real.: I+ H real. ' precedes (3)- 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of 
transcription. 
A40- Intentional 
H, (m) ; Hy (m), 
place rather than 
(1) ORIGIN S: 
(2) MANIF. H: 
r (3) p ref. prtl. S: 
&p exp. 
r (4) p ref. & H: 
mus. ack. 
(5-1) 7, S: 
. 2) z I*, 
wants to leave his briefcase in a secure 
carry it round with him all day. 
There isn't a cloakroom round here 
that works 
H real. 
Oh the gents is flooded is it? 
+3 real. 
NO I MEANT a cloakroom for putting 
things in 
Ah not the kazi 
Kazi? 
I'd have said lavvy 
Source Reported by S&H 
p There isn't a manned cloakroom here for leaving 
r 
things 
p ere isn't alGents' round here that works 
S real.: I+ S real. ' effected by recognition of cognitive 
inappropriacy of (2) ; anticipated response relating 
to cloakrooms and security. 
H real.: t+ H real. t precedes (2). 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription* 
A41- Hv (f), has been telling S2 (f), what food she has cooked 
for the freezer, viz. mince and cheesecake; they then talk 
about what type of cheesecake has been made. 
(1) H: I could have done quicker ones but I 
wanted to do the rich one 
(2) ORIGIN S: What else did you put in? 
(3) MANIF. H: Cottage cheese ehm 
WY pr err. sig. S: Ohl mince 
+H real. 
(5-1) mus. ack. H: Ohl in the FREEZER 
. 2) pr exp. SI thought you meant the things in the 
cheesecake 
+S real. 
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Source S-C. E. H. -J. 
p What else did you put in the freezer? 
pr What else did you put in the cheesecake? 
S real.: I+ S real. l. effected by H Imus. aok. 9 pr ejcp. '. 
H real.: t+ H real. t effected by Sy& pr err. sig. 1 
Confirmed in subsequent disoussion'of 
transcription. 
A42. Sp (f), and H, (f), are colleagues; H is going to a dental 
appointment at 4 o'clock; office tea is consumed at half 
past three. 
(1) ORIGIN S: Are you having your tea and going? 
(2) IND. MANIF. H: No 
(3) y S: I thought you were going at quarter to 
four 
H real. 
(4-1) mus. ack. H: Oh my tea 
*2) pr exp. I thought you meant my eat tea 
+S real. 
-3) z Yes 
Source S=C. E. Ho-J, 
p Are you having your cup of tea and then going? 
pr Are you having your tea (evening meal) and 
then going? r S real.: I+ S real. * effected by H Imus. ack., p exp. l. 
H real.: I+ H real, ' effected by S ly'. 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of 
transcription, 
A43* S, (m), and H, (f), are at a cafe and are discussing how 
derelict it has becomep S pointing out that the cost of 
the thatched roof must preclude further development. 
(1) ORIGIN St They've band concerts here 
(2) IND. MANIF. H. - Why? 
(3) x rpt. prtl. S: Band concerts 
Sp H real. 
(4) mus. ack. SjHt 
(5-1)(,, 
r ep. impl. ) 
S: 
. 2) z 
/ laugh / 
Isn't it funny that there's no way you 
can distinguish between By A, Ny D and 
By Ay N, N, Ep D? 
Both are right 
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Source Reported by S and H 
p They have band concerts here 
Pr They have banned concerts here 
S real.: I+ S real. ' effected by recognition of 
cognitive inappropriacy of (2) ; anticipated 
response relating to Uand concertsý 
H real.: I+ H real. ' effected after reconsideration 
following S Ix rpt. prtl. I* 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of 
transcription. 
The following additional commentary was 
provided: 
By S after (2) "What have I said that (H) 
couldn't give me an answer? " 
A44 o S, 
(m) ; H, (M), is reading a newspaper an opened can 
of juice is on his desk. 
(1) ORIGIN S: Is there anything in that (H)? 
(2) MANIF. H: Not particularly 
action S - drinks from can - 
- +H real. 
(4) mus. ack, & H: Oh I thought you meant the paper 
pr exp. +S real. 
Source Overheard 
P Is there anything left in that can? 
pr Is there anything in that paper? r S real.: 0+ S real, ' effected by H Imus. ack. &p exp. 1. 
H real. s 1+ H real, ' effected by S 'action'* 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of 
transcription. 
A45* HI (f) ; SIB (f)v husband is working abroad; the chair 
is one which particularlY SagB when one BitS in it- 
1) ORIGIN s: I alwaVB Bit in this chair because it 
makes me feel fat 
- sits in chair - 
*2) ORIGIN My skirts won't go round me 
. 3) y I'm tranquillized by the lose so absence 
of my husband 
(2 1 MANIF, Hs I wish I was like that ý :2 
7 1 can't get into mine 
+ S real. 
(3-1) y SS No nor can I 
. 2) p exp. prti. t That's what I mean 
+ H real. 
(4) r p exp. HS Oh I thought you'd lost weight so your 
& mus. ack. skirts wouldn't fit 
+S real. 
(5) P eXpe SS Ilm fat so I sit here to remind me 
,+H real. 
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Source H+C. E. H. -J. 
pI always sit in this chair because it reminds 
r me 
I'm fat. My skirts won't go around me. 
PI always sit in this chair because it makes 
me feel fat. My kilted skirts won't go 
around me. 
S real.: 1+ S real. ' effected (i)? by cognitive 
inappropriacy of (2ei) &S ly'; anticipated 
response relating to weight problem or absence 
of husband; (ii) by H tpr exp. -& mun. ack. l. 
H real.: 2+ H real. ' effected (i)? by S lyp p, exp. prtlol; 
(ii) by S Op' exp*19 
A46. S, (f), and H, (f)p are in a bathroom; water is running 
into the bath for S and there is water in the wash basin. 
(1) ORIGIN S: What have you got that water in there for? 
(2) MANIF. HS To keep my hair wet 
y S: Oh 
y H: I blow dry it you see 
S: Mmm 
/ pause / 
aotion H - washes face in wash basin - 
. 2) y S: But you're washing your face 
(6) 11: Yes 
(7) S: That's what you're doing with that water 
+H real. 
(8.1) H: Oh yes 
*2) 3F exp. : I thought you said what have you got that 
hat on for 
+S real. 
-3) mus. ack. S How silly 
Source S=C. E. H. -J. 
p What have you got that water in there for? 
pr What have you got that hat on for? 
S real.: I+ S real*' effected by H I. %r exp. 1 subsequent to R 
'action' aný exchange of lyl utterances# 
H real.: I+ H real. ' effected by S ly' utterances. 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription* 
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A47- S, (f)v is H's t (m)v wife; it is 10 p9m* on a Saturday 
night. 
(1) ORIGIN S: *Will you excuse me if I go up to bed? 
(2) MANIF. H: Noy not at all 
/ pause 
(3) r x qued. S: Did you hear what I said? 
(4-1) xF exp. H: Yesv you said will you exc use me if I 
go up to bed 
pause 
H real. 
*2) mus. ack. : Oh 
-3) pr exp. I knew what you said and I knew you meant 
do you mind and I said no not at all. 
+S real. 
(5) z S: I thought you were doing one of your 
jokes because ycaoften do 
Source S=C. E. H. -J. 
Will you excuse me if I go up to bed? 
P? Do you mind if I go up to bed? 
S real.: I+ S real. ' effected by H Opr exp,. I* 
H real.: I+ H real. ' effected by H Ixr expolo 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of 
transcription. 
A48. S, (f), and H, (f), are listening to a tape which S has 
made of H's record. 
(1) ORIGIN S: I've only got one side of it 
(2) IND. MANIF. H: Wby? 
(3) Y S: Because I've got Peer Gynt on the other 
+H real. 
r (4) p exp. Ht Oh I thought you meant it was in mono 
& mus. ack, +S real, 
(5) pr ref. prtl. S: No I meant only one side of the album 
&p exp. 
Source Reported by So 
p I've only got one side of the record 
pr I've only got one channel (i*eo it is in mono) 
S real. t 1+ S real. ' effected by H tpr exp, & mus, ack. l. 
H real.: 1+ H real. ' ýffected'by S tyl elaborating the 
origin 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription. 
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-AA9, rý S, 
(f), and H9 (f)v share accommodation and are sitting in 
H's room; the rooms are high-ceilinged; 'he' is the 
landlord, who lives below them. 
S: I don't know how we change the bulb 
ORIGIN Hope he's got a ladder 
r (2) p err. sig. H: What? 
(3) y S: For when the bulb goes 
(4) MANIF. H: It's got a little hole at the top 
r (5) p err. sig. S: What? 
(6) y H: To change the bulb 
+S real. 
(7) p exp. SS I mean a ladder to get up to the bulb 
+H real. 
(8) mus. ack. H: Oh 
(9) mus. ack. 32 HS / laugh / 
(10) pr qued. St What on earth did you think I meant 
by ladder? 
(11, J) pr exp. H: Well, like a ladder in tights 
. 2) pr exp. I thought you meant pull it apart 
Source S=C. &H. -J. 
P Hope he's got a ladder (so we can got up to the bulb) 
pr Hope he's got a ladder so we can get the bulb out 
S real, z I+ S real, ' effected by H ly' elaborating the 
manifestation. 
H real.: I+ H real., effected by S Ip, exp. 1 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcriptions 
A50 - S9 
(f)j and H, (f), are discussing birthstones and Zodiac signs- 
(1.1 H: I was born on the 13th 
0 2ý I quite like that 
(2.1) S: Yeah 
, 2) ORIGIN Was it on a Friday as well? 
(3-1) IND. MANIFo H: I don't know 
, 2) INDo MANIF. I don't remember 
(4ol) pr erro sig, S: Ah hah 
(; 
2) 7SI was born on a Wednesday 
y H: I was born on a Sunday 
r (6) p erro sig, St Mmm 
pause 
H real. 
(7.1) mus. ack. H. - Oh 
0 2) x qued. : Did you ask me if I was born on a Friday? 
(8) x exP- prtl. S: Yeah 
(9) xr exp* H: I thought you asked me if it was frightening 
+S real. 
(10) muse ack. S: laugh / 
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Source H+C. E. H. -J. 
P Was your birthday a Friday as well as being the 13th? 
pr Was your birthday frightening? 
S real.: I+ S real. l. effected by H Ix exp. l. 
H real.: t+ H real. ' effected after reconsideration of 
conversation & S's neutral responses. 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription. 
S admitted that she had not really been sure what 
H was talking about in (3-1,3.2). 
TTPE B: +S real. +H real. +0 real. 
Basic Structure with Expansion 
B51. In H'sp (f), house after an evening out, H puts a footstool 
in front of S1sq (f)y chair, for her greater comfort. 
(1) ORIGIN S: Can I take my shoes off? 
(2) MANIF. H: No no of course you needn't take your 
shoes off 
,+S real. 
x exp. &x emph. S: (H) dear, I said CAN I take my shoes off 
& 3cr ref. not SHALL I take my shoes off 
,+ Hy 0 real. 
mus. ack. SIHIO: / laugh / 
Source Reported by S 
p Do you mind if I take my shoes off? 
pr Should I take my shoes off? 
S real., * I+ S real. ' effected by recognition of linguistic 
and cognitive inappropriacy of (2); incohesion 
of the adjacent modal auxiliaries "can" and "need"; 
anticipated permission to remove shoes rather 
than permission not to remove them. r H real.: I+ H real. t effected by S Ix exp. & emph. &x refel 
0 real.: 1+ 0 real. ' effected as per I+ S real. ' 
, Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription. 
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Basic Structure with Interactive E2Spansion 
B 52- 
(1) 
S, (f), and her husband are going with H, (f)y to an 
informal singý-song at which H's husbandy Darrell is 
to play the organ. 
ORIGIN S: Bv the wav what's Darrel wearink? 
IND. MANIF. H: I donOt know 
MANIF. I know Eddy Waring 
MANIF. Darrel Waring? 
MANIF. Never heard of him 
+ S, 0 real* 
(4-1) 
. 2) 
-3) 
-4) 
(3) mus. sig. SjO: / laugh / 
(4) x rpt. &x emph. S: What IS Darrel wearing? 
H real. 
Source s0=C. E. H. -J. 
p= What is Darrel wearing? 
Pr= What is Darrel Waring (i. e. what does he do? ) 
S real.: I+ S real. ' effected by recognition of cognitive 
inappropriacy of (4-1v 4.29 4-3v 4-4); anticipated 
response detailing clothes. 
H real. t I+ H real. ' effected by S tx rpt. &x emph. le 
0 real*: 1+ 0 real. ' effected as per I+ S'real. to 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of 
transcription. 
B53* S, (f); H, (f), escorted by 01, (m)p to a dinner party 
in the Isle of Man, has not met the others, S and 02, (m)t 
before. 
(1) ORIGIN 
(2) MANIFo 
(5) mus. ack. S, O: / laugh / 
(6.1) mus. ack. H: Oh 
. 2) mus. ack. : / laugh / 
S: Are you Manx? 
Hs No, ehq I'm divorced actually 2 S, 01,0 reaL 
(3) mus. sig. SIO 
112 
(4: 1 Ir ref. St 
2ý x exp. &x emph. s 
/ laugh / 
Not MARRIED 
I asked you are you MANX 
+H real. 
/ laugh / 
Ohp ehp sorry 
No I'm not 
z O's Are you divorced? :2zt 
No I come from Staffordshire actually 
(8) z SIH90 
112 
s/ laugh / 
(5) mus. ack. S10192 
(6.1) mus. ack. 
. 2) z 
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Source 02 = CeEeHo, -Je 
p Are you Manx? 
pr Are you. married? 
S real-i I+ S real-' effected by recognition Of cognitive 
inappropriacy of (2); anticipated response 
detailing nationality. 
H real.: '+ H real, ' effected by S Ixx ref, x exp. &x emphol. 
01 real.: 1+ 01 realol effected as per t+ S real*lo 
02real.: 1+ 02 real-' effected , as per I+ S realol. 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcriptiono 
Diversified Structure with Interactive Expansion 
B54. St (f), Hy (m)p_and 0, (f), are talking about morris-dancing, 
which H does. 
(1) 
(2) 
ORIGIN S: Where do you do this? 
MANIF. H: To make the crops grow 
Sq 0 real. 
(3) 
(4) 
MUSS sigo SIO: / laugh / 
x exp. &. x emph. 0: (S) said WHERE do you do it 
+H real. 
mus. ack. H: laugh 
z: In a tin hut in Greeba 
(5-1) 
. 2) 
Source 0-C. E. H. -J. 
p Where do you do morris dancing? r p do you do morris dancing? 
S real.: I+ S real. ' effected by recognition of cognitive 
inappropriaoy of (2); anticipated response 
detailing a place. 
H real.: I+ H real. ' effected by 0 Ix exp. &x emph. l. 
0 real.: 1+ 0 real. ' effected asRer I+ S real. '* 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription. 
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B55- St (f)t is about to collect mid-mornine drinks for her 
colleagues and is consulting H9 (f)p and 01 (f)t as to 
how many are required. 
S: I wonder if Helen will be back in time 
2ý She's gone to get her eyes tested :3 
It was at 10 o'clock 
-4) z Should I get her tea? 
(2) H: I noticed she didn't have her glasses 
on today 
(3) S: I think she's trying to get used to 
not wearing them for when they're 
away getting new lenses 
(4) H: Oh yes 
(5) ORIGIN S: Have you any idea how long it takes? 
(6.1) IND. MANIF. H: I don9t know 
. 2) MANIF. It's about two to three weeks isn't it? 
+ S, 0 real* 
(7) r p ref. prtl. S: No 
& mus. Sig. 
(8) p exp Ot The appointment 
H real. 
(9) mus. ack. H: Ohl the appointment 
(10) z 0: 1 could drink my coffee and rinse my 
flask and then we could store Helen's 
tea in it 
Source,: S=C. E. H. -J. 
P- Have you any idea how long it takes to have your 
r eyes 
tested? 
P= Have you any idea how long it takes to receive a 
now pair of glasses? 
S real.: I+ S real. ' effected by recognition of cognitive 
inappropriacy of T-6.2); anticipated response 
detailing time in minutes. 
H real.: t+ H real*t effected by 0 Op expl. 
0 real.: 1+ 0 real. t 
, 
effected as per I+ S real. '. 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription., 
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B56. 
B57 * 
S, (m)v goes into a baker's shop to buy two egg salad rolls 
and to pay for two rolls owing from the previous day; 
Hq (f), serves him; 01 (f), served him the previous day. 
(1) ORIGIN S: Can I have two egg salad rolls and 
I owe you two 
H- gives him two rolls - (2) MANIF. H: That Is thirty 
(3) x ampl. S: But I owe you two (hesitantly) 
?+0 real. 
(4) manif- rpt- Hs Yes, that's thirty 
+0 real. 
(5) pr ref. prtl. 0: No he means two rolls' 
&p exp + 32 H real, 
(1) 
IND. MANIF. HS No 
MANIF* s I'll be in Edinburgh 
,+S real. 
(3-1) 
2ý 
mus. sig. 
pr ref. 
St 
S 
Yes 
I didn't mean stay in Newcastle : 3 p exp. I meant visit Newcastle 
+ H, 01,02 rea: 
(4) x qued. prtl, Ol Well wby didn't you say that? 
(5-1) 3c ejcp., S: Well we live here but we're going to 
stay in Carlisle 
02) z It's a funny wordý stay 
(6) z 02S, In French it would be rester a, I think. 
Source Reported by S 
P Can I have two egg salad rolls and I owe you 
r 
for two rolls from yesterday 
p Can I have two egg salad rolls and I owe you 
two pence from yesterday r S real. s I+ S real. ' effected by 0 1P ref. prtl. &p exp. l. 
H real. s I+ H real. ' effected asper I+ S real. ', 
0 real.: 1+ 0 real. ' effected by recogmition of pragmatic 
inappropriacy of (2) and (4); thirty pence is 
not the price of four rolls. 
S reported that the transaction was then completed 
satisfactorily and that all participants 
realized. 
H, (f)p has lived in Newcastle and is now going to live in 
Edinburgh; By (f)p and her daughtersp 01 and 02 are H's 
friends and are about to go on holiday to Carlisle; 01 
will continue to live in the flat she formerly shared with 
H in Newcastle. 
ORIGIN S: Are you going to stay in Newcastle? 
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Source :H -- C. E. H. -J. 
Pt Are you going to visit Newcastle? 
P: Are you going to stay on living in Newcastle? 
S real.: I+ S real I effected by recognition of cognitive 
inappropriacy of (2.2); anticipated response 
relating to possible visits rather than response 
stating fact already known by S. 
H real.: I+ H real. ' effected bS spr ref. p p, exp. l. 
Olreal.: 1+ 01 real. '-effected as per I+ H real. '. 
02real.: t+ 02 real. 1'effected as per 1+ H real.. 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription. 
B58- S, (f), has been babysitting for Sy (m)v and Op (f) ; she 
had to rush from her job to babysit on time; On S and O's 
return, the conversation has been about the earlier rush. 
(1) ORIGIN St Did you have anything to eat? 
(2.1) IND. MANIF. H1 Yes thanks 
. 2) MANIF. Chocolate limes, biscuits and biscuits 
" Sy 0 real. 
(3) r p ref. prti. 0: No 
& mus. Sig. 
(4) p exp. S: I meant before you came 
(5) x ampl. 0: Did you have any tea? 
"H real. 
(6.1) mus. ack. H: Oh 
. 2) z : Yes 
*3) z : Yes I rushed through the-house collecting 
clothes and tea and then out again 
Source H-C. E. H. -J. 
p Did you have anything to eat before you came? 
pr Did you have anything to eat while you were here? 
S real.: I+ S real. ' effected by recognition of cognitive 
inappropriacy of (2*2); anticipated response 
. relating to proper meal rather than snacks in their house. 
H real. s I+ H real. ' effected by 0 Ix ampl. 1, 
0 real.: 1+ 0 real*' effected as per I+ S real. ' 
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B59 St (m); Hl (f); 
(1) ORIGIN 
(2) IND. MANIF. 
(3) IND. MAMP. 
(4) y 
09 (m); (n. b. 0-H2 )0 
S: - Is Freud still alive? 
H: No of course not 
0: No 
Ht He died ages ago didn't he? 
+S real. 
r (5) p ref S: Not Freud the man 
(6) pr err. sig. H: Uh? 
(7) P exp. Ss Freud the idea 
H, 0 real. 
(8) mus. ack. 
(9.1) mus. ack. 
. 2) mus. - ack. 
H: Oh 
0: Oh 
:/ laugh / 
Source H-C. E. H. -J. 
P Are Freud's theories still being cited? 
p Is Freud still alive? 
S real.: 1+ S real. ' effected by H ly' referring to 
Freud the man rather than the theories. 
H real.: 1+ H real. ' effected by S Op expl. 
0 real.: 1+ 0 real. * effected as per 1+ R real. ' 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription. 
B60. So (f)t is telling H, (m), and 01 (m), abouthaving hit a 
car in a car park and her subsequent argument with the 
dr iver. 
(1) ORIGIN S: and then he got fed up 
(2.1) MANIF. H: He got the polis? 
/ pause / 
. 2) manif. rpt. The police? 
prtl. 
(3-1) y S: No 
02) y I drove off 
(4) x qued. inemp. H: Didn't you say 
?+0 real* 
(5) x exp. 0: She said that he got fed up 
+H real. 
(6.1) mus. ack. HS Oh 
. 2) xr ep. I I thought you said he got the fed .* up 
Sp 0 real* 
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1 
Source Overheard by C. E. H. -J. 
P And then he got fed up 
pr And then-he got the fed (police) up 
S real.: I+ S real. ' 
, effected 
by H I. J exp. 1. 
H real.: I+ H real. ' effected by 0 tx exp. l. 
0 real.: 1+ 0 real. $ effected (i)? by recognition of 
cognitive inappropriacy of (2.19 2*2); 
anticipated response relating to driver's 
having had enough of the argument rather 
than police who have not been mentioned; 
(ii) by H lxr exp. l. 
B61. S, (f)q H, (f), oll (f), and 022 (m)v are colleagueol 
another colleague, Tom Wade, will shortly be leaving 
for a promoted post in another department. 
(1) ORIGI14 
(2) 7 
(3-1) MANIF. 
S: (H)p where does Tom Wade live? 
Olt Port Erin (quietly) 
Ht 
pr err. sig. Olt2 2 
. 2) x qued. prtl. H: 
He thinks about a month 
/ look astonished / 
Is that what you said? 
S, 0 real. 
(4) x rpt. prtl. S: Where does he live? 
+H real. 
(5-1) mus. ack. HS laugh 
*2) xr , P. S Oh I thought you said when does he leave 
,+S, oil 029 realy 
(6) mus. ack, S, H, o 
1 laugh / 
(7) z021 didn't know he was leaving 
Source S-C. E. H. -J. 
P Where does Tom Wade live? 
pr When does Tom Wade live? 
S real.: I+ S real. ' effected (i)? recognition of Cognitive 
inappropriaoy of (3-1); anticipated response 
relating to place and H Ox qued prtl*l indicates 
possible mishearing; (ii) by H Ixr exp*'* 
H real.: I+ H real. ' effected by S Ix rpt, prtlete 
Olreal. t 1+ 01 real. ' effected asper I+ S real. ' 
02 real. i t+ 02 real. ' ýffected as per I+ S real. '. 
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TYPE C:? +S real. +H real. 
Basic Structure with Expansion 
C62. S, (f)q is a shop assistant; Hq (f)q is taking her 
typewriter to be repaired; the premises in which the 
conversation takes place are divided into retail 
stationery on the ground floor and typewriter sales 
and servicing on the lst floor; S is on the ground 
floor and H is starting to go upstairs when the 
conversation begins. 
S: There's no-one upstairs 
(2) H: Oh isn't there 
H- comes back downstairs - 
(3) S: They won't be back till 2 o'clock 
H: Oh 
2) Perhaps you can help me 
*3) I've got a problem with my typewriter 
S: / shakes head / 
(5) ORIGIN S: Can't deal with it 
(6.1) MANIF. H: But I bought it here 
. 2) MANIF. It's under guarantee 
+S real. 
1) x ampl. (7 S: I don't have anything to do with them : 
2) y I'm down here 
+H real. 
Source H=C. E. H. -J. 
pI can't deal with it (it's not my department) 
pr The shop can't deal with it. 
S real.: I? +S real. ' effected by recognition of 
pragmatic inappropriacy of (6.19 6.2); 
irrespective of guarantee, the retail 
department cannot deal with repairs* 
H real.: I+ H real*' effected by S Ox ampl. 9 y'. 
Diversified Structure with Interactive Expansion 
C63. Sq (f), and Hp (f), are going to have an evening meal with 
a bizarre range of people, including George; S has just 
finished her lunchq a strange assortment of foodp while 
H is still eating hers. 
(1) ORIGIN S: This is going to be a very funny meal 
(2) MANIF, H: Yes but it's nice 
(3) y S: Well George will be all right 
+H real. 
(4) mus. ack. H: Oh that meal 
?+S real. 
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Source H=C, E. H. -J. 
p This meal this evening is going to be very funny 
pr This meal we are eating is going to be very funny 
S real.: I? +S real. ' effected by H Imus. ack. ' 
H real.: 1+ H real. t effected by S lyt specifying meal. 
C64- H, (f), gets on a bus with two friends, a man and a woman; 
the woman pays the fare for the man and herself, leaving H 
to pay her own fare; the two go through to sit down and H 
offers Sp (m), the bus driver, her fare. 
M H: Twelve please 
(2) ORIGIN S: Are you with her? 
(3) IND. MANIF. H: Yes 
/ pause 
action B - holds up three 5P pieces (part of 25P 
given by the other woman) - (4) y S: That Is for two 
(5) y H: She gave you 25P 
(6) y S: Yes that's right 
/ pause / 
(7-1) H: Twelve please 
+H real. 
. 2) mus. ack. &y Oh she was with that man 
-3) y She paid for them 
-4) y I'm paying for myself 
?+S real. 
z-action H - pays 12p and receives ticket - 
Source H=C. E. H. -J. 
p Are you travelling with her (included in the 
r 
fare she paid) 
p Are you travelling with her? 
S real.: I? +S real. ' effected by H Imus. ack. & yj yj Y, 
H real.: I+ H real. ' effected after reconsideration of 
conversation. 
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TYPE D: +S real. ?+H real. 
Basic Structure 
D65- Hy (m), is telling S, (f), about the director of an 
airport at Abu Dhabi who has been visiting the airport 
at Ronaldsway, where H and Alan Oates both work. 
Hs He offered Alan Oates a job on the spot 
(2) ORIGIN S: Where, at Abu Dhabi? 
(3) MANIF. H: No, at Ronaldsway 
+S real. 
(4) x -Empl. S: Where was the job? 
,? +H real. 
(5) Y/Z H: Abu Dhabi 
Source Overheard 
p Where was the joby was it at Abu Dhabi? 
pr Where was he when he offered Alan Oates the job? 
S real.: '+ S real. ' effected by recognition of cognitive 
inappropriacy of T-2T; anticipated response 
detailing place other than Ronaldsway. 
H real.: I? +H real. ' probably effected by S Ix ampl. 1 
Partly confirmed in subsequent discussion of 
transcription with S. 
Basic Structure with E=ansion 
D66. So (f)q and H, (m)j are talking about a man who used to fly 
a gyrooopter ; the man was killed when the gyrocopter 
crashed. 
(1) ORIGIN Ss He killed himself didn't be? 
(2) MANIF, Ht No the plane killed him 
+S real. 
(3*1) p exp. prtl. St Same thing 
*2) p exp, prti, i That was what I meant 
?+H real. 
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Source Overheard 
p He was killed when he was flying his gyrocopterl 
wasInt he? 
pr He killed himselfy didn't he? (i. e. committed 
suicide) 
S real.: I+ S real. t effected by recognition of cognitive 
inappropriacy of T-2T; anticipated response 
confirming and developing p rather than denying 
it and then re-stating it. 
H real. t I? +H real. ' probably effected by S Ip exp. 
prtl. 9 p exp. prtl. l 
Partly confirmed in subsequent discussion of 
transcription with S. 
-JDJ67, S, (f), is in O's roomý having just played squash against 
O's wife; prior to the game S was also in O's room when 
H, (m)p was there; S has won the game; H walks into the 
room. 
(1) ORIGIN S: The conquering hero returns 
(2) MANIF. H: Why am Ia conquering hero? 
+S real. 
r (3-1) p ref. prtl. S. - You aren't 
. 2) p exp am 
?+H real. 
Commentary by participant is as follows S 
By S after (1) : "I'm backq after winning" 
Source S c. C. E. H. -J, 
p The conquering hero (S) returns (I'm back after 
r winning) p The conquering hero (H) returns 
S real.: 1+ S real. ' effected by recognition of cognitive 
inappropriacy of (2); anticipated response 
relating to S as conquering hero and his squash 
gamey rather than H as conquering hero, r H real.: I? +H real. ' probably effected by Sp refe 
prtl. &p exp. 1. 
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D68. S, (f), and her husband H9 (m)q and 0 are talking about 
a stag party which H has attended; the party started 
off with a mixed crowd and then the girls went off except 
for one who remained with the men; H talked to her for 
some time while most of the men played pool. 
(1) H: I felt sorry for that girl 
(2) 0: She must have felt awful 
(3) ORIGIN SO- Wonder why she didn't stay with the 
others 
(4) MANIF. H: They were all playing pool 
+S real. 
(5) P' ref. prti. S: No I meant oh never mind 
&p exp. inemp. ?+H real. 
U. mus. sig. ) 
Y/Z H: Perhaps there was no room in the car 
Source 0=C. E. H. -J. 
p Wonder why she didn't stay with the other girls 
pr Wonder why she didn't stay with the men 
S real.: I+ S real. ' effected by recognition of cognitive 
inappropriacy of (4); anticipated response 
relating to the girls, not the men. r H real.: I? +H real. ' probably effected by Sp ref. 
prtl. &p exp inamps (mus. sig. ) 
Partly confirmed in subsequent discussion of 
transcription with S. 
Diversified Struoture with Interactive Expansion 
D69.0, (m), has been talking to S) (f), and H, (m)j about a 
boat sinking outside a local harbour; 0 moves awaV; S 
and H talk about the bad weather of the previous day, 
commenting on the rough sea and big waves. 
(1) 
(2.1) 
*2) 
(3) 
(4-1) 
, 2) 
ORIGIN St It went down very quickly 
IND. MANIF. H: Did it? 
IND. MANIF. :I don't know 
y S: Well the sea was flat calm today 
y Ht Oh yes 
y: m= 
H real. 
3ý ? mus. ack. : Oh :4? 
mus. ack. : Oh 
-5) ? mus. aok. Yes 
+S real. 
Commentary s 
Tone in (4.1) implies "as if THAT was very obvious" 
Commentary by partioipant is as follows : 
By S after (4-5) "He thought I meant the boat but I 
meant the sea" 
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Source S=C. E. H. -J. 
P The sea went down quickly 
p The boat went down quickly 
S real.: I+ S real. ' effected by change between HIs 
assertiveness in (4)1 uttered as though (3) 
was very obvious, and lack of knowledge in 
(2.11 2.2) plus hesitant I? mus. ack. 1 
utterances. 
H real.: 0? +H real. ' probably effected by 
reconsideration of conversation after S tyl 
D70. S, (f), is waiting to go and use a photocopying machine 
which she knows is being used by Op (f)9 to copy some 
material for Hp (f); 0 could have been getting Ha number 
of books and manuscripts which might have been heavyp thus 
warranting assistance from her colleague, S. 
(1) ORIGIN S: Was it quite a lot? 
(2) MANIF. H: No she's just gone down to do some 
photocopies for me 
+S real. 
(3-1) mus- sig. S: Yes 
. 2) x ampl. How much was there? 
?+H real. 
y H: Just five pages 
p exp. S: It's only because I'm waiting to go 
and do some xeroxing too 
?+H real. 
? mus. ack. H: Ah 
Source S-C. E. H. -J. 
p Did you ask her for quite a lot of xeroxing? 
pr Did you ask her for quite a lot of material? 
S real.: I+ S real. ' effected , 
by recognition of cognitive 
inappropriacy of (2); anticipated response 
detailing amount of xeroxing rather than f act 
of xeroxingy which S knows. 
H real.: I? +H real. ' probably effected by S Imue-sig-9 
x ampl. 1 or by S Ip exp. l. 
272 
D71. S, (m), and H, (m), are civil servants; H deals with 
'Appeals' in the department while David is the area 
inspector for the tovm, Peelv and works in a separate 
branch of the department; S has a bundle of papers 
relating to 'Appeals' and is looking for the right 
person to give them to. 
(1) ORIGIN S: Who deals with Appeals? 
(2) x quedo H: Peel? 
(3) x exp. prtl. S: Yeah 
(4) MANIF. H: Davi d 
+S real. 
(5) x rpt. prtl. S: APPEAL 
&x emph. +H real. 
(6.1) ? y/mus. ack. H: Oh 
+H real. 
. 2) ? pr err. sig. What? 
action H- sees bundle of papers 
?+H real. 
. 3) ? mus. ack & H: Oh they're mine 
Y/Z 
Source Overheard 
p Who deals with Appeals? 
pr Who deals with Peel? 
S real.: I+ S real. ' effected by recognition of pragmatic 
inappropriacy; S knows that David. deals with 
Peel and not with Appeals. 
H real.: I? +H real. t probably effected by S Ix rpt. 
prtl. &x emph. 1 or by reconsideration of 
conversation after (6.1) or by R 'action'. 
Partly confirmed in subsequent discussion of 
transcription with S. 
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TYPE E:? +S real. +H real. ?+0 real 
Basic Structure with Interactive Expansion 
L'72. - H, 
M9 is working as a barmaid; Sp (m), and Op (my f), 
are customers in the pub; they have been talking to H 
about what she did prior to barmaiding, yýz. a degree, 
and what she hopes to do later. 
(1) ORIGIN S: Have you done? 
(2) MANIF. H: Yes I've done 
(3-1) x ampl. S: Have you done talking? 
. 2) x ampl. Have you done working? 
(4) manif. rpt. H: Yes 
prtl. + Sp ?+0 real, 
(5) Mus. Sig. Sj'O: 1 augh 
(6) y S: Are you ready to serve us? 
+H real. 
(7) mus. ack. H: Oh sorry 
Z-aotion H- picks up empty glasses to got drinks - 
Commentary by partioipant is as follows s 
By H after (2) 1 "Finished my degree ** pleased" 
By H after (4) S "What? Puzzled" 
By H after (7) t "Ibbarrassed" 
Source :H=C. E. H--J- 
PW Have you finished talking/working (Are you ready 
r 
to serve us? ) 
P- Have you finished your degree? 
S real.: I? +S real** probably effected by cognitive 
and social inappropriacy of (2Tand (4); 
anticipated service; H responds as fellow 
customer rather than as barmaid* 
H real.: +H real. ' effected by S lyl 
0 real.: ?+0 real. ' probably effected as per I? +S realelo 
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TYPE F: - Sreal. -H real. 
Diversified Structure with Int-eractive Expansion 
F? 3- H, (m), dashing to the shops, meets S, (m), on his side of 
the road. 
(1) H: 
(2.1) S: 
. 2) ORIGIN 
(3) MANIF. H: 
(4) p exp. prti S: 
r (5) p err. sig. H: 
(6) x rpt. prtl. S: 
(7) y H: 
(8) y S: 
(9) y H: 
(10) y S: 
I can't stop because I want to catch 
the shops, but how are you ? 
Oh alright 
Have you had a funeral ? 
No but I feel as if I have 
Oh I thought you'd gone to one 
What ? 
A funeral 
No I haven't been to a funeral 
But you're wearing a black tie 
Oh I always wear a black tie 
Oh 
Source Reported by H 
Have you had a funeral? 
PF Have you had flu ? 
S real.: -S real., as evidenced by ly' utterances relating 
to topic of x, confirmed by H 
H real.: -H real., confirmed by H 
H provided the following commentary 
By H after (2.2) : "Have you had the flu? " 
By H as an afterthoughtq having subsequently realized 
the misunderstanding after the conversation ended : 
"On reflection I suddenly realized that it all started 
because I was wearing a white shirt; I always do wear 
a black tie but rarely with a white shirt" 
TYPE G:? -S real. ?-H real. ?-0 real. 
Diversified Structure with Interactive Expansion 
G74.0, (m), and H, (m), are in O's room; S, (m), enters the room; 
0 is S's supervisor. 
(1) S: 
(2) H: 
(3) S: 
*2) 
93) 
(5) 
Can I borrow (0) for a few minutes 
Yeah sure 
I'll not be a tic 
What ? 
What ? 
Oh you were talking to (H) then were you ? 
No I was just broaching the subject 
/ continued 
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G74 ... continued 
/ 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11.1) 
. 2) 
e3) 
. 4) 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
(17-1) 
. 2) 
-3) 
(18.1) 
. 2) 
-3) 
(19.1) 
. 2) 
H: A question of ownership 
S: That's right, yeah 
0: But you were saying to (H) can I just 
borrow (0) for a minute 
H: There's nothing wrong with that 
S: You weren't paying any attention 
0: 1 misinterpreted that 
Can I just borrow (0) for a minute 
I thought you were going to go on 
Can I just borrow (0) for a minute such and 
such is what I thought you were going 
to do so you eh 
S: 
0: 
S: 
S: 
0: 
(20) ORIGIN S: 
(21) IND. MANIF. H: 
(22.1)y ,r err. sig. S: p 
. 2) y 
(23.1) y 0: 
. 2) y 
-3) y 
I thought that it would be in the 
department and strolled out of the library 
for a copy of the relevant 
That's right, you've got you you you've got 
the necessary yeah you've got the 
You're just so used to me having dysphasic 
No the tonicity tonicity was wrong 
Dysphasic syntax 
Can I just BORrow 
You had the tonic on borrow, right 
You should have had the tonic on (0) 
Can I just BORrow (0) for a minute 
That's what I said 
Can I just BORrow (0) for a minute 
Yeah right 
What you should have said was can I just 
borrow (0) for a minute 
Did you understand it ? 
No not a word 
That's right that's why you said yes 
Great 
Well that's just total rot 
/ laugh / 
But he's just been teaching at school for 
a year or two 
(24) y S: It hasn't left its mark yet 
(25) y 0: It has if you say yes to anything 
Source Tape recorder 
P Did you understand my question ? 
P Did you understand the discussion on tonicity ? 
S real.: 19. -S real. #, as evidenced by S ly &pr err. sig. l. 
H real.: 19. -H real. ', as evidenced by lack of further comment 
0 real.: I? -0 real-', as evidenced by 0 lyl utterances 
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G75. S, (f), H, (m), 0 (f), 02, (f) and 03 , (m) are friends 
0 He blew up my nose and he gave me a 
headache 
. 2) It was nasty 
(2) ORIGIN S: It's supposed to be like a sort of a zephyr 
(3) y01: Well he was a phhhhh 
(4) y S: A gale 
(5) y02: Is that supposed to be romantic? 
(6) y S: It gets dogs going I believe 
(7) MANIF. H: Zeppelins aren't romantic 
(8) pr err. sig. S: Pardon 
(9) manif. rpt. H: Zeppelins aren't romantic 
(10) xr qued. S: Who mentioned zeppelins ? 
r (11) x exp. prtl. H: You just did, didn't you ? 
&x qued. 
r (12) x rpt. prtl. S: No 
(13) y01: This is one of those conversations 
r2 (14) x exp. prtl. 0: You did 
(15 )Xr exp. prtl. H: I know, but only because I thought (S) did 
& pr err. sig. 
r2 (16) x ref. prtl. 0 No, you started that one 
&X exp, 
(17 )xr ref. prtl. S: No I'm afraid not (H) 
(18) y 03: They could be thought extremely phallic 
(19) y S: What can? 
(20) y H: Phallic ? 
(21) y01: Zeppelins 
(22) y OS: Zeppelins 
(23) y01: Oh those b* things that go like that extends Ums wi e- 
Source: Tape recorder (0 
2=C. E. U. -J. 
= It's supposed to be like a sort of a zephyr 
p' = It's supposed to be like a sort of a zeppelin 
S real.: I? -S real. ', as evidenced by devices relating only to 
the source of the misunderstanding in the conversation 
H real.: 19. -H real. ', as per 19. -D real. ' 
01 real.: 19. -01 real. ', as per I? -S real. ' 
02 real.: as ker 01 
03 real.: as zer 01 
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TYPE H: +S real. -H real. 
Diversified Structure 
H76. S, (f), is H's, (m), wife; H has been to Douglas, a town 
twelve miles from their home, on airport business but has 
been unable to conclude the business. 
ORIGIN S: Oh, do you have to go into Douglas 
again tomorrow? 
(2) MANIF. H: Yes but it's all right, we're going in 
the airport car 
+S real. 
Source Overheard 
p Oh do you have to go into Douglas again tomorrow 
r 
(poor old you having to go and hang around again) 
P Oh do you have to go into Douglas again tomorrow ? 
(having to pay for the fuel for the journey) 
S real.: I+ S real. ' effected by recognition of cognitive 
inappropriac7y of (2); anticipated response relating 
to business tedium 
H real.: '- H real. ', as evidenced by conversation ending 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription with S. 
DiVersified Structure with Interactive Expansion 
H77. In H's, (f), local shop, S, (f), a visitor, is buying a 
carton of milk which is an unfamiliar shape to her 
(1) ORIGIN S: How much is it ? 
(2) MANIF. H: It's usually ten and a half p 
+S real. 
(3) p exp prtl. S: Big ones, little ones 
r (4) p err. sig. H: What ? 
Source S=C. E. H. -J. 
= How much is contained in this carton 
p= How much does this carton cost ? 
S real.: I+ S real. ' effected by recognition of cognitive 
inappropriacy of (2); anticipated response relating 
to size r H real.: '- H real. ', as evicenced by H Ip err. sig. 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription. 
TYPE I: 2+S real. -H real. 
Diversified Structure with Expansion 
178. S, (f), is describing her holiday in Edinburgh; H, (f), lives 
in Dundee, S in the Isle of Man. 
(1.1) ORIGIN S: I love walking around cities 
. 2) y It's the best way to see them 
(2.1) IND. MANIF. H: That's like me 
. 2) MANIF. love cities 
-3) y don't really 1: ike the country 
,? +S real. 
S: The country's all right if you're not 
isolated 
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Source Overheard 
FI love walking around cities 
pI love cities 
S real.: 19. +S real. ', probably effected by recognition of 
cognitive inappropriacy of (2.2); anticipated response 
relating to sightseeing techniques 
H real.: '- H real. ', as evidenced by lyl utterances 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription 
with S (I+ S real. ' could not be confirmed). 
TYPE J: +S real. -H real. +0 real. 
Diversified Structure with Interactive Expansion 
J79. S, (f), is talking to friends, H, (m) and (0, (f), about their 
son and his new accountancy firm, headed by Roy Brown 
(1.1) S: It's good that they accept him as he is 
. 2) They get the best out of him 
(2.1) H: Well they're all young you see 
. 2) There isn't an old one there 
(3) 0: There's just one 
(4) ORIGIN S: They could be young and stuffy 
(5-1) MANIF. H: When I met Roy Brown he was well dressed 
and smart and anything but stuffy 
. 2) y He was all set for a session but he had 
to go and play squash 
+ S, 0 real. 
(6) pr ref. prtl. 0: No 
& mus. Sig. 
mus. ack. S, O: - exchange glances 
Source S=C. E. H. -J. 
p They could be young and stuffy 
pr They are young and stuffy 
S real.: I+ S real. ' effected by recognition of cognitive 
inappropriacy Tf--(-5. l, 5.2); anticipated response 
relating to hypothetical character, not actual. 
H real.: I- H real. ', as evidenced by lack of further utterances. 
0 real.: 1+ 0 real. ' as Ler I+ S real. '. 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription 
j8o. S, (f), who is ill, is with H, (f), and 0, (f); as 0 speaks, 
S is about to dose herself with cough medicine. 
0: 1 wouldn't mind being ill 
(2) ORIGIN S: It's not very nice 
(3-1) MANIF. H: That's a very nice one 
. 2) yI had it when I was ill 
+S real. 
r (4) p exp. incmp. 0: Oh I thought you meant 
&p err. sig. 
(5) p exp. prtl. S: Yes I did 
0 real. 
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Source S=C. E. H. -J. 
P It's not very nice being ill 
p This cough medicine isn't very nice 
S real.: 1+ S real. ' effected by recognition of cognitive 
inappropriacy of (3-1,3.2); anticipated response 
relating to illness not cough medicine 
H real.: I- H real. ', as evidenced by lack of further utterances. 
0 real.: 1+ 0 real. ', as per 1+ S, real. '. 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription. 
TYPE K: -S real. +H real. 
Diversified Structure 
K81. Intentional 
H, (f), is S's, (m) daughter; Molly is a late-middle-aged 
cleaner where S works. 
(1.1) S: I was talking to Molly 
. 2) ORIGIN : She's in the Brownies or Cubs 
(2) MANIF. H: Bit old isn't she ? 
(3) y S: They couldn't gbt anyone else 
Source :H=C. E. H. -J. 
= She's a leader in the Brownies or Cubs 
p' = She's a member of the Brownies or Cubs 
S real.: I- S real. ', as evidenced by S lyl 
H real.: I+ H real. ' Precedes manifestation. 
+H real. 
K82. S, (m), is an accountant, brother to H, (f); Eddie is the 
licensee of the Colly Green Hotel; Iforeignerl. is Manx idiom 
for moonlighting, i. e. performing one's trade in one's own 
time rather than as part of one's job. 
ORIGIN S: I'm doing a foreigner at the moment so 
that takes up most of my time 
(2) IND. MANIF. H: How foreign ? 
(3) y S: Well, for Eddie at the Colly Green 
,+H real. 
Source H=C. E. H. -J. 
p I'm doing a foreigner at the moment ho that takes 
r up most of my 
time 
p I'm having an affiir with a faeign girl so that takes 
up most of my time 
S real.: I- S real. ', as evidenced by S ly'. 
H real.: 1+ H real. ', effected by S ly'. 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription. 
K83- S, (f), has been talking to H, (f), about someone paralysed 
in an accident several years previously. 
(1) ORIGIN S: Did you read in the Clarion this week 
a fellow called Connan ran away with all 
the prizes at the Flower Show 
(2) MANIF. H: Really! 
(3) x comp. S: In a wheelchair 
+H real. 
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Source Reported by H 
p Did you read in the Clarion this week a fellow 
r called 
Connan won all the prizes at the Flower Show 
p Did you read in the Clarion this week a fellow 
called Connan stole all the prizes at the Flower Show 
S real.: '- S real. ', as evidenced by no further comments 
after Ix comp. l. 
H real.: 1+ H real. ' effected 
, 
by S Ix comp. l. 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription. 
H provided the following additional commentary: 
By H after (1) : "Amazement that someone had swiped 
the prizes" 
By H after (3) : "In a wheel chair ? ... Impossible ... 
Someone won the prizes, someone who 
has a wheelchair". 
K84. S, (m); H, (f); S, Tim and Steven Jackson are airport staff. 
ORIGIN S: Tim and Harry were going to the Ayr 
races with Steven Jackson 
(2) MANIF. H: Where ? 
(3) x rpt. prtl. S: Ayr 
+H real. 
mus. ack. H: Oh 
Source Overheard 
p Tim and Harry were going to the Ayr races 
pr Tim and Harry were going to the air races 
S real.: I- S real. ', as eidenced by lack of further utterances. 
H real.: I+ H real. ' effected by S Ix rpt. prtl. I. 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription. 
K85. S, (f. ) is in the kitchen; H, (f), is in the adjoining room. 
(1.1) S: Hell ! 
. 2) ORIGIN My nerve ends must be getting nearer the 
surface 
/ pause 
H - goes to kitchen - 
-3) ORIGIN S: I'm becoming much more susceptible to 
(2) MANIF. H: Little niggles 
(3) x comp. S: Heat and cold 
+H real. 
(4) mus. ack. H: laugh 
Source H=C. E. H. -J. 
p My nerve ends must be getting nearer the surface; 
r 
I'm becoming muc4 more susceptible to heat and cold 
p= My nerve ends must be getting nearer the surface; 
I'm becoming much more susceptible to little niggles 
S real.: I- S real.,, as evidenced by lack of further comment. 
H real.: 1+ H real. ' effected by S Ix comp. l. 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription. 
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S, (m), Bob and James are all friends known to H, (f), who is 
S's sister; 'doing a foreigner' is Manx idiom for mohnlighting, 
i. e. performing one's trade in one's own time rather than as 
part of one's job; Bob, a builder, has been married twice; 
Surby is a village, 'the Jane' is the local maternity hospital. 
(1.1) ORIGIN S: Bob's doing a foreigner in Surby for somebody 
. 2) y The brother-in-law came over and he doesn't 
speak any English so Bob was in a mess 
-3) y He got him to the pub but the guy kept 
talking German 
. 4) y James knows a bit so they managed 
(2) IND. MANIF. H: How's his marriage 2 
(3) manif. qued. S: Which one ? 
(4) manif. ampl. H: The second 
(5) y S: She's going into the Jane in a couple of 
days time 
(6) 2nd MANIF. H: Well what about the one in Surby? 
(7) y S: No it's only a foreigner 
r (8) p err. sig. H: But .. oh God 
+H real. 
Source H=C. E. H. -J. 
F Bob's doing a foreigner (a job) in Surby for somebody 
p Bob's having an affair with a foreign girl in Surby 
for somebody 
S real.: I- S real. 19 as evidenced by S ty, utterances 
H real.: I+ H real. ' effected after re-consideration of 
conversation. 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription. 
TYPE L:? -S real. +H real. +0 real. 
Diversified Structure with Interactive Expansion 
L87. H, (f), has just started working in a Reference Library; S, 
(f), is a customer; the original manuscripts of wills are not 
issued to the public; instead, microfilms of the wills are 
issued; Episcopalian wills are indexed on yellow cards and on 
pink cards with yellow stripes while another type of will is 
indexed on white cards; H does not know about this procedure 
but 0, (m), who works in a different department of the Library, 
does; microfilms can be copied by being printed out from a 
particular microfilm- reader, as opposed to ordinary photocopying. 
ORIGIN S: Could I have a photocopy of these wills 
please 
/ pause 
(2) IND. MANIF. 1 H: Yes 
(3) y S: Now then, the yellow cards are Episcopal 
wills and the pink ones with yellow stripes 
are as well I assume 
/ continued 
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L87 ... continued / 
(If) y H: Eh 
(5-1) 
. 2) 
-3) 
. 4) 
. 5) 
(6.1) 
y 
y 
y H: 
. 2) MANIF. 
2 
('7.1) y 0: 
*2) p qued. 
(8) pr r 
ref. prtl. S: 
&p err. sig. 
y 0: 
(10.1) pr exp. S: 
. 2) p ref. 
1) pr err. ack. H: : 
2) x exp. 
(12) p exp. S: 
You're new aren't you ? 
Well I'm sure they are 
They probably ran out of yellow cards 
These are the ones I want 
If you can give me a piece of scrap paper 
I'll write them out for you and you can think 
about them 
Thanks 
gets paper and gives it to S- 
pause / 
turns to 0- 
Can we do photocopies of wills ? 
Yes, well, print-outs 
- turns to S- 
You want a print-out from the reader ? 
No 
That's how we copy wills 
I want to look at them 
I don't want a copy 
Oh sorry 
I thought you said you wanted them photocopied 
I want to look at the photocopies you have 
+0 real. 
(13) p qued. 0: The microfilms 
(14) p exp. prti. S: Yes 
+H real. 
(15-1) mus. ack. H: Oh 
. 2) mus. ack. I see 
-3) mus. ack. Sorry 
Source H=C. E. H. -J. 
p Can I have the photocopies (microfilms) of these wills 
r please 
(to look at) 
p Can I have a photocopy of these wills please (to take 
home) 
S real.: 12 -S real. ', as evidenced by S utterances and the 
fact that, being new, H may not understand, rather 
than misunderstand, the request. 
H real.: I+ H real. ' effected by 0 Ip qued. 1 and SIp exp. prt. l. 
0 real.: 1+ 0 real. ' effected by S Ip exp. l. 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription 
with 0. 
ýý'j 
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TYPE M: +S real. ?H real. 
Diversified Structure with ExDansion 
m88. H, (f), is telling S' (f), about Elaine; when Linda's 
Fellowship expired, she received more research money from a 
fund previously held by Eileen. 
(1) ORIGIN S: She wasn't the Elaine that Linda got the 
money from ? 
(2.1) y H: No that's Eileen 
. 2) MANIF. Linda didn't get the money FROM her 
+S real. 
(3 1) 
rYS: No I know : 2) p ref. prtl. :I didn't mean that 
Source S=C. E. H. -J. 
p She wasn't the Elaine that had the grant before Linda 
pr She wasn't the Elaine that Linda got the money from 
S real.: '+S real. ' effected by recognition that 'FROM' for H 
means 'gave to' rather than 'held before' 
H real.: 1 9. H real. ' (no evidence) 
Diversified Structure with Interactive Expansion 
m8g. Anne is H's, (f. ), daughter and is a fiend of S, (g); Anne 
lives in England while both S and H live in the Isle of Man. 
(1) ORIGIN S: Did Mum say that Anne rang tonight 
(2.1) IND. MANIF. H: Yes (happy) 
. 2) y Poor Anne 
-3) y She was going off to do the washing 
(3-1) y S: Aaah 
+S real. 
. 2) x ampl. Did she say, that Anne phoned ME ? 
(4.1) y H: No 
. 2) y Oh how nice 
Source S=C. E. H. -J. 
p= Did Mum say that Anne rang (me) tonight 
p= Did Mum say that Anne rang (you) tonight 
S real.: I+ S real. ' effected by H ly', giving information Anne 
had not told S. 
H real.: 1.9 H real. ' (no evidence). 
M90. S, (f), and H, (m), are talking about going back in the past 
and living in another country. 
(1.1) 
) 
ORIGIN 1 S: Would you change character ? 
.2 ORIGIN : Would you be more ruthless ? 
(2) MANIF. H: I would make Raphael and Michelangelo 
try to make them realize there's a place 
for both of them 
,+S real. 
(3-1) x12 ampl. S: Would you have a-character change in yourself? 
. 2) x rpt. Would you be more rutHess 
(4) y H: No I don't think so 
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Source S=C. E. H. -J. 
p Would you change your character 2 Would you be 
r more ruthless 
? 
p Would you change any characters ( as a prince)? 
Would you be ruthless to others ? 
S real.: I+ S real. ' effected by recognition of cognitive 
inappropriacy of (2); anticipated response relating 
to H's character, not other people. 
H real.: 12 H real. ' (no evidence) 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription. 
H could not confirm his own state of realization. 
M91. S, (f), and H, (m), are in a room adjoining the kitchen in 
which their daughter and neice are beginning to wash dishes; 
Jon is S and H's son and lives in his own home. 
(1) 
(2.1) 
. 2) 
(3-1) 
. 2) 
(4) 
ORIGIN 
MANIF. 
S: Do I hear a nice sound? 
H: No it's your daughter and your neice 
/ pause / 
(S) thought she heard Jon 
+S real. 
p exp. & 
pr err. sig. 
pr ref. prtl. S: 
x exp. 
No I didn't 
I said did I hear a nice sound 
?r mus. ack. / H: Oh 
err. ack. 
Source Overheard 
F Do I hear a nice sound (dishes being done) ? 
p Do I hear a nice sound (my son)? 
S real.: I+ S real. ' effected, by S Ip r exp. &pr err. sig. l. 
H real.: I? H real. ' 7Fno evidence) 
TYPE N:? +S real. 2H real. 
Diversified Structure with Interactive EXDansion 
N92. S, (m); H, (m), has been talking about oilmen drinking a lot. 
(1.1) ORIGIN 1 2 S: I can't drink whisky 
e2) ORIGIN Can you? 
(2.1) MANIF. H: Oh beer and whisky .. the lot 
. 2) MANIF. They'll drink anything, those men 
?+S real. 
(3 1) 1 ampl. 2 x S: Yes, but I can't drink whisky : 2) x ampl. Do you like it ? 
(4) H: / indistinct / 
(5) y S: Terrible stuff 
Source Overheard 
FI canit drink whisky. Can you 2 
p=I can't drink whisky. Do they (oilmen) ? 
S real.: 19 +S real. ' probably effected by recognition of 
cognitive inappropriacy of -(-2.2); anticipated response 
relating to H's own drinking habits. 
H real.: 1? H real. ' (no evidence) 
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N1973- S9 (f), and H, (f), are on a bus which is passing a new 
housing estate, still partly under construction. 
H: I don't like these new houses they're 
building 
. 2) They get cracks in them 
(2) ORIGIN S: I've heard that they're having trouble 
with the flat roofs 
(3-1) MANIF. H: Oh I'd never live in a flat 
. 2) y I hate them ?+S real. 
(4.1) y S: Do you ? 
. 2) x ampl. And they're having trouble with those 
flat roofs as well 
(5) y H: Are they ? 
Source Overheard 
p I've heard that they're having trouble with the flat 
roofs 
pr I've heard that they're having trouble with the flats 
S real.: 19. +S real. ' probably effected by recognition of 
cognitive inappropriacy of (3-1); anticipated response 
relating to building or roofs. 
H real.: 19. H real., (no evidence). 
TYPE 0:? S real. +H real. 
Diversified Structure with Interactive Expansion 
o94. H, (f), is both long- and short-sighted and often wears her 
glasses to see the blackboard at lectures and then takes them 
off to write notes; S, (m), has commented on this in the past; 
the lecturer always writes a complicated list of the contents 
of her lecture before commencing. 
H- gets out glasses case 
(1) ORIGIN S: Here we go again 
(2) MANIF. H: No I don't think I need them today 
(3) y S: The crazy table contents of the lecture 
+H real. 
Source :H=C. E. H. -J. 
p= Here we go again - she's writing up her list 
p= Here we go again - putting your glasses on and off 
S real.: I? S real. ' (no evidence). 
H real.: I+ H real. ' effected by S ly'. 
095. S, (m), works in Air Traffic Control and is describing his day 
at an Air Rally to his wife, H; IR. T. 1 is 'Radio Telephone'. 
S: There was a woman going round with a tape 
recorder who had official on her badge 
. 2) ORIGIN She came up to ask if she could record R. T. 
(2) MANIF. H: your what ? 
(3) x rpt. prtl. S: R. T. 
+H real. 
(4.1) mus. ack. H: laugh 
. 2) mus. ack. : Oh 
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Source Reported by 
F She came up 
p She came up 
S real.: 19. S real. -' 
H real.: I+ H real. ' 
Confirmed i 
S could not 
S and H 
to ask if she could record R. T. 
to ask if she could record our tea 
(no evidence) 
effected by S Ix rpt. prtl. '. 
n subsequent discussion of transcription. 
confirm his state of realitation. 
o96. S, (m), is a customer in a pub; H, (f), is a new barmaid who 
has hitherto only worked at lunchtimes but is about to work 
in the evenings as well 
(1) ORIGIN S: indistinct / ... lunchtime 
action H pats stomach - 
(2) MANIF. H: So it is 
(3) ?x rpt. S: They only allow you to work lunchtimes? 
+H real. 
(4) y H: Yes, well, I'm working tonight 
(5) y S: Oh are you ? 
Source H=C. E. H. -J. 
p (They only allow you to work) lunchtimes? 
p It's nearly lunchtime 
S real.: I? S real. ' (no evidence) 
H real.: 1+ H real. ' effected by S 19. x rpt. 1. 
TYPE P:? S real. ?+H real. 
Diversified Structure with Interactive Expansion 
P97. H, (m), opens his office door and sees S, (m), whose office 
is on the same floor, about to go upstairs; department mail 
is kept upstairs. 
(1) H: Hi (S) 
(2) ORIGIN S: / indistinct get my mail 
(3) MANIF. H: Oh there won't be any 
(4) pr err. sig. S: Mmm 
+H real. 
(5) p qued. H: 
(6) x rpt. prtl. S: 
(7) p qued. H: 
(8.1: ) p exp. prtl. S: 
. 2) y 
(9-1) z H: 
. 2) z 
-3) z 
Source 
p 
S real.: 
H real.: 
Oh this morning's 
Mail 
This morning's mail 
Yeah 
I haven't been in this morning 
No 
There wasn't much interesting 
You need some aubergine money 
Tape recorder 
(I'm going up 
(I'm going up 
I? S real. ' 
12 +H real. ' 
of S Ip r err. 
to) get my mail 
to) get my mail from 2nd post 
(no evidence) 
probably effected by neutral response 
Sig., * 
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TYPE Q:? S real. +H real. +0 real. 
Diversified Structure with Interactive Expansion 
S, (m), and H, (m), were at school together; H is in contact 
with fellow 'Old Boys' from the Liverpool area, ýrhile S is 
Secretary to the 'Old Boys Association' but has little personal 
contact; the conversation takes place towards the end of H's 
party; 0, (m, f). 
ORIGIN S: How's Johnny Walker 
(2) MANIF. H: Get him some more whisky 
(3) x rpt. prtl. S: Johnny Walker 
(4 )pr err. sig. H: MMM 
(5) x ampl. S: Walker, J. R. 
+ H, 0 real. 
mus. ack. H: Oh 
(7) mus. ack. S, O: / laugh / 
(8) z H: Rather sad, actually 
Source :0=C. E. H. -J. 
F= How Is Johnny Walker ? 
p= Is there any more Johnny Walker whisky left ? 
S real.: 1.9 S real. ' (no evidence) 
H real.: I+ H real. ' effected by S Ix ampl. '. 
0 real.: 1+ 0 real. ' effected as per I+ S real. '. 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion with H. 
TyPE R:? S real. +H real. ?+0 real. 
Diversified Structure with Interactive Expansion 
IDn9 
0 S, (m), is a Magistrate; H, (m) and 0, (f), are his son and 
daughter; H lives away from home; Stephen is a family friend. 
W ORIGIN S: Stephen appeared before me the other week 
(2) MANIF. H: What, for speeding ? 
?+0 real. 
(3) y S: No it was a domestic case 
?+0 real. 
(4) y 0: He's a solicitor 
+H real. 
(5) mus. ack. H: Oh he was representing someone 
Source Overheard 
P Stephen appeared before me the other week (representing 
r someone) 
P Stephen appeared before me the other ýreek (as a 
defendant) 
S real.: 1.9 S real. ' (no evidence) 
H real.: 1+ H real. ' effected by 0 1y1* 
0 real.: 19. +0 real. ' probably effected by recognition that 
manifestation treats Stephen as defendant, or by 
S tyle 
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TYPE S:? S real. ?H real. 
Diversified Structure 
S100. S, (f), and H, (f), are in a common room for which coffee 
is normally provided; for the previous four weeks there has 
been no coffee, only some attrocious tea; this situation was 
discussed by S and H at the time it bagan. 
(1) ORIGIN S: There's coffee again now 
(2) MANIF. H: Have you been off coffee then? 
(3) y S: There hasn't been any for some time 
Source Overheard 
P There's coffee again now after a spell without any 
p I'm drinking coffee again now 
S real.: I? S real. ' (no evidence). 
H real.: 19. H real. ' (no evidence). 
Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription. 
S and H could not confirm their states of realization; 
both admitted the conversation was problematic. 
S and H provided the following commentaries: 
By S after (2) : "Why has she said that ? 11 
By H after the conversation had ended : 
"I wasn't listening properly". 
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APPENDIX 2 
RELATIVE EFFICACY OF DEVICES 
1. By S 2. By H 3. By 0 
The following Tables indicate the efficacy of devices in relation 
to the number of times they are used (see Chapter VIII, pages 180-2 ). 
Where the use of a device cannot be confirmed, such as I? mus. ack. ',. 
it is here counted as having been used rather than being omitted 
altogether. 
Key 
0: 
number of times a device is used 
number of times a device 
effects realization 
number of times a device 
effects realization when used 
#separately' 
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